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Abstract: This dissertation examines the effect of long work hours (“overwork”) on 
gender inequality by examining how it affects men and women’s labor market 
outcomes. Long work hours have become increasingly prevalent in many advanced 
industrial societies and established workplace norm. By working long hours, 
employees demonstrate professional competence and work commitment, especially in 
many professional and managerial jobs. By adopting a theoretical perspective 
emphasizing gendered organizations and institutions, I argue that although seemingly 
gender neutral, the overwork norm disadvantages many women, who have less time 
available to do paid labor because they are expected to do more housework and 
perform most of the caregiving responsibilities. To demonstrate this argument, I 
conduct three empirical analyses, which apply quantitative methods to longitudinal 
data drawn from the Survey of Income and Program Participation and data from the 
Current Population Surveys, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The results show 
that overwork increases gender inequality in three important labor market outcomes: 
occupational mobility, employment, and earnings. The project has broader theoretical 
implications for the study of gender, social inequality, and organizations.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Working long hours has been increasingly common in the United States. Schor 
(1993) found that the average paid work hours in the U.S. increased by 163 hours per 
year between 1970 and 1990. This trend raised concerns in sociology and related 
fields due to the well-known negative consequences of overwork on health, family 
welfare, and leisure time (Bunting 2004; Crouter et al. 2001; Hochschild 1997; Jacobs 
and Gerson 2004; Schor 1993; Shields 1999; Spurgeon, Harrington, and Cooper 1997). 
For example, long hours of work are known to increase the risk of depression, anxiety, 
high blood pressure and cardiovascular disorders (e.g, Shields 1999; Spurgeon et al. 
1997). They are also associated with a decrease in time spent with family and negative 
parent-adolescent relationships (e.g., Crouter et al. 2001). 
Gender scholars also have an interest in the trend toward long work hours, due 
in part to the persistence of a substantial gender gap in paid work (Clarkberg and 
Moen 2001; Epstein et al. 1999; Gornick 1999; Hochschild 1997; Hochschild and 
Machung 2003 [1989]; Jacobs and Gerson 2004). Among all workers in 2000, 26.5 
percent of men worked 50 hours or more per week, compared with 11.3 percent of 
women (Jacobs and Gerson 2004 ). The gender gap in work hours leads to an earnings 
gap between men and women mainly for two reasons: (1) more women than men tend 
to work part-time positions, which results in the gender gap in weekly or monthly 
earnings (even when the same hourly rates are applied to both full-time and part-time 
work);  (2) women tend to be under-represented in occupations where the average 
work hours are longer (e.g., professional occupations), but per hour earnings tend to be 
higher in these occupations (Jacobs and Gerson 2004).  
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Among various approaches that attempt to explain the overwork phenomenon, 
the most widely accepted is to understand overwork as an established norm in the 
workplace. In many high-paying professional and managerial jobs, work hours are 
considered a proxy for workers’ commitment or their professional competence. 
Workers are assessed by their “face time,” such that those who are present at work for 
long hours are perceived to be more committed, thus rewarded by higher income and 
more frequent promotions, while those who are present at work fewer hours are 
penalized for being less committed (Blair-Loy 2003; Epstein et al. 1999; Legault and 
Chasserio 2003; Sharone 2004).  
In this dissertation, I argue that the norm of overwork systematically 
disadvantages women, who are less likely to work long hours because of the 
expectation that they will take primary responsibility for household labor with 
minimal spousal support (Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]). Although more than 
60 percent of women are in the labor force (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006a), the 
structure of the workplace still assumes the “separate spheres” arrangement, consisting 
of breadwinning men and homemaking women (Acker 1990; Hochschild 1997; 
Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]; Williams 2000). Under this assumption, the 
“ideal workers” are considered those who fully devote their time to work, free from 
other family or community obligations, as if they have full-time housewives who take 
care of them (Williams 2000). However, now that 78 percent of all married workers 
are in dual-earner households, this assumption is no longer accurate (Bond, Galinsky, 
and Swanberg 1998). Furthermore, the mismatch between the gendered assumption of 
the workplace and the reality of a changing workforce can systematically disadvantage 
women, who are still typically expected to do the majority of housework and childcare, 
even when they are employed full-time (Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]; Stone 
2007). 
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By applying the gendered notion of the ideal worker, the overwork 
phenomenon results in negative career consequences for women in at least two 
important ways. First, one way is through a workplace “push factor,” that is, while the 
workplace penalizes workers who are less likely to overwork and rewards workers 
who work long hours, the expectation of performing the larger share of the housework 
and having primary responsibility for childcare constricts women’s ability to work 
long hours. Under this system, women are likely to be evaluated poorly and 
disadvantaged in promotions and wage growth, and facing these barriers, they often 
experience difficulties in staying in the labor force or advancing to higher positions of 
organizations which offer greater earnings and other valuable resources (Epstein et al. 
1999; Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]; Stone 2007; Williams 2000).  
A more subtle, but also important way that the overwork phenomenon can 
disadvantage married women is through their husbands’ long hours of work. When 
men spend more hours at work, their contribution to household labor decreases, which 
in turn further increases women’s share of housework (Bunting 2004; Stone 2007). 
This decreases women’s availability for overwork and may even make it difficult for 
them to maintain their careers. As highlighted by Jacobs and Gerson (2004), the 
increased work hours have a greater impact on dual earner households by causing 
work-family conflict to a greater extent, and thus the family should be considered as a 
key factor in fully understanding the consequences of long work hours. Therefore, 
focusing on the effect of spousal overwork, this dissertation seeks to understand the 
effect of overwork by considering the dynamics within the family and demonstrate 
how the family’s solution to resolving the conflict can result in disadvantageous 
outcomes for women.  
To demonstrate these two paths, I conduct three empirical analyses that show 
the consequences of overwork on three important dimensions of gender inequality: 
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occupational sex segregation, earnings, and employment. The first two analyses focus 
on the first path, by which the overwork norm directly affects women in occupations 
where the overwork norm tends to be the strongest. The third analysis focuses an 
indirect path, by which the overwork norm increases the gender gap in employment 
through the spouse’s long work hours. Each analysis addresses broader theoretical 
questions of how gendered assumptions about a worker and workplace and the 
organization of workplace and family reinforce current inequality system and stall 
progress toward more gender egalitarian society. These arguments are discussed in 
Chapter 2.  
In Chapter 3, I describe the trend of the overwork phenomenon to establish the 
fact that long work hours have become more common, especially among professional 
and managerial workers. I next explore characteristics of those who work long hours 
(50 hours or more per week). In so doing, I examine spousal characteristics (income, 
work hours, and occupations) to establish that there is a great divide of spousal support 
between men and women who overwork.   
In Chapter 4, I demonstrate that long work hours reinforce occupational sex 
segregation. I first show that, at the aggregate level, occupations in which long work 
hours are the norm tend also to be those in which women’s representation is the lowest. 
I then turn to an individual level analysis to investigate one possible source of the 
correlation between overwork and segregation, specifically, that women are more 
likely than men to leave occupations in which overwork is the norm. These two sets of 
results help to evaluate whether overwork is a gendered norm that contributes to 
occupational sex segregation.  
In Chapter 5, I show that overwork contributes to increasing gender earnings 
inequality. I first examine the earnings consequences of gender-typed occupational 
mobility driven by overwork. In particular, I examine whether the earnings of women 
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who previously left occupations because of overwork decrease in the next time point. 
In this way, I can determine how much wage loss is generated by mobility that results 
from overwork. In the second analysis, I engage an important puzzle of why 
convergence in earnings between men and women has slowed. I investigate whether 
the increasing compensations for overwork contribute to widening the gender earnings 
gap. To this end, I employ a wage decomposition method, which allows me to 
formally test whether the slowdown of convergence in the gender earnings gap is in 
part explained by the increased price for overwork. 
In Chapter 6, I extend the analysis to the interaction between the workplace 
and the family. I emphasize the role of family that amplifies the effect of overwork on 
gender inequality. Specifically, I focus on the effect of spousal overwork on the 
likelihood of job quits among men and women in dual-earner households. Although 
long work hours can cause conflict between work and family for both men and women, 
men’s careers are more likely to be prioritized, while women are assumed to be 
primarily responsible for household labor. Because of these prevailing gender norms, I 
expect that spousal overwork increases women’s likelihood of quitting, but it does not 
increase men’s likelihood of quitting. In showing this, I advance the argument that 
overwork reinforces the separate spheres arrangement by reintroducing the traditional 
gender arrangement to many formerly dual-earner households. 
Lastly, in chapter 7, I draw conclusions from the findings of each of analysis 
and discuss the broader implications for theory and research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORY: GENDER AND OVERWORK  
 
Work hours have a normative aspect. Those who work long hours are 
considered more productive and committed (Epstein et al. 1999; Fried 1998; 
Hochschild 1997), and thus are rewarded with upward mobility, financial security, and 
recognition from colleagues (Blair-Loy 2003; Legault and Chasserio 2003; Sharone 
2004). Many employers are even willing to pay a wage premium to employees who 
work long hours (Altonji and Paxson 1986; Altonji and Paxson 1988). In contrast, 
when employees violate this norm, they are perceived as less committed to their 
careers, are disadvantaged in terms of promotion and reputation, and are also 
evaluated more poorly by their colleagues. This overwork norm is especially strong in 
the U.S. workforce (Jacobs, Gerson, and Gornick 2004), and it is assumed that the 
norm is inevitable or inherent in the job, but prior studies show that the work hour 
norm substantially varies across countries (Perlow 2001). I argue that the overwork 
norm is an important source of gender inequality in the U.S. labor market because it is 
built upon structurally disadvantageous conditions for women. 
Workers’ ability to devote their time to paid labor largely depends on the 
existence of someone who can take care of their non-paid work needs. For example, 
Van Echtel et al. (2009) show that both men and women are less likely to work 
overtime when they have more childcare and housework responsibilities. For this 
reason, Hochschild and Machung (2003 [1989]) argue that the necessary condition of 
working long hours is to have “backstage support” (254), which takes care of workers’ 
family obligations and other needs. Earlier, Acker (1990) argued that the notion of 
workers is gendered, by uncovering the underlying assumption existing in the 
workplace that a “worker is the male worker whose life centers on his full-time, life-
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long job, while his wife or another woman takes care of his personal needs and his 
children” (149). Similarly, the contemporary notion of the “ideal worker” is also built 
upon the male breadwinner model (Williams 2000). 
Unlike the idealized image of the “worker,” many workers in reality 
experience conflict between work and family, as the proportion of dual earner 
households has dramatically increased (Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]; Jacobs 
and Gerson 2001). Applying such an unrealistic assumption sets the stage for the oft-
noted “work-family” conflict for many contemporary families in today’s labor market 
(Clarkberg and Moen 2001; Hochschild 1997; Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]; 
Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Moen and Yu 2000).  
The work-family conflict can, theoretically, affect both men and women, but a 
prevailing gender belief differentiates the ability of men and women to work long 
hours, and makes it far more likely for women than men to change their careers when 
dual earner couples face with work-family conflicts. Gender beliefs prescribe what 
behaviors are appropriate for men and women and make individual men and women 
accountable for enacting culturally-defined appropriately gendered behaviors (West 
and Zimmerman 1987).  
Although a majority of the contemporary workforce is from dual-earner 
families, women are still expected to be do more housework and be the primary 
caregiver in most families (Crittenden 2002; Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]; 
Stone 2007). Even when a woman is on as equally demanding a career track as her 
husband, familial obligations are widely believed to be her responsibility (Berk 1985; 
Crittenden 2002; West and Zimmerman 1987). For example, women are still expected 
to do more housework (Brines 1994), do a larger share of the day-to-day aspects of 
childcare (Galinsky 1999; Maume 2008; Yeung et al. 2001), and make most of the 
major decisions about childrearing and other familial obligations (Crittenden 2002; 
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Hays 1998; Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]). Working mothers are often 
viewed negatively when their children have problems at school, or when housework is 
not done, while this social sanction does not apply to working fathers (Hochschild and 
Machung 2003 [1989]; Risman 1998). Because of the gendered expectations about 
caregiving, contemporary women spend almost the same amount of time with their 
children as several decades ago, despite the increased time they spend in paid labor 
(Bianchi 2000; Bryant and Zick 1996). 
The normative conception about breadwinning also affects women’s careers 
negatively. Despite the increased numbers of dual-earner families, the expectation of 
male-breadwinning remains dominant ideology in most families (Hochschild and 
Machung 2003 [1989]; Potuchek 1997; Stone 2007; Townsend 2002), and those men 
who fail to maintain primary breadwinner status are often seen as less successful and 
are less respected by their family, friends, and neighbors (Potuchek 1997; Schwartz 
1994; Townsend 2002). Also, the normative expectation that emphasizes the male-
partners’ breadwinning status leads many dual-earner couples to resolve work-family 
conflicts in a way that they prioritize the man’s careers even when the woman’s job 
brings as much income to the family as the man’s job (Hochschild and Machung 2003 
[1989]; Stone 2007). 
Men have increased their engagement in family life, compared to men several 
decades ago (Bianchi 2000). However, perhaps because of this gendered expectation 
operating within the family, their contributions to childcare and housework are still 
limited. For example, research shows that the increase of men’s contributions to 
childrearing is mostly on weekends rather than during the work week (Galinsky 1999; 
Yeung et al. 2001). Even when men ideologically support their wives’ paid work, the 
support often does not lead to the substantive contributions to childcare and 
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housework because of their own workplace that also expects them to work long hours 
(Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]; Stone 2007).  
In summary, given the gender beliefs operating within the family, the norm of 
overwork assumes the particular organization of paid work and unpaid household 
labor, in which men are primarily engaged in paid labor, and women are responsible 
for unpaid household labor. Under this assumption, women, who are in the structural 
positions that limit their availability for paid work, are more likely to be disadvantaged 
by the overwork norm. Women have less time for paid work because they are under 
the normative expectation to be the ideal caregivers, which requires constant presence 
for the family members. They are also less likely than their male counterparts to 
receive spousal support for their paid work, which is a critical condition of being the 
“ideal worker.” Therefore, I expect that overwork result in negative career outcomes 
for women in today’s labor market.  
 
Overwork and the Motherhood Effect 
The expectation that women do more housework, a tendency to prioritize male 
partners’ careers, cognitive bias that stereotypes mothers, and childless women as 
“potential mother,” (Williams 2003) apply to both mothers and childless women, but  I 
expect a more dramatic gender effect among workers who have children. While 
having a job constitutes the core ideology of fatherhood, constant availability for the 
children is a core component of ideal motherhood (Hays 1998; Townsend 2002). 
Furthermore, while the workplace increasingly demands workers to fully devote their 
time to work, the norm of parenting also entails increasingly more intensive care than 
in the past (Hays 1998; Lareau 2003). Hays (1998) describes today’s working mothers 
as individuals who are expected to fulfill two “contradictory cultural images of 
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mothers who selflessly nurture their children and businessmen who selfishly compete 
in the paid labor force” (3). 
Research also suggests that women with children may be penalized more than 
other workers for not being at work. Correll, Benard, and Paik (2007) found that 
mothers’ presence and punctuality are more harshly scrutinized. In their laboratory 
study, the participants allowed mothers fewer days of being late or leaving work early 
to meet the hiring standard, compared to childless women or fathers. This is because 
people often associate women’s absences with their childcare responsibility and 
maternal status, which are believed to be in conflict with the “ideal worker” image. 
Similarly, while many women pursue both their careers and family life, they are often 
perceived as either exclusively work-oriented or family-oriented (Garey 1999). This 
categorization assigns more women to the family-oriented category than are actually 
in it. While this assumption also applies to childless women, it is activated more 
strongly for mothers because caregiving image is more salient for mothers, which 
results in biased estimates of their ability and commitment  (Correll et al. 2007). 
While mothers are more likely to be penalized for working fewer hours than 
other workers, research also suggests that mothers could still be penalized even if they 
work long hours (Heilman 2001; Rudman and Glick 2001). Rudman and Glick (2001) 
found that women with achievement-oriented qualities tend to be seen as “selfish” and 
“interpersonally hostile,” and thus are evaluated as less suitable for managerial 
positions. A similar bias may operate for mothers who work long hours. Women with 
children are often expected to be more caring and communal, while overwork is an 
achievement-oriented behavior (Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick 2004; Ridgeway and Correll 
2004). Deviant from this expectation, overworking mothers may be perceived 
negatively. 
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In summary, mothers who overwork are more likely to experience conflict 
because of the expectations to fulfill the “ideal mothers” and “ideal worker” roles at 
the same time. The cultural ideologies of these titles are based on the separate spheres 
assumption, and thus, both are structurally difficult to earn simultaneously. Stone 
(2007) notes that in the workplace, today’s working mothers are expected to make 
their professional decisions without considering their caregiving responsibilities, and 
in the family, they are expected to perform “intensive mothering” (Hays 1998:6), as if 
they do not have paid jobs. While mothers are situated in two conflicting norms, the 
expectation for women with children to be good mothers is much stronger than the 
expectation to be good workers. Penalties can remain even when working mothers 
behave like the ideal worker, for this reason. All of these factors place more pressure 
on women to leave the labor force facing work-family conflicts and discriminatory 
work environment.  
Despite the insights into the gendered aspects of overwork, previous studies 
have not provided direct evidence to show the negative effects of overwork on 
women’s career outcomes. In this dissertation, I show how overwork contributes to 
gender inequality in three important ways: occupational sex segregation, earnings, and 
employment. Below, I discuss each outcome in more details.  
 
Overwork and Occupational Sex Segregation 
Despite the entrance of increasing numbers of women into traditionally male-
dominated occupations, occupational sex segregation remains a persistent feature of 
the American labor market (Charles and Grusky 2004; Petersen and Morgan 1995; 
Reskin 1993; Weeden 2004). Men and women tend to hold in different types of jobs 
(Charles and Grusky 2004; Jacobs 1989; Petersen and Morgan 1995; Reskin and 
Hartmann 1986; Reskin and Roos 1990). The jobs that men typically hold pay higher 
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earnings and offer better access to other important labor market resources, such as 
authority and power, while the jobs typically held by women are less valued in the 
labor market (Jacobs 1992; Petersen and Morgan 1995; Reskin and Roos 1990). For 
this reason, occupational sex segregation has been considered an important source of 
gender inequality. Indeed, Petersen and Morgan (1995) found that about 64 percent of 
the gender wage gap is explained solely by occupational sex segregation. While many 
scholars have attempted to identify the root causes of occupational sex segregation, 
our understanding of its underlying mechanisms still remains incomplete. In this 
dissertation, I argue that long work hours have a different impact on mobility 
decisions of men and women in male-dominated occupations and contribute to 
occupational sex segregation at the structural level. 
While long work hours may constrain availability for paid work of workers 
across occupation, prior research suggests that the gendered nature of overwork is 
more prominent in male-dominated occupations (Committee on Maximizing the 
Potential of Women in Academic Science and Engineering 2006; Roth 2003; Stone 
2007; Xie and Shauman 2003). Roth (2006) found that on Wall Street, the 
breadwinning man-homemaking woman arrangement is a dominant family type, and 
women on Wall Street reported the difficulties of competing with their male 
counterparts, who have disproportionately more spousal support and more time 
availability for paid work. Similarly, women in many high-level positions in science 
and engineering have also reported that competing with men who can spend long 
hours at work is one of the major difficulties they face in these fields (Committee on 
Maximizing the Potential of Women in Academic Science and Engineering 2006; Xie 
and Shauman 2003). The overtime hours are also higher among blue-collar workers, 
such as production workers and vehicle operators, than service or clerical workers 
(Carr 1986; Hetrick 2000; Mansfield et al. 1991). In these occupations, the norm that 
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all workers behave like male workers is stronger, and when workers do not meet this 
expectation, it oftentimes creates a workplace atmosphere that does not favor workers 
who are deviant from this expectation (Williams 2000). Perhaps because of the 
combination of unequal availability for overwork of men and women and the stronger 
pressure to overwork in male-dominated occupations, Maume and Houston (2001) 
found that women in male-dominated occupations are more likely than women in 
more female-dominated ones to report work-family conflict, while gender composition 
of the workforce does not affect men’s perception of work-family conflict. 
To resolve the work-family conflict, women in male-dominated fields often 
look for solutions such as reducing their work hours or using other flexible work 
arrangements, if available. However, the strong norm about work hours in male-
dominated occupations inhibits the utilization of these flexible arrangements. Women 
may choose the “mommy track,” i.e., work part-time, and change jobs to ones that 
require less travel, as solutions to work-family conflict (Crittenden 2002; Gerson 
1986; Hochschild 1997; Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Stone 2007). However, women who 
work part-time are often no longer taken seriously because it signals that they no 
longer conform the norm of the ideal-typical male worker (Bunting 2004), and are 
perceived as “occupational deviants” (Epstein et al. 1999:25). In many professional 
occupations, employers or bosses often refuse women’s request to work part-time 
(Stone 2007).   
Certainly, male-dominated occupations tend to offer more flexibility in work 
schedules and locations than female-dominated occupations do, which should help 
decrease work-family conflicts (Glass and Camarigg 1992; Weeden 2005). However, 
flexible work policies are often offered only in a limited number of situations, and 
furthermore, workers are discouraged to use these policies because of the stronger 
normative pressure of overwork  in male-dominated occupations (Epstein et al. 1999; 
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Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Maume and Bellas 2001). For example, Roth (2003) notes 
that even when work-family policies are implemented in many Wall Street firms, they 
are often only limited to childbearing, but are not applied to childcare. Flexible work 
policies are used by women in clerical occupations more frequently because workers 
in professional occupations are afraid of being penalized for using these policies 
(Epstein et al. 1999; Fried 1998). In the absence of formal policies, men tend to use 
flexible schedules more than women do (Weeden 2005). This may in part because 
men tend to be the jobs that allow more autonomy in schedules, but also because 
women’s presence is more strictly scrutinized at work, and so they use flexible hours 
less frequently than men. 
Based on this discussion, I expect that women in male-dominated occupations 
are more likely to leave male-dominated occupations because of the strong normative 
expectation of working excessive hours and the greater penalty for deviating from this 
norm. Women may move to more female-dominated occupations, where the norm of 
working long hours is weaker, or leave the labor force entirely. In contrast, I do not 
expect long work hours to affect men’s careers in the same ways because, although 
they face conflict between work and family, they do not bear the same pressure to be 
the primary caregiver. Because the key factor that generates the gendered consequence 
of overwork in male-dominated occupations is caregiving responsibility, I expect that 
childless women will not be affected by long work hours.1 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Childless women are free from the responsibilities of childrearing, but they may still be expected to 
perform primary role in elder care (e.g., Kramer and Kipnis 1995). However, the proportion of women 
involved with elder care is relatively small, compared to childcare, and thus I do not expect that elder 
care drive the caregiving effect.  
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Overwork and Gender Earnings Inequality 
 Overwork may also help to maintain gender inequality in earnings. I expect 
that not only does overwork increase the attrition of women from male-dominated 
occupations, but this mobility also result in increasing gender earnings inequality. The 
obvious way is that fewer work hours result in lower weekly, monthly, or annual 
earnings, even if the same hourly rates are applied. The other way is that per hour 
earnings tend to be higher in jobs where average work hours are longer. Prior studies 
have shown that the average wages are lower in occupations with higher women’s 
representation (Baron and Newman 1990; Cohen and Huffman 2003; England 1992; 
England et al. 1988; Kilbourne et al. 1994). Therefore, one may expect that moving 
from male-dominated to female-dominated occupations results in a decrease in 
earnings through the second way. Although prior research has shown that occupational 
sex segregation is a major source of the gender earnings gap (e.g., Petersen and 
Morgan 1995), it has not been shown how much of this type of mobility is motivated 
by overwork and what the earnings consequence generated by this mobility is. 
Therefore, once I establish that the prevalence of overwork in male-dominated 
occupations results in disproportionately higher rates of women’s attrition, I also 
expect to find that this mobility generates earnings loss. 
While mobility from male-dominated to female-dominated occupations driven 
by overwork may result in a decrease in earnings for both men and women, I expect 
earnings loss to be greater for women than for men. Prior research suggests that the 
wage penalty associated with being in a job with a higher proportion of women is 
greater for women than for men (Aiba and Wharton 2001; Budig 2002; Cohen and 
Huffman 2003; Huffman, Velasco, and Bielby 1996). The gender wage gap also tends 
to be larger in female-dominated occupations than in male-dominated occupations 
(Cohen and Huffman 2003). Scholars tend to attribute this to the “glass escalator” 
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effect, which describes structural advantages that men experience in female-dominated 
occupations. While women in male-dominated jobs tend to experience lack of social 
support and the exclusion from important social network (Kanter 1977), this “token 
effect” does not apply to men in female-dominated occupations. On the contrary, men 
in female-dominated occupations often experience structural advantages in hiring and 
promotions, and receive better workplace support (Acker 1990; Taylor 2010; Williams 
1989). Perhaps because of the relative advantages of men in female-dominated 
occupations, the wage penalty associated with female-dominated jobs often decreases 
or even disappears for men who work in female-dominated occupations (Aiba and 
Wharton 2001; Budig 2002). 
Men who previously worked long hours in the male-dominated occupations 
may experience greater glass escalator effects because they have the reputation that 
they are committed workers. Furthermore, the reasons why these men move to female-
dominated occupations may be different from their female counterparts, who tend to 
leave male-dominated occupations because they find it difficult to meet the workplace 
demand for overwork and the family demand for “intensive mothering” at the same 
time (Hays 1998). More men than women may change jobs for job-related reasons, 
instead of reconciling work and family, and job-related mobility tends to be positively 
associated with subsequent earnings in part because it improves employer-worker 
match (Bartel and Borjas 1981; Jovanovic 1979). Conversely, given that the ideal 
worker norm, those who change careers, reduce their work hours, take flexible 
schedules, or use family policies experience wage penalty (Epstein et al. 1999; Fried 
1998; Glass and Noonan 2008). This suggests that women’s mobility to female-
dominated occupations may generate higher wage penalties, compared to that of men. 
Furthermore, even when women change their jobs for non-familial reasons, they may 
still suffer from employers’ cognitive bias that leads employers to think their mobility 
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as a result of familial needs. This is because gender and motherhood status are 
strongly attached to female workers as status characteristics (Ridgeway and Correll 
2004). For these reasons, I expect wage penalty associated with mobility to female-
dominated occupations driven by overwork to be greater for women. 
In the earnings chapter, I also evaluate the impact of overwork on the wage 
structure and gender earnings inequality at the aggregate level. I expect that the returns 
to overwork have increased. And if returns to overwork increase, I expect that 
overwork widens the gender earnings gap, given the substantial gender gap in work 
hours.   
Increased work hours in more prestigious jobs may widen the earnings gap 
between overwokers and non-overworkers. Work hours tend to be longer in the higher 
status positions and in larger corporations, both of which tend to pay higher wages. 
Landers, Rebitzer, and Taylor (1996) found that in a large law firms, around 90 
percent of partners say that long work hours are one of the important assessment 
criteria of determining one’s promotion to the partner positions. In a study of a large 
corporation, Fried (1998) shows that although the company offers a family leave 
policy, upper-level managers rarely use it. Roth (2003) also confirms the detailed job-
level segregation associated with work hours among investment bankers on Wall 
Street. Among top firms, women are substantially less represented in positions above 
the vice-president rank and jobs in corporate finance whereas they are over-
represented in lower rank positions and jobs in equity research or public finance. In 
her sample, women’s average weekly work hours are about 4 hours lower than their 
male peers. These studies suggest that this finer-level job segregation may be stratified 
by the extent to which the overwork norm is strong, and therefore, the “glass ceiling” 
effect may be explained by overwork.   
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The tendency of working long hours in these prestigious jobs has become more 
common because the international competition has increased and, as a result, 
individuals’ perception about job security has decreased (Jacobs and Gerson 2004; 
Maume and Bellas 2001; Newman 1994; Schor 1993). In contrast, work hours 
decreased in many lower-income jobs over the past three decades (Jacobs and Gerson 
2004). This suggests that the wage gap between overworkers and non-overworkers 
may have increased, as work hours in more prestigious jobs have increased.  
Within jobs, employers and clients may be willing to pay higher wages for 
overworkers, all else being equal. Prior research suggests that employers, colleagues, 
and clients consider those who can be on call anytime more competent and easier to 
work with (Epstein et al. 1999; Hochschild 1997; Roth 2003). Under this assessment 
system, overworkers are more likely to be rewarded with more job opportunities and 
wage promotions and also be able to build a good reputation. In contrast, workers who 
provide fewer hours of “face-time” may suffer from lack of career opportunities and 
the wage penalty, and a reputation that they are less committed, which may affect 
wages in their subsequent jobs. This bifurcation has become stronger as competition 
increases especially with the market expansion to the global economy (Jacobs and 
Gerson 2004; Maume and Bellas 2001; Schor 1993). 
Both the finer-level job segregation (overworkers are positioned in the jobs 
that tend to pay higher earnings), and within-job compensation (overworkers are 
preferred and rewarded better even within job level) suggest that the wage premium 
for overwork has increased over the years. I expect that increased pay for overwork 
widened the gender earnings gap. In Chapter 5, I demonstrate this empirically. 
Showing the effect of overwork on gender earnings inequality may also help to 
address an important puzzle of why we see the “slow convergence” of the gender 
earnings gap in recent years. Many studies find that the closing the gender earnings 
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gap has slowed in the 1990s (e.g., Blau and Kahn 2006). As we will see, this stalled 
progress continues in 2000s. As noted by Blau, Brintton and Grusky (2006), the 
slowed progress may be due to the fact that gender inequality is deeply embedded in 
social institutions. Gendered institutions, such as the workplace and family, constantly 
create new sources of gender inequality in various forms (Acker 1990; Ridgeway 
1997). I argue that overwork is one important countervailing factor that hinders wage 
convergence in recent years. 
 
Spousal Overwork and Employment 
So far, I examine the ways in which the overwork phenomenon can result in 
negative career consequences for women through their own overwork or the norm of 
overwork in their own workplace. However, overwork can affect women who 
themselves do not necessarily work long hours or are not in the occupation where the 
norm of overwork is strong. Overwork can negatively affect these women’s careers 
through their spousal overwork.  
As discussed earlier, facing work-family conflicts, men’s careers are more 
likely to be prioritized, while women are assumed to be primarily responsible for 
household labor, even when earnings of men and women are equal (Becker and Moen 
1999; Spain and Bianchi 1996). This normative expectation disproportionately 
increases the expectations for women’s quitting. While men’s quitting or going part-
time is viewed negatively due to the expectation that men should financially support 
the family, women’s quitting is often expected as a family strategy to reconcile work 
and family (Epstein et al. 1999; Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]; Townsend 
2002). In addition, employed women are more socially sanctioned than employed men 
when housework remains unfinished or their children have problems at school (Brines 
1994; Epstein et al. 1999; Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]). Women themselves 
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also feel more responsible for and guilty about their occasional absence from their 
family (Becker and Moen 1999; Crittenden 2002; Gerson 1986). 
Overwork has a crossover effect as well. As men increase their work hours, 
this constrains their availability for caregiving responsibilities (Hochschild and 
Machung 2003 [1989]; Stone 2007). Further, they might expect more support from 
their wives for their own overwork, restricting their wives’ availability for paid work 
even more. Legault and Chasserio’s (2003) study of engineers and managers, for 
example, found that approximately 30 percent of male workers interviewed who 
experienced conflict between work and their family life believed that their wives 
should provide more support for their work. When faced with increased work hours, a 
normative expectation of men’s and women’s roles can be reinforced.  
While women are more likely to change their careers as a familial solution, I 
expect that men are less likely to do so because breadwinning is a central component 
of men’s masculine identity and the notion of fatherhood (Townsend 2002). Indeed, 
the ideology of men’s breadwinning is so strong that even when wives’ jobs bring in 
higher incomes to the family, men are still likely to perceive themselves as the primary 
provider (Gornick and Meyers 2003; Potuchek 1997; Stone 2007). Similarly, if men 
have spouses who have demanding jobs and thus spend more time at work than they 
do, it may threaten their masculine identity as the primary breadwinner in the family, 
and they often compensate by reaffirming traditional gender norms. Brines (1994) 
found that men who are economically dependent on their wives tend to do less 
housework as their dependency increases. Similarly, men whose spouses work long 
hours may also experience a threat to their masculinity, and therefore are less likely to 
quit their jobs, even though their quitting makes more sense economically. Deutsch 
and Saxton (1998) found that when women earn a higher rate of pay, their husbands 
tend to put in more hours so that they earn more than their wives. This shows that men, 
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under the workplace norm of overwork and expectation of being the primary 
breadwinner, may not quit in response to their wives’ overwork. Therefore, I 
hypothesize that husbands’ long work hours increase the likelihood of women’s 
quitting, while wives’ long work hours do not result in an increase in the likelihood of 
men’s quitting. 
The gendered effect of spousal overwork is likely to be exacerbated for women 
in professional and managerial occupations. Not only does the greater pressure of their 
own long work hours make it difficult for professional women to maintain their 
careers, but also overwork on the part of their spouses makes it even more difficult to 
maintain their careers compared to non-professional women. Because professional 
women are more likely to marry professional men, who are also under the pressure of 
the norm of overwork, professional women are even less likely to receive spousal 
support from their husbands (Stone 2007; Xie and Shauman 2003). Further, 
professional men may expect spousal support for their own overwork. For this reason, 
Roth (2006) suggests that the breadwinner-homemaker arrangement remains very 
common among workers on Wall Street. The ideology of “intensive mothering” is also 
more common among families of professional workers (Hays 1998; Lareau 2003). 
Laureau (2003) suggests that parenting in middle-class families consists of the 
“concerted cultivation” of children through organized leisure activities with intense 
parental involvement. With scarce spousal support and a more intensive form of 
parenting, professional women who have children may experience more difficulties in 
staying in the labor force than other women.  
In contrast, professional men do not face the same pressure. When men have 
“decent jobs,” their careers are even more likely to be prioritized over their wives’ 
careers (Becker and Moen 1999; Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]; Kanter 1977; 
Pleck 1985). Stone (2007) found that women with professional husbands tend to defer 
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to the priority to their husbands’ careers over theirs, even when their careers are 
equally high-achieving (Stone 2007). Pyke (1996) describes this prominence of the 
prioritization of professional men’s careers as the “hegemony of the male career” to 
highlight the fact that the importance of these men’s careers is not questioned by either 
themselves or their wives. Also, professional men’s careers are frequently used as a 
rationale for their lower contributions to childcare or other housework, while working 
class men are more likely to be contested by their wives when they are less engaged in 
these activities. Therefore, it is less likely to see professional men quitting in response 
to their wives’ overwork, compared to non-professional men. 
Family income can differentiate the spousal overwork effect for professional 
and non-professional families. Because professional women are more likely to be in an 
economically affluent household, their quitting may not have a decisive impact on 
their family’s financial situation. Stone (2006) notes that husbands’ higher earnings 
are a necessary precondition that enables high achieving women leave their jobs. 
Gerson (1985) also found that young women who face difficulties in promotion are 
more likely to quit when they are married to men who have higher earning power. In 
contrast, non-professional women tend to experience more economic restrictions. 
When women’s income is essential for family wages, their employment decisions may 
be restricted by this economic factor more than the normative pressure of being ideal 
caregivers. Also, since many workers in non-professional jobs are at higher risk of 
unemployment (Jacobs and Gerson 2004), this can also limit the ability for non-
professional women to quit. Therefore, I expect that spousal overwork has a greater 
effect on the odds of quitting for professional women than for non-professional 
women, while professional men are less likely to be affected by their wives’ overwork 
than non-professional men.  
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In summary, building upon the separate spheres assumption, the overwork 
norm disadvantages many women, who have less time available to do paid labor 
because they are expected to do more housework and perform most of the caregiving 
responsibilities. Based on this theoretical approach, I explore a way in which 
overwork affects women’s careers through not only their own overwork but also 
through that of their husbands. In next chapters, I will empirically demonstrate the 
gendered consequences of overwork. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WHO WORKS LONG HOURS? 
 
Who overworks? Previous studies indicate that although long work hours have 
increased over the past few decades (Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Schor 1993), this 
tendency has not applied to all workers.  For example, Jacobs and Gerson (2004) 
suggest that the overwork phenomenon is more frequent among workers with 
prestigious jobs, whereas in the lower-income jobs, “underwork” (working fewer 
hours than desired) is more common because workers cannot find full-time jobs. 
Furthermore, the division of those who work long hours and those who do not are also 
closely related with gender (Epstein et al. 1999; Hochschild 1997). The prevalence of 
long work hours is based on the male-breadwinning model, and so women, especially 
women with children, are less likely to work long hours. In this chapter, I examine the 
trend of work hours to show that overwork is increasingly common, and this trend is 
especially prominent among professional and managerial workers. I also explore 
characteristics of overworkers, including those of overworkers’ spouses, to establish 
the gender difference in conditions under which men and women overwork. 
 
Data 
 I utilize two data sources to describe the trend of overwork and describe the 
characteristics of overworkers. I use data from the Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups 
of the Current Population Survey (CPS) to describe the trend of average work hours 
and the proportion of those who work 50 hour more hours per week. CPS offers a 
wide range of years (1979 to 2008), which is effective in showing longer term trends. I 
then use two years’ data (1996 and 2001) from Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP) to describe characteristics of overworkers. The SIPP offers 
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important information such as work experience measures and spousal characteristics 
that are not asked in the CPS data. These two data sources are used for the empirical 
analyses in later chapters, in which I describe them in more detail (see data sections in 
Chapters 4 to 6).  
 
Trend of Overwork 
 Figure 3.1 shows the trend of the average of weekly work hours for men and 
women. Women’s average weekly work hours increased throughout the years from 
35.6 hours in 1979 to 37.0 in 2008. Men’s average weekly work hours, by contrast, 
remain steady in all years: 41.7 in 1979 and 41.3 in 2008. Because women’s average 
work hours have increased while those of men’s did not change, the overall gender 
gap narrowed slightly. 
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Figure 3.1. The average weekly work hours of men and women 
The distribution of work hours, however, has changed dramatically (see Figure 
3.2).  Consistent with Jacobs and Gerson (2004), men’s standard deviation in work 
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hours increased in earlier years, perhaps as a consequence of restructuring. However, 
more recent years (after mid 1990s) show a decrease in standard deviation of weekly 
work hours, indicating that inequality between the top and the bottom of the 
distribution in work hours decreased. Also, Figure 3.2 shows a clear gender difference 
in distributional changes of work hours. Unlike men, the standard deviation for 
women decreases throughout the years, reflecting the fact that the proportion of 
women working full-time hours increased. Although the divergent pattern of work 
hours has weakened in recent years, the distribution shows more changes than are 
shown in average work hours. Below, I examine the changes at the top and at the 
bottom of the work hour distribution more closely. 
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Figure 3.2. The standard deviation of weekly work hours  
men 
women 
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Figure 3.3. The percent of workers whose weekly work hours 50 hours or more 
 
Figure 3.3 examines the gender gap in the percentage of those who work 50 
hours or more per week, which represents the group of workers who are at the top of 
the work hour distribution. In 1979, 14.8 percent men worked 50 hours or more; by 
the late 1990s, the percent reached its peak to 19 percent; by 2000s, the percent of 
overworking men decreased to 16.5 percent. Despite the decrease of overworking men 
in 2000s, the longer term pattern indicates that percentage of overworkers increased. 
Women show a similar pattern, although fewer women worked 50 hours or more: 3.1 
percent of women in 1979 worked 50 hours or more, 7.1 percent in 2000, and 6.4 
percent in 2008. It shows that while the percent of overworkers increased over the 
years both for men and women, the gender gap in the percent of overworkers remained 
substantial. The size of the gap increased during the 1990s and decreased in 2000s, 
remaining stable overall. The gender difference in the percentage of overworkers was 
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11.7 percentage points in 1979, and it remained steady, as a 12.1 percentage point 
difference in 2008 indicates. 
A supplementary analysis (not shown) suggests that the decline of the gender 
gap in work hours shown in Figure 3.1 may be driven by narrowing the gender gap in 
the proportion of part-time workers. A larger percentage of women than men worked 
part-time hours in all years, but the percentage of women who work part-time hours 
decreased over time, unlike men, whose part-time proportion slightly increased. In 
1979, 24 percent women worked part-time hours, while 6 percent men did (18 
percentage points difference); in 2008, 21 percent women, and 8 percent men worked 
part-time hours (13 percentage points difference). The gender gap narrowed in these 
two time points by approximately 5 percentage points.  
Figure 3.4 shows the trend of percentages of overworkers by occupation. For 
this analysis, I use data of years from 1983 to 2002, in which compatible occupation 
codes are available (1990 Census occupation code). The figure indicates that 
professional and managerial occupations are composed of a higher proportion of 
workers whose weekly work hours are 50 hours or more. In 1983, approximately 16 
percent of workers in professional and managerial occupations worked 50 or more 
hours per week, which is more than two times greater than most of other occupations. 
For example, only 4.5 percent of workers in service occupations, and 6 percent of 
workers in “technical, sales, administrative occupations” worked 50 hours or more per 
week in the same year. Both “production, craft, repair occupations” and “operator, 
fabricator, labor occupations” are also represented by smaller proportions of 
overworkers, compared to professional and managerial occupations. The percentages 
in these occupations increased rapidly until the late 1990s, when more than 10 percent 
of workers worked 50 hours or more per week in both occupational groups.  
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Figure 3.4. The percent of workers whose weekly work hours 50 hours or more by 
occupation 
 
The only exception here is the group that consists of farming, forestry, and 
fishing occupations. Until 1991, the greater percentage of workers in this occupational 
group worked 50 hours or more per week than workers in professional and managerial 
occupations. However, this percentage decreases rapidly, which perhaps corresponds 
to the rise of the corporate agriculture industry and decline of the family farming. 
Professional and managerial occupations, in contrast, show an increasing pattern. The 
percent of overworkers in professional and managerial occupations peaks in the late 
1990s with approximately 22 percent of workers who worked 50 or more hours per 
week; the percentages declines slightly in 2001 and 2002, years of which coincide 
with the early 2000s economic recession. Still, more than 20 percent of professional 
and managerial workers worked 50 hours or more in these years, while all other 
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occupational groups show a much smaller percentage of overworkers. Many other 
occupational groups, such as “technical, sales, and administrative occupations”; 
“production, craft, and repairs occupations”; “operators, fabricators, and laborers,” 
also show increasing patterns of the percentages of overworkers, although the overall 
overworker representation in theses occupations is lower than that in professional and 
managerial occupations. This confirms Jacobs and Gerson (2004) who argue that the 
overwork phenomenon is more common among workers in most prestigious jobs.   
 
Who Works Long Hours?  
 Table 3.1 compares the characteristics of overworkers and non-overworkers. 
First of all, women are less represented in the overwork group: women are 52 percent 
of non-overworkers but only 27 percent of overworkers. Women’s lower 
representation in the overworker group appears to be associated with marriage and 
parental status. Marriage is less common among overworking women, compared to 
non-overworking women: married women consists of 15 percent of overworkers, but 
they consist of 30 percent of non-overworkers. In contrast, marriage is more common 
among overworking men, compared to non-overworking men: married men consist of 
53 percent of overworkers, but they consist of 27 percent of non-overworkers. The 
percentage of women who have children is also lower among overworkers, as 
compared to non-overworkers: 10 percent of women have children among 
overworkers, while 23 percent of non-overworking women have children. The 
opposite pattern is found for men: 33 percent of men have children among 
overworkers, as compared to 22 percent men among non-overworkers. This is 
consistent with the claim that mothers are expected to perform most of caregiving 
responsibilities, and hence are less likely to overwork, whereas fathers are under a 
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greater pressure to financially support the family, and hence are more likely to 
overwork.  
Overworkers also tend to be highly educated. The percentage of workers 
whose educational attainment is more than a college graduate is 41 percent among 
overworkers, while it is 22 percent among non-overworkers. Also, the average years 
of work experience and job tenure tend to be longer for overworkers than non-
overworkers. Average earnings are higher for overworkers. Their average monthly 
earnings are 5300 dollars (in 2008 $), whereas non-overworkers earnings are 2700 
dollars.  
Job characteristics also tend to be different for overworkers and non-
overworkers. Overwork is less common in public sector and unionized jobs. As shown 
earlier, the representation in professional and managerial occupations are higher 
among overworkers than non-overworkers: 46 percent of overworkers are in 
professional and managerial occupations, while 25 percent non-overworkers are.  
Next, I compare spousal characteristics of overworkers and non-overworks 
with the subset of married workers in the sample. The results in Table 3.1 show an 
interesting non-linear relationship between an individual’s work hours and spouse’s 
work hours: compared to non-overworkers, a higher percentage of overworkers’ 
spouses do not work or work part-time, and also a higher percentage also overworks. 
Conversely, a greater percentage of non-overworkers’ spouses work full-time hours 
(i.e., ≥35 hours <50 hours). This suggests that overworkers include workers from a 
single breadwinner families as well as workers from two-career families in which both 
partners spend long hours at work. Among the latter group, the overwork phenomenon 
is intensified at the family level (Jacobs and Gerson 2001). 
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Table 3.1. Means and standard deviations of worker characteristics for non-
overworkers and overworkers 
Non-overworkers 
(worked  ≥ 50 hrs /wk) 
Overworkers 
(worked  ≥ 50 hrs /wk) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Female 0.52  0.27  
Married 0.57  0.68  
× Female 0.30  0.15  
Have child 0.42  0.43  
× Female 0.23  0.10  
Age 37.34 11.63 39.00 10.17 
Race:     
White 0.74  0.83  
Black 0.12  0.07  
Hispanic 0.10  0.06  
Other race 0.04  0.03  
Education:     
Less than high school 0.11  0.07  
High school graduate 0.33  0.25  
Some college 0.34  0.27  
College graduate 0.16  0.25  
Advanced degree 0.06  0.16  
Years of work experience 17.57 11.50 20.36 10.50 
Years of job tenure 6.76 7.73 7.82 8.04 
Government 0.18  0.14  
Union 0.17  0.14  
Occupations:     
Professional and managerial 0.25  0.46  
Technical, sales, and 
administrative support  0.32  0.21  
Service  0.15  0.05  
Farming, forestry, and fishing  0.01  0.02  
Precision production, craft, and 
repair  0.11  0.12  
Operators, fabricators, and 
laborers 0.16  0.13  
Monthly earnings ($1,000) 2.72 2.51 5.32 5.26 
N 61,931 12,419 
Spousal weekly work hours     
Not working 0.17  0.26  
<35 hrs 0.12  0.17  
≥35 hrs <50 hrs 0.57  0.39  
≥50 hrs  0.14  0.18  
Spousal monthly earnings ($1,000) 2.87 3.16 2.61 3.72 
Spouse work in professional 
occupations  0.25  0.32  
N 30,512 7,360 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996 & 2001  
 
 33 
Two overworker families are more common among families of female-
overworkers than those of male-overworkers, as shown in Figure 3.5. Among both 
non-overworkers and overworkers, a greater proportion of men have wives who stay 
home or work part-time hours, compared to their female-counterparts. Among men, 
approximately 25 percent of non-overworkers have wives who stay at home, and about 
20 percent have wives who work part-time hours. In contrast, these percentages are 
much smaller for women, as 8 percent and 5.5 percent of non-overworkers have 
husbands who stay at home or work part-time hours, respectively. This suggests that 
on average, men are under conditions in which their spouses provide support for their 
long work hours.  
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
men, non-
overworkers
men, overworkers women, non-
overworkers
women, overworkers
not working
<35 hrs
!35 <50 hrs
!50 hrs
 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996 & 2001 (N=40,122) 
 
Figure 3.5. Men’s and women’s spousal work hours by overwork status  
 
The support divide between men and women is exacerbated among 
overworkers. Approximately 50 percent of overworking men’s wives either stay home 
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or work part-time hours, but only about 13 percent of overworking women’s husbands 
do. The percentage of stay-at-home wives is greater among overworking men than 
among non-overworking men, but this does not apply to women who overwork. The 
percentage of women who have stay-at-home husbands or husbands who work part-
time are not much different for overworking women and for non-overworking women. 
Furthermore, the majority of overworking women’s husbands works also long hours 
(44 percent). The percentage of overworking men’s wives who overwork is much 
smaller, as about 12 percent of overworking men’s wives also work 50 hours or more 
per week. This gendered pattern of spousal work hours effectively demonstrates that 
overworking women are under structural conditions in which they are less likely to 
receive spousal support, and are therefore more likely to experience difficulties 
competing on hours with their male counterparts, whose wives are more likely to stay 
home or work part-time.  
The descriptive results here help to establish the argument that overwork is a 
gendered phenomenon that is based on different structural conditions that are more 
likely to be disadvantageous for women. In the following chapters, I demonstrate that 
overwork is in fact more likely to result in perpetuating gender inequality in 
occupational sex segregation, earnings, and employment. 
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CHAPTER 4 
OVERWORK AND OCCUPATIONAL SEX SEGREGATION  
 
 In this chapter, I evaluate whether the gendered workplace norm of overwork 
has disparate negative impacts on women in many male-dominated occupations and 
contributes to occupational sex segregation. To this end, I first show a broad pattern in 
which long work hours are associated with women’s low representation in male-
dominated occupations at the occupational level. I then demonstrate that this structural 
pattern is reinforced by the individual-level occupational mobility process, in which a 
larger number of women than men leave male-dominated occupations in response to 
overwork. I show that this gendered mobility pattern is primarily driven by caregiving 
responsibilities.  
 
OVERWORK AND OCCUPATIONAL SEX SEGREGATION 
Data 
 The analyses draw on data from several sources. Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP); Integrated Public Use of Microdata Series (IPUMS); 
and the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) database. The SIPP is national 
longitudinal household survey data collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. I pool the 
most recent two panels (1996 and 2001 panels, which cover the years from 1995-
2004) in order to estimate the occupational level variables more accurately (see below) 
and to capture the period in which overwork became more common. The time range of 
the data is appropriate for this study, given that overwork is a more recent 
phenomenon. For SIPP, individuals from randomly selected households were 
interviewed once every four months over 36-month (2001 panel) to 48-month (1996 
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panel) periods. The panel structure allows me to observe changes in the labor market 
outcomes of men and women, including their occupations 
To conduct the occupational-level analysis, I reshaped the SIPP into an 
occupation-month format. The unit of analysis is a 3-digit 1990 Census occupation. 
While the 1990 Census occupational classification system consists of 501 occupations, 
I exclude military occupations because of their uniqueness in the organization of work 
hours and the payment system; “legislators,” “postmasters and mail superintendents,” 
and “judges,” who were not interviewed for SIPP; and “natural science teachers, not 
elsewhere classified” and “social work teachers,” who have missing information on 
years of experience.2 The final occupation-level data set thus consisted of 496 of the 
501 occupations. 
 I supplement SIPP with two other datasets. First, I use the 1990 IPUMS 5 
percent sample to calculate accurate work-hour information for occupations that, in 
the SIPP, contain fewer than 100 workers. There were 36 (of 496) such occupations in 
the SIPP.3 The second supplementary data source is the O*NET 3.1 database. I use 
this dataset to include occupational skills measures which are not available in the SIPP. 
O*NET is the nation’s primary source of occupational information compiled by The 
U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) and Employment and Training Administration 
(ETA). I construct the occupational skill measures from the O*NET 3.1 database, 
which is compatible with the 1990 Census occupation classifications through several 
data matching processes using crosswalks provided by ETA.4 I created the dataset for 
                                                
2 Including these two occupations with the omission of the work experience measure does not change 
the substantive findings of this study.  
3 I did not use IPUMS for all cases because IPUMS reflects the labor market in 1990, whereas SIPP 
offers more recent data (1996 to 2004). Also, IPUMS does not offer information on years of work 
experience and years of job tenure. For such cases, I used the information from SIPP even if the 
occupations are composed of less than 100 observations.  
4 The dataset and more detailed information on the construction of the measures are available upon 
request.  
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the occupational characteristics through previous steps, which generates ten 
occupational skill measures that are similar to the measures used in the segregation 
literature (e.g., England and Kilbourne 1989; Grusky and Levanon 2008). I use these 
measures to adjust for the effect of occupational skills and requirements, details of 
which are described below. To test whether long work hours is associated with 
women’s lower representation in the occupations, I use ordinary least square 
regression models. 
  
Variables  
 The dependent variable is women’s representation in the occupation, measured 
by the log odds of women’s representation in each 3-digit 1990 Census occupation. It 
is commonly used by previous research to measure occupational segregation (e.g., 
England et al. 1988; Kilbourne et al. 1994; Weeden 2002). Using log odds helps to 
address non-linearity and non-constant variance problems of percent-based measures 
(Fox 1997). It also offers a measure of the level of segregation in an occupation that is 
not dependent on the gender ratio in the labor force, thereby allowing a cleaner 
interpretation. Alternative measures of segregation, such as using cutoff points (e.g., 
Jacobs 1989), yielded substantively similar patterns, but a less straightforward 
interpretation for the purposes of identifying occupation-level patterns.  
 The key independent variable for the occupational-level analysis is the degree 
to which long work hours are prevalent in an occupation. I use a continuous variable 
that measures the average weekly work hours by occupation. The likelihood ratio test 
between the model with the linear term and the model fitted with the quadratic term of 
occupational work hours suggests a non-linearity between occupational work hours 
and the level of segregation (p<0.01). Nonetheless, both models suggest the 
substantively same conclusion, so I present the linear model that provides the cleaner 
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interpretation. The model with the quadratic term is shown in the Table A.1 in the 
Appendix (also see footnote 5).     
In addition, to adjust for the effect of other occupational characteristics that 
may affect the segregation among occupations, I include the occupational skill 
requirements and the average worker and work characteristics. To address the 
argument that women may move to female-dominated occupations more than men do 
because of the male-typed skill requirements in male-dominated jobs (Polachek 1975; 
Zellner 1975), I use skill measures that were originally introduced by England and 
Kilbourne (1989) and modified by Grusky and Levanon (2008). They measure the 
degree to which occupations require verbal skills, finger dexterity, nurturance-
communal skills, physical strength and manual skills, math skills, analytical skills, 
authority, technical skills, and occupational specific skills (for review of gender typed 
skills and segregation, see England 1992). I also include the percent of college 
graduates to measure the general skill levels in the occupation. To address the 
argument that women are more likely than men to value job characteristics that are 
common in female-dominated occupations (e.g., clean conditions), I include a variable 
that measures the extent to which workplace conditions are physically demanding or 
unpleasant.  
Each skill measure is constructed using the average score of the detailed 
components provided by the O*NET 3.1 database, instead of factor loadings utilized 
by Grusky and Levanon (2008). I use standardized scores so that each item of the 
composite measure contributes equally (α>0.9, for all scale measures). Occupational 
specific skills are measured with the Specific Vocational Preparation (SVP) score, 
which is prepared by O*NET. It ranges from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating a 
higher level of occupation-specific skills. 
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Some important worker characteristics that may affect the segregation pattern 
are also included. When an occupation offers greater self-employment opportunities, 
women and men may stay in the same occupation as self-employed workers even 
when they experience conflict between work and family (Budig 2006). Therefore, I 
use variables that measure the percentages of self-employed workers in the occupation. 
In addition, long average years of work experience and job tenure may suggest an 
internal labor market, which is known to be less favorable for women (Estévez-Abe 
2005). To take this factor account, I adjust for the effects of the average years of work 
experience and job tenure in each occupation. Finally, the percent of non-whites is 
used as a proxy for the workplace equity level because we may see a workplace less 
segregated by gender if the workplace is less discriminatory toward minority groups. 
 
Descriptive Results 
Table 4.1 lists means and standard deviations for all occupational level 
variables in this study. Occupations on average include 37.2 percent of women. The 
average weekly hours worked in the occupation are 39.4 hours. Because most 
occupational skill measures are standardized, their means are close to 0, and standard 
deviations are close to 1. The dexterity measure uses the score that O*NET provides, 
and its mean is approximately 2 from a range of 0 to 5, which means most occupations 
require medium-level dexterity. The occupation-specific skills measure indicates a 
mean value of 2.8, which means occupations on average require moderate-level 
occupational skills.   
 
OLS Analysis of Women’s Occupational Representation 
I apply OLS regression models to estimate the effect of the average work hours 
of an occupation on women’s representation in the occupation (Table 4.2). This  
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Table 4.1. Means and standard deviations of occupational characteristics 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Percent of women  37.23 30.65 
Average hours worked per week 39.43 5.37 
Occupational skill measures   
Verbal -0.01 0.96 
Dexterity 2.04 0.80 
Nurturance 0.00 0.86 
Strength 0.00 0.95 
Disamenities 0.00 0.82 
Math 0.00 0.94 
Analytical 0.00 0.94 
Authority 0.00 0.93 
Technical 0.00 0.83 
Index of occupational specific skills 2.82 1.25 
Other occupational characteristics:   
Percent of unionized workers 15.51 17.58 
Percent of government-sector workers 17.34 23.95 
Percent of self-employed workers 4.77 8.26 
Average years of work experience 17.74 5.23 
Average years of job tenure 7.31 4.09 
Median of monthly earnings (2000 U.S. 100 dollars) 23.15 11.25 
Percent of non-whites 24.55 16.40 
Percent of married workers 58.03 16.63 
Percent of workers with children under 18 42.94 12.89 
Percent of college graduates 11.94 23.70 
Percent of service industry jobs 47.77 38.64 
Number of occupations 496 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996, 2001 (1995-2003); Integrated Public Use 
Microdata Series 1990; and O*NET 3.1. 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses where relevant.  
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Table 4.2. Regression coefficients for the effect of average work hours on the log odds 
of women’s occupational representation 
Variables Model 1 
Average hours worked  -0.14** 
 (0.03) 
Verbal  1.14** 
 (0.41) 
Finger dexterity  0.28 
 (0.20) 
Nurturance -0.05 
 (0.33) 
Strength  0.33 
 (0.23) 
Disamenities -2.81** 
 (0.30) 
Math -0.52 
 (0.29) 
Analytical  0.35 
 (0.35) 
Authority -0.22 
 (0.26) 
Technical -0.16 
 (0.22) 
Index of occupational specific skills -0.40* 
 (0.18) 
Percent of unionized workers -0.01 
 (0.01) 
Percent of government-sector workers  -0.00 
 (0.01) 
Percent of self-employed workers  -0.02 
 (0.02) 
Average years of work experience  -0.09** 
 (0.03) 
Average years of job tenure   0.07 
 (0.04) 
Median monthly earnings (2000 100 U.S. dollars) -0.05* 
 (0.02) 
Percent of non-whites  0.00 
 (0.01) 
Percent of married workers  0.01 
 (0.01) 
Percent of workers with children under 18  0.01 
 (0.01) 
Percent of college graduates  -0.01 
 (0.01) 
Percent of service industry jobs -0.01 
 (0.01) 
Constant -1.48** 
 (0.12) 
Number of observations 496 
R-squared  0.55 
Source: SIPP 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003); IPUMS 1990; and O*NET 3.1. 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses, * p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
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analysis reveals the anticipated negative association between the average work hours 
in the occupation and women’s representation, net of a wide range of factors that may 
be associated with women’s representation in the occupation. More specifically, an 
hour increase of average weekly work hours in the occupation is associated with a 13 
percent decrease (exp[-0.14] = -0.87) in the odds of women being in the occupation.5 
This suggests that women’s lower representation in male-dominated occupations is 
partly explained by long work hours in these occupations.  
Other occupational characteristics indicate findings consistent with prior 
research: women are overrepresented (relative to their share in the average occupation) 
in occupations that require high verbal skills, low occupation-specific skills, or low 
average years of experience; they are underrepresented in occupations that entail 
physically demanding or unpleasant work or high average earnings. These occupation-
level controls do not entirely absorb the work-hour effect.  
These results support the contention that there is a strong, negative association 
between normative work hours and women’s representation in occupations. It remains 
to be seen, however, whether individual women leave male-dominated fields and enter 
female-dominated fields or quit their jobs because of long work hours. To further 
investigate a source of this aggregate-level pattern, I turn to individual-level analysis 
to examine the mobility process in which more women than men exit male-dominated 
occupations or leave the labor force entirely, in response to overwork. 
 
 
                                                
5 When the quadratic term of the average work hours is introduced, the model suggests the 
substantively similar conclusion. The curvilinear model suggests that log odds of women’s occupational 
representation increase as the average hours in the occupation increase until occupational hours reach 
17 hours, and decrease afterwards. Since the minimum of occupational hours 18.7 in my data, the 
model suggests that log odds of women’s representation decrease with an increasing rate, as the average 
work hours in the occupation increase (See Table A1 in the Appendix). 
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LONG WORK HOURS AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY 
Data 
 For the individual-level analysis, I use only SIPP. The respondents for SIPP 
were interviewed every four months, but monthly information was also collected 
retrospectively for some variables. However, it is reported that the respondents tend to 
report the same value for the retrospective questions and only report changes in 
employment in the last month (“seam bias”), which may bias the results if all four 
months’ records are used (Weinberg 2003). Therefore, I use data only from the fourth 
month, which is the common practice to address this problem (e.g., Gottschalk 2005; 
Grogger 2004).  
The sample is restricted to respondents whose ages are between 18 and 64 with 
positive earnings. Also, because the focus of this study is on the odds of men’s and 
women’s exiting male-dominated occupations, the analyses examine those who 
initially worked in male-dominated occupations. Nonetheless, to examine whether the 
gendered effect of overwork is indeed greater in male-dominated occupations, I 
additionally compare the overwork effect in male-dominated occupations to the one in 
other occupations. The distinction between male-dominated occupations and other 
occupations is made based on a cut-off point of 30 percent of women in the 
occupations, which is a commonly used cut-off point to define male-dominated 
occupations (e.g., Jacobs 1989; Kmec 2005). Male-dominated occupations in my 
sample include engineers, natural scientists, technologists, architects, technicians, 
protective service workers, construction workers, mechanics and repairers. Using this 
cut-off point excludes some occupations that are well known for overwork culture, 
such as lawyers and physicians. Therefore, I apply several other cut-off points to 
check the sensitivity of the results to the cutoff points. The final sample consists of 
127,700 observations (person-month) from 20,038 men and 22,141 observations from 
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4,581 women. The sample size for men is larger than that for women because of the 
lower representation of women in male-dominated occupations (6 percent versus 44 
percent for men).  
 
Variables  
The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure that indicates whether the 
respondents move out of the male-dominated occupation by the next time point.6 If the 
respondents move to other occupation or leave the labor force, the dependent variable 
is coded 1; if the respondents stay in the male-dominated occupations, it is coded 0. In 
an additional analysis, I examine the effect of moving to more-female dominated 
occupations and quitting separately. In both cases, those who stay in male-dominated 
occupations constitute the baseline category. In all three types of variables, those who 
quit for involuntary reasons, such as job displacement and layoff, are excluded in the 
analyses to isolate voluntary occupational mobility or quitting. To estimate the odds of 
moving to more female-dominated occupations in response to long work hours, I 
allow a time lag between one’s mobility and the independent variables. A four-month 
time lag is applied due to the survey design (see above).  
 The primary independent variable of interest, overwork, is measured with a 
series of dummy variables that indicate whether the respondents’ usual work hours in 
their main jobs are (1) less than 35 hours per week (“part-time”), (2) 50 hours or more 
but less than 60 hours per week (“between 50 and 60 hours”), or (3) 60 hours or more 
per week (“60 hours or more”).7 The baseline category measures whether the 
                                                
6 Instead of using the binary measure, a continuous variable (i.e., percent of women in the occupation) 
can be used to measure occupational gender composition. However, a continuous measure ignores the 
discrete effects of changing jobs across gender-typed occupation. 
7 Of all workers in the sample, 90 percent reported that their main job is their only job. Although SIPP 
offers the work hours variable from the second job (where relevant), I use work hours only from the 
main job because a close examination of the data suggests that respondents have frequently reported the 
same values for the first and the second job. Nonetheless, including the hours in the second job does not 
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respondents work more than 35 hours but less than 50 hours per week (“between 35 
and 50 hours”), and overwork is defined by weekly hours of 50 or more.8 I use 
categorical variables instead of continuous variables in recognition of likely 
nonlinearities in the effect of overwork on the odds of one’s leaving male-dominated 
occupations: while I expect that long work hours increase women’s likelihood of 
moving out of male-dominated occupations, I also expect that part-timers are more 
likely to change their occupations or leave their jobs, given that part-time workers are 
also penalized for being less committed, especially in many male-dominated jobs 
(Epstein et al. 1999; Roth 2006).9    
A secondary goal of the individual analysis is to determine whether long work 
hours have a greater effect for mothers than for childless women. To this end, I 
include a dummy variable that measures whether the respondents have children under 
the age of 18 years, and allow this variable to be interacted with weekly work-hour 
variables.10 The children are the respondents’ own children under the age of 18 who 
reside in the same household with the respondents. Children’s age is not considered in 
the model because SIPP does not collect such information. Theory suggests mixed 
predictions about the effect of children’s age: in some studies, younger children are 
represented as typically needing more intensive care than older children, but other 
                                                                                                                                       
change the findings. 
8 Some prior work defines overwork as 40 hours or more, to which an overtime pay rate is applied in 
many production and service workers. This definition is rather unrealistic for many professional and 
managerial workers, to whom overtime rates are not applied. Furthermore, many studies use a 50 hour 
cutoff point to reflect increased average work hours in the overall labor market (e.g., Cha 2010; Jacobs 
and Gerson 2004). Nonetheless, the findings are consistent when a 40 hour cutoff point is used.    
9 The hour variables are based on men’s and women’s self-reported hours. Given the expectation of 
working long hours, workers in male-dominated occupations may over-report their hours. If men over-
report their hours more than women do, this may explain nonsignificant effect of overwork for men. To 
check this possibility, I examine the effect with additional overwork category, “70 hours or more,” to 
see if this change the results. The added variable remains insignificant in men’s model, which help to 
ensure that the gender difference in self-reporting does not drive the gendered effect found here.   
10 I use a dummy variable because it is parental status that differentiates workers’ caregiving 
responsibilities and time availability the most. Also, research suggests that the perceptions about 
workers’ competence or commitment differ by their parental status (Correll et al. 2007). Nonetheless, 
using a linear measure of number of children does not change the findings.  
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studies suggest that parenting older children (e.g., teenagers) also entails intensive care 
for their psychological and cognitive development (Kurz 2002). The mixed predictions 
suggest that being a parent requires intensive caregiving responsibilities throughout all 
age groups of the children.  
 To estimate the effect of overwork on the odds of moving out of male-
dominated occupations, I adjust for individual characteristics that are known to affect 
one’s mobility. I include workers’ age because mobility rates are known to be higher 
among younger workers than older workers (Blau and Kahn 1981). Given that 
women’s mobility is often affected by their childbearing and childrearing, I include 
the squared term of age to capture any non-linear effect of it. Because marital status 
can differentiate the level of spousal support for housework and other obligations, I 
include a dummy variable that indicates whether respondents are currently married. To 
address the possibility that workers’ moving to more female-dominated occupations is 
driven by their lower level job skills, I include several variables that measure workers’ 
skill levels. I utilize five categorical measures for educational attainment to measure 
the level of general skills. Years of work experience and job tenure with their squared 
terms are also considered in the models to adjust for the non-linear effect of job-
specific skills (Altonji and Shakotko 1987).  
 I include monthly earnings because workers are less likely to change their jobs 
when their earnings are high.11 They are re-scaled as U.S. 100 dollars with an inflation 
adjustment to a nominal 2000 dollars (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2005). When 
monthly earnings are missing, I use the hourly earnings multiplied by the usual hours 
per week worked and weeks worked per month. Since public sector jobs are under the 
stronger enforcement of the Equal Employment Opportunity regulations (Baron, 
                                                
11 I use monthly earnings rather than hourly earnings because monthly earnings better reflect the extent 
to which workers financially rely on the job. Hourly earnings are only collected for hourly workers, and 
calculating hourly earnings from monthly earnings may increase inaccuracy due to measurement errors.   
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Mittman, and Newman 1991), which may help to improve workplace equity, I use a 
dummy variable that indicates whether a respondent works in the public sector. Given 
that workers who are covered by unions are less likely to quit their jobs, I include a 
dummy variable for the respondents’ union membership. Also, since those who hold 
more than one job may indicate the instability of their employment, I use a dummy 
variable for respondents who have two or more jobs.    
Because jobs in some industries are more flexible than in others (e.g., service 
industry jobs have more turnovers than jobs in professional industries), I include 
eleven industry dummy variables based on the 1990 one-digit census industry codes. 
Similarly, the norm of overwork and the extent to which flexible arrangements are 
offered differs by occupation. Thus, I employ a series of dummy variables for 
occupations based on the one-digit 1990 Census occupation code. 
 
Method 
To investigate whether individual workers move out of male-dominated 
occupations in response to their long work hours, I employ logistic regression models. 
A random intercept term is introduced to take into account the dependence among 
observations due to the panel structure of the data. The models take the following 
general form:  
 
! 
log
pij
1" pij
=  xijβ + αi + εit ,    (1) 
where pij is the probability of quitting by the next time point (4 months later), xij is a 
row vector of variables for individual i at time j, and β is a column vector of 
regression coefficients. Residuals are composed of two parts: αi represents random 
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intercepts for persons, assumed to be uncorrelated with xij and normally distributed 
with a mean of zero and constant variance; εij is a random disturbance term.12  
I run the models separately by gender. This helps to avoid the bias that can be 
generated by assuming that all other variables have the same effect on men and 
women. Furthermore, while the full models would help to distinguish significant from 
non-significant gender differences, fully stratified models are better for the purpose of 
detecting gender-specific effects that are only relevant to explain the behavior of one 
gender. For example, men’s odds of moving to female-dominated occupations may not 
be related with their long work hours, but they may be an important factor in 
explaining women’s mobility.  
While this is an effective way to demonstrate the effect of overwork in 
determining the gendered attrition from male-dominated occupations, and thereby 
potentially increasing occupational sex segregation, it is important to note that this 
study does not intend to directly measure the extent to which overwork explains 
increased rates of occupational sex segregation. Obviously, the segregation rates can 
be determined by both exit and entrance rates from/to male-dominated occupations, 
but the entrance rates are not considered in this analysis. However, overwork may also 
affect the process of men and women selecting into male-dominated occupations: 
fewer women than men enter male-dominated occupations because anticipated barriers, 
such as overwork (and other factors like discrimination, and lack of social support). 
Because this selection process is not captured in the model, the extent to which 
                                                
12 Alternatively, one could estimate the effect of the average work hours in the occupation (the 
contextual effect), instead of individual work hours, as the key independent variable and apply multi-
level models in which individuals are nested in occupations. However, this modeling strategy makes it 
difficult to deal with the panel data structure (individuals have multiple records per person, so time is 
nested within the individual, and individuals are nested in occupation, but their occupations often 
change over time). Also, more importantly, the individual measure is better for the purpose of this study 
because it captures the extent to which individuals experience work-family conflict more directly, 
which is the key argument of this study. 
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overwork contributes to occupational sex segregation is likely to be underestimated 
when only estimating the effect of the exit process.  
On a different note, however, it is entirely possible that the increased entrance 
rates of women in male-dominated occupations may cancel out the extent to which 
overwork increases segregation rates. For example, the cohort effect (the rates of 
women entering male-dominated fields increased among younger cohorts) may 
contribute to desegregation (e.g., Jacobs 1989). Determining the contribution of 
overwork on occupational segregation relative to other factors, or contribution of exit 
process relative to entry process to the overall segregation rates are important 
questions, which should be explored in future studies, but are beyond the scope of this 
study. The purpose of this study is to identify one important factor that contributes to 
higher exit rates of women in male-dominated occupations than other occupations, 
which can reinforce occupational sex segregation. 
 
Descriptive Results 
 Table 4.3 presents means and standard deviations of variables used in this 
analysis. The dependent variable indicates that about 3.6 percent men who formerly 
worked in male-dominated occupations (occupations which have less than 30 percent 
women) leave the occupations for voluntary reasons in the next time point. 0.9 percent 
of men quit and 2.7 percent men move to more female-dominated occupations. Not 
surprisingly, women in male-dominated occupations are more likely than men to move 
out of the occupations, with 8.2 percent of women leaving male-dominated 
occupations. The majority of these women (i.e., 6.2 percent of the total) move to more 
female-dominated occupations, while the rest quit paid labor altogether.13  
                                                
13 The rates for “quitting” and “moving to more female-dominated occupations” do not add up to the 
overall rate (under “moving out of male-dominated occupations”) because the denominator of each 
subcategory excludes the respondents from the other subcategory.   
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Table 4.3. Means and standard deviations of individual characteristics 
Variables Men Women 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Moving out of male-dominated occupations (%, 
after 4 months) 3.58  8.21  
Quitting  0.9  2.26  
Moving to more female-dominated 
occupations 2.67  6.22  
Usual work hours per week (%, ≥ 35 hours < 50 
hours is omitted)      
< 35 hours (part-time) 17.93  27.40  
≥ 50 hours <60 hours 13.00  7.33  
≥ 60 hours 6.83  2.56  
Have own child under 18 years old 0.67  0.54  
Currently married 0.46  0.44  
Age 39.35 10.85 38.88 10.33 
Race (“white” is omitted):      
Black 0.09  0.13  
Hispanic 0.12  0.09  
Other race 0.04  0.06  
Education (“less than high school is omitted”):     
High school graduate 0.36  0.34  
Some college 0.32  0.31  
College graduate 0.12  0.19  
Advanced degree 0.05  0.06  
Years of work experience 20.17 11.31 16.95 10.34 
Years of job tenure 8.17 8.66 6.91 7.44 
Monthly earnings (2000 U.S. 100 dollars) 29.67 23.26 24.57 19.32 
Union 0.21  0.13  
Government 0.13  0.16  
Two or more jobs 0.09  0.09  
Industry (“manufacturing” is omitted)     
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 0.04  0.03  
Mining, construction 0.17  0.03  
Manufacturing 0.26  0.30  
Transportation, communication, and other 
public utilities 0.13  0.10  
Wholesale trade 0.07  0.08  
Retail trade 0.08  0.13  
Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.02  0.03  
Business and repair services 0.08  0.09  
Personal services 0.01  0.01  
Entertainment and recreation services 0.01  0.01  
Public administration 0.07  0.09  
Occupation (“professional and managerial” is 
omitted):     
Technical, sales, and administrative support  0.13  0.25  
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Service  0.06  0.07  
Farming, forestry, and fishing  0.04  0.04  
Precision production, craft, and repair  0.34  0.13  
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 0.31  0.31  
Year (“1996” is omitted)     
1997 0.17  0.16  
1998 0.16  0.15  
1999 0.12  0.12  
2001 0.16  0.17  
2002 0.14  0.14  
2003 0.09  0.08  
Number of observations 127,700 20,038 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses where relevant.  
 The data also show that more men in male-dominated occupations work long 
hours than women, while more women work part-time. The gender difference in 
representation in the overwork categories is striking. Men who work between 50 and 
60 hours per week constitute 13 percent of men, while their female counterparts 
constitute 7 percent. More than twice as many men work 60 hours or more per week as 
women (7 versus 3 percent). This suggests a substantial time divide between men and 
women in male-dominated occupations. 
 
Does Overwork Increase the Attrition of Women from Male-dominated 
Occupations?  
 To evaluate whether overwork increases women’s likelihood of moving out of 
male-dominated occupations, but not men’s, I examine the effect of long work hours 
on the odds of men and women moving out of male-dominated occupations. Male-
dominated occupations are defined by the cutoff point of 30 percent of women in the 
occupation. As expected, the results in Table 4.4 provide evidence that long work 
hours increase the odds of women moving from male-dominated occupations to more  
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Table 4.4. Random effects logistic regression coefficients for the effects of overwork 
on the log odds of moving out of male-dominated occupations (%women < 30) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Men Women Men Women 
Usual work hours per week (≥ 35 hours < 50 
hours is omitted):      
<35 hours (part-time)  0.37**  0.23**  0.35**  0.22* 
 (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.00 -0.02  0.04 -0.20 
 (0.05) (0.14) (0.07) (0.18) 
≥ 60 hours  0.07  0.39*  0.08  0.00 
 (0.07) (0.19) (0.09) (0.27) 
Have children -0.03  0.21** -0.03  0.16+ 
 (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) 
× <35 hours     0.06  0.02 
   (0.08) (0.13) 
× ≥ 50 < 60 hours    -0.10  0.42 
   (0.11) (0.27) 
× ≥ 60 hours   -0.02  0.86* 
   (0.14) (0.38) 
Married -0.12**  0.14+ -0.11*  0.14+ 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
Age -0.12** -0.11** -0.12** -0.11** 
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Age squared  0.00**  0.00** 0.00**  0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Race (“white” is omitted)     
Black  0.15*  0.12  0.15*  0.12 
 (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) 
Hispanic  0.08  0.13  0.08  0.13 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.13) 
Other race  0.22* -0.21  0.22* -0.21 
 (0.09) (0.16) (0.09) (0.16) 
Education (“less than high school” is omitted)     
High school graduate  0.20** -0.18  0.20** -0.18 
 (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) 
Some college  0.38** -0.10  0.39** -0.09 
 (0.06) (0.13) (0.06) (0.13) 
College graduate  0.59** -0.12  0.59** -0.10 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.08) (0.15) 
Advanced degree  0.59** -0.11  0.59** -0.10 
 (0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.22) 
Years of work experience -0.04** -0.00 -0.04** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Years of work experience squared  0.00**  0.00  0.00**  0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years of job tenure -0.07** -0.09** -0.07** -0.09** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Years of job tenure squared  0.00**  0.00**  0.00**  0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Monthly earnings ($US) -0.01** -0.02** -0.01** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union -0.32** -0.18 -0.32** -0.18 
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 (0.06) (0.12) (0.06) (0.12) 
Government -0.05 -0.00 -0.05 -0.01 
 (0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15) 
Two or more jobs  1.11**  1.37**  1.11**  1.37** 
 (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.09) 
Industry a Included 
Occupations b Included 
Year c Included 
Log likelihood -18231.7 -5106.6 -18230.9 -5103.1 
! 
ˆ "  d  0.24  0.24  0.24  0.28 
Number of persons 22,141 4,582 22,141 4,582 
Number of observations 127,700 20,038 127,700 20,038 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.   
a b c The coefficients of dummy variables for the industry, occupation, and year are estimated in all 
models but are not shown here. Full results are available upon request.  
d 
! 
ˆ "  (intra-class correlation) = 
! 
ˆ " 
( ˆ " + ˆ # )
, where 
! 
ˆ "  is the estimate of the variance of the random 
intercept of persons (αi), and 
! 
ˆ "  is the estimate of the variance of the random disturbance term (εij).  
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
female-dominated occupations or leaving the labor force, while long work hours do 
not significantly affect men’s odds of moving out of male-dominated occupations.  
More specifically, in Model 1 of Table 4.4, working 60 hours or more per 
week increases women’s odds of leaving male-dominated occupations by 48 percent 
(exp[0.39]=1.48), as compared to their female counterparts who worked non-overwork 
full-time hours (between 35 and 50 hours) in the previous time point. For men, neither 
of the overwork categories reaches significance. This finding suggests that long work 
hours disproportionately increase the likelihood of women’s exiting male-dominated 
occupations, but not that of men’s. All else being equal, the gendered effect of long 
work hours will reinforce occupational sex segregation. 
The lower overwork category, however, does not show the same gendered 
effect. Working between 50 and 60 hours does not increase women’s odds of leaving 
male-dominated occupations. This suggests that despite the disproportion amount of 
caregiving and household responsibility that they take in the family, many women in 
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male-dominated occupations behave similarly to their male counterparts, competing 
on work hours to meet the workplace expectation. Only an extreme amount of work 
hours produces the gendered outcomes.  
The magnitude of the overwork effects can be better illustrated by the 
predicted probability in Figure 4.1. The Y-axis represents the predicted probability of 
exiting male-dominated occupations of a hypothetical man and woman who have the 
mean characteristics on all other factors that are included in the model (see Table 4.2). 
The calculation of the predicted probabilities is based on Model 1 in Table 4.4, and the 
values are presented as a percent by being multiplied by 100. Note that the mobility 
rates here are lower than the national-level mobility rates because they are constructed 
conservatively (e.g., excluding involuntary quitters or those who reported “do not 
want to work”) to accurately estimate the causal effect of overwork. The far left group 
indicates the rates of leaving male-dominated occupations for the reference group 
(workers who worked full-time hours), and the next two groups indicate the rates for 
workers who worked 50 hours or more and 60 hours or more in the previous time 
point. Thus, the figure effectively illustrates how the rates of exiting male-dominated 
occupations change as men’s and women’s weekly work hours increase.  
Not surprisingly, Figure 4.1 shows that the rates of leaving male-dominated 
occupations are higher for women than for men across work hour categories. Also, as 
demonstrated in Model 1, men’s rates of exiting male-dominated occupations do not 
vary by hours they worked in the previous time point. In contrast, women’s rates of 
leaving male-dominated occupations increase substantially from 2.4 percent to 3.6 
percent as their work hours increase from full-time hours to 60 hours or more. Put 
differently, working 60 hours or more increases probability of women leaving male-
dominated occupations by approximately 50 percent, compared to women who 
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previously worked full-time hours, holding all other factors constant at the mean 
values.  
Quitting and mobility are, of course, rare events. As a result, the baseline 
probabilities are low, and the effects seem small when presented in predicted 
probabilities. Although rare, these events result in important social and economic 
consequences for individuals. These events lead to longer term “scar effects,” 
generating long-term earnings loss and negatively affecting workers’ subsequent 
career trajectories (Gangl 2006). The effects also cumulate to generate aggregate-level 
inequalities, such as glass ceiling or occupational sex segregation.  The findings here 
show that overwork is an important determinant of these events that have these 
broader implications. In the next section, I investigate whether the gendered effects of 
overwork are primarily driven by caregiving responsibilities.  
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Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation (1995-2003). 
Notes: Estimates are derived from Model 1 in Table 4.4. All other variables are set to their 
mean values. 
Figure 4.1. The predicted probability (×100) of leaving male-dominated occupations 
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Is Caregiving Responsible for the Gendered Attrition from Male-Dominated 
Occupations?  
 Do caregiving responsibilities in part explain the gendered effect of overwork? 
To answer this question, I fit a model that allows interaction effects between indicator 
of parent and work hour variables (see Model 2 in Table 4.4). This model assesses 
whether having a child increases the odds of overworking women leaving male-
dominated occupations, but not for their male-counterparts. The results show that 
motherhood status significantly increases the odds of women moving out of male-
dominated occupations, but fatherhood status has no effect on the mobility on the odds 
of overworking men. As shown by the interaction effect between working 60 hours or 
more and having children, having children increases overworking women’s odds of 
leaving male-dominated occupations by 2.4 times, compared to their non-mother 
counterparts. Notably, the main effect of working 60 hours or more becomes 
insignificant after interaction effects are introduced. This means that the non-mothers’ 
odds of leaving male-dominated occupations are not affected by long work hours. This 
is consistent with the argument that caregiving responsibilities are the key factor that 
drives the gendered overwork effect.  
By contrast, men’s odds of exiting male-dominated occupations are not 
affected by their parental status. The interaction effects between overwork and having 
children are negative, but the standard errors for these interaction terms are massive, 
and so I do not interpret these coefficients.14 However, the stark contrast in patterns by 
gender, together with the non-significant result for childless women, indicates that 
caregiving responsibilities are the primary factor that determines this gendered pattern.  
                                                
14  When the gender differences in the interaction effects between overwork and having children 
variables are tested in the pooled model, which includes both men and women in the sample and use 
three way interaction terms (i.e., overwork × have children × women), the gender effects are 
significantly positive for both the “between 50 and 60 hours” and “60 hours or more” categories 
(p<0.05).   
 57 
 The magnitudes of these effects are illustrated by changes in predicted 
probabilities (multiplied by 100) in Figure 4.2. Panel (a) of Figure 4.2 depicts the 
relationship between overwork and the probability of leaving male-dominated 
occupations for workers without children, and Panel (b) of Figure 4.2 shows the 
relationship for workers with children. Again, all other factors that are included in the 
model are set to their mean values. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 4.2 provide the 
evidence consistent with the argument that the gendered effect of overwork on the 
attrition from male-dominated occupations is driven by caregiving responsibilities that 
are largely borne by mothers. In panel (a) of Figure 4.2, long work hours do not 
increase the rates of exiting male-dominated occupations for both non-mothers and 
non-fathers. Even when non-mothers worked 60 hours or more in the previous time 
point, their rates of leaving male-dominated occupations (2.2 percent) are virtually 
identical with the rates for women who worked non-overwork full-time hours. This 
suggests that non-mothers’ mobility chances are not affected by the overwork 
phenomenon. The exit rates for men continue to show no systematic changes in 
response to their weekly work hours. 
In contrast, panel (b) of Figure 4.2 shows that for mothers, their rates of exiting 
male-dominated occupations increase dramatically as their weekly work hours 
increase. When mothers worked non-overwork full-time hours, their exit rate from 
male-dominated occupations is 2.6 percent. These exit rates increase as their weekly 
work hours increase. When mothers worked 50 hours or more, the rate increases to 3.2 
percent, and it increases further to approximately 6 percent when mothers worked 60 
hours or more in the previous time point. In comparison of the exit rates between 
mothers and non-mothers, the exit rate for mothers who worked 50 hours or more is 
about 1.8 times greater, and the exit rate for mothers who worked 60 hours or more is 
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(a) Workers without children 
 
0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
2.6%
3.2%
5.9%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
>=35 <50 hours >=50 <60 hours >=60 hours
men
women
 
(b) Workers with children 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation (1995-2003). 
Notes: Estimates are derived from Model 2 in Table 4.4. All other variables are set to their 
mean values. 
Figure 4.2. The predicted probability (×100) of leaving male-dominated occupations 
by parental status  
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about 2.2 times greater than those for their non-mother counterparts, whose exit rates 
are 1.8 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively. The changes in the rates between non-
mothers and mothers represent the magnitude of the interaction effects between 
weekly hours and parental status examined earlier. 
When we compare the exit rate of mothers who worked full-time hours (2.6 
percent) to the exit rate of their non-mother counterparts (2.2 percent), they are not 
substantially different from each other. This suggests that caregiving responsibilities 
alone do not increase the rates of exiting male-dominated occupations for women; 
rather, it is the joint effect of overwork and the gendered expectation about caregiving 
responsibilities. The fact that fathers exit rates do not systematically vary by weekly 
hours category supports the argument that the overwork effect on the gendered 
attrition from male-dominated occupations is driven by caregiving responsibilities.15  
 Although not directly related to predictions made earlier, the effect of the part-
time hour variable is worth examining. Part-time workers (“≤ 35 hours”) are more 
likely to quit or move to more female-dominated occupations (see Table 4.4). As 
shown in Model 1, the odds of part-time men leaving male-dominated occupations are 
45 percent greater, and the odds of part-time women are 26 percent greater, compared 
to their counterparts who worked non-overwork full-time hours in the previous time 
point. This is consistent with prior research that suggests that employment for part-
time workers are less stable than that for full-time workers (Tilly 1996). Previous 
research also suggests that women often reduce their work hours before they quit their 
jobs (Hochschild 1997; Williams 2000). The interaction effects between having 
                                                
15  I also examine whether the gendered mobility patterns are driven by different skills that male-
dominated and female-dominated occupations require (the results are not shown). I do so by estimating 
the overwork effects while further adjusting for occupational skills and requirements (the previous and 
current jobs, separately) that were used for the occupational-level analysis (see Table 4.1 for list of the 
variables). Adding these additional variables does not change the results substantively. 
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children and the part-time hour variables in Model 2 show that parental status does not 
differentiate this part-time effect by gender.16 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 A series of sensitivity analyses give additional support to the findings. First, I 
investigate the relationship between overwork and the probability of leaving male-
dominated occupations separately for those who quit and those who move to more 
female dominated occupations (see Table 4.5). Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.5 examine 
the effects of overwork with models using the same set of covariates that are included 
in Model 2 in Table 4.4, but separating the dependent variable into quitting and 
moving to more female dominated occupations. Separating the two factors generates 
results broadly consistent with the ones from previous models, and it also suggests that 
overwork has a greater impact on mothers’ quitting paid labor more than on their 
moving to female-dominated occupations (4 months later).  
The model further reveals that working 60 hours or more and caregiving 
responsibility jointly increase the odds of women quitting (see Model 1 in Table 4.5). 
The odds of mothers who work 60 hours or more are 8.3 times greater than their 
childless counterparts. Considering the main effect and the interaction effect together, 
the odds of quitting for mothers who worked 60 hours or more are 2.3 times greater 
than those of non-mothers who worked full-time hours (exp(-1.27+2.12)=2.34). While 
in the predicted direction, the interaction effect for women working between 50 and 60 
hours per week does not reach the conventional significance level. Fatherhood status, 
by contrast, does not significantly increase the odds of quitting for men who worked 
long hours. On the contrary, fathers who work between 50 and 60 hours per week are  
                                                
16 It is also worth noting that dummy variables for non-whites (blacks, other race) often show positive 
coefficients (see Tables 4.4 and 4.5), indicating that racial minority workers are more likely to leave 
male-dominated occupations, perhaps due to workplace discrimination and lack of social support.  
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Table 4.5. Random effects logistic regression coefficients for the effects of overwork 
on the log odds of quitting and moving to female-dominated occupations separately  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (Quitting) (Moving to female-
dominated 
occupations) 
 Men Women Men Women 
Usual work hours per week (≥ 35 hours < 50 
hours is omitted):      
<35 hours (part-time)  0.24**  0.18  0.40**  0.23* 
 (0.09) (0.18) (0.06) (0.11) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.01 -0.18  0.07 -0.18 
 (0.14) (0.35) (0.08) (0.21) 
≥ 60 hours -0.07 -1.27  0.15  0.23 
 (0.19) (0.82) (0.11) (0.29) 
Have children -0.00  0.46** -0.06  0.03 
 (0.10) (0.17) (0.06) (0.11) 
× <35 hours   0.21 -0.15  0.01  0.09 
 (0.15) (0.24) (0.09) (0.15) 
× ≥ 50 < 60 hours  -0.53*  0.76 -0.06  0.27 
 (0.26) (0.48) (0.12) (0.31) 
× ≥ 60 hours  0.14  2.12* -0.09  0.70+ 
 (0.29) (0.95) (0.15) (0.42) 
Married -0.31**  0.48** -0.06  0.01 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.05) (0.08) 
Age -0.27** -0.20** -0.04 -0.07* 
 (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) 
Age squared  0.00**  0.00**  0.00  0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Race (“white” is omitted)     
Black  0.29**  0.49**  0.07 -0.00 
 (0.11) (0.19) (0.07) (0.12) 
Hispanic  0.24*  0.30  0.02  0.03 
 (0.11) (0.21) (0.07) (0.15) 
Other race  0.34+ -0.05  0.21* -0.30 
 (0.18) (0.28) (0.10) (0.19) 
Education (“less than high school” is omitted)     
High school graduate  0.00 -0.74**  0.30**  0.11 
 (0.10) (0.20) (0.07) (0.14) 
Some college  0.21+ -0.53*  0.49**  0.17 
 (0.11) (0.21) (0.08) (0.15) 
College graduate -0.06 -0.74**  0.79**  0.20 
 (0.17) (0.27) (0.09) (0.18) 
Advanced degree -0.03 -0.77+  0.80**  0.20 
 (0.25) (0.40) (0.13) (0.25) 
Years of work experience -0.09** -0.04+ -0.02*  0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Years of work experience squared  0.00**  0.00  0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years of job tenure -0.09** -0.12** -0.06** -0.09** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Years of job tenure squared  0.00**  0.00**  0.00**  0.00** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Monthly earnings ($US) -0.01** -0.02** -0.00** -0.02** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union -0.10 -0.04 -0.41** -0.22+ 
 (0.10) (0.21) (0.07) (0.14) 
Government -0.02 -0.82** -0.05  0.21 
 (0.15) (0.32) (0.10) (0.17) 
More than two jobs -0.18  0.00  1.40**  1.66** 
 (0.11) (0.20) (0.05) (0.10) 
Industry a Included 
Occupations b Included 
Year c Included 
Log likelihood -6078.7 -1824.0 -14268.4 -4066.3 
! 
ˆ "  d  0.39  0.37  0.24  0.35 
Number of persons 21,480 4,189 21,934 4,439 
Number of observations 124,325 18,818 126,501 19,613 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.   
a b c The coefficients of dummy variables for the industry, occupation, and year are estimated in all 
models but are not shown here. Full results are available upon request.  
d 
! 
ˆ "  (intra-class correlation) = 
! 
ˆ " 
( ˆ " + ˆ # )
, where 
! 
ˆ "  is the estimate of the variance of the random 
intercept of persons,  
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
less likely to quit, compared to childless men who work between 50 and 60 hours per 
week (the odds of fathers are 41 percent greater than those of non-fathers). 
 Model 2 in Table 4.5 examines how overwork affects the mobility of men and 
women from male-dominated to other occupations. The results are consistent with the 
findings above. Having children and working long hours jointly increase the odds of 
women moving to more female-dominated occupations, while they do not 
significantly affect men’s odds. Although still substantial, the extent to which 
caregiving responsibility generates mobility to more female-dominated occupations 
appears to be smaller than in Model 1. Having children doubles the odds of mothers 
moving to more female-dominated occupations when they work 60 hours or more per 
week compared to their childless counterparts (exp[0.7] = 2.01). Considering the main 
effect together, the odds of mothers who work 60 hours or more per week are 2.5 
times greater, compared to non-mothers who worked between 35 and 50 hours per 
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week (exp[0.23+0.7]=2.53). In contrast, fathers’ mobility is not significantly affected 
by long work hours.  
In sum, these analyses provide more convincing evidence that long work hours 
are more likely to make women quit and also make them leave male-dominated 
occupations to move to more female-dominated ones because their caregiving 
responsibility limits their availability for paid labor.  
A second set of robustness checks evaluates whether the findings are consistent 
throughout by applying different cutoff points (see Table 4.6): specifically, defining 
male-dominated occupations as those with 35 percent and 40 percent women, instead 
of 30 percent. While applying a 30 percent cutoff point is a more conservative way to 
define male-dominated occupations, applying 35 percent or 40 percent cutoff points 
has the advantage of including some professional occupations that are otherwise 
excluded.17 Including more of these occupations in the sample can check the stability 
of the effect of overwork. Models 1 and 2 in Table 4.6 confirm the findings previously 
shown. That is, the interaction effect of overwork and having children for women 
remain the same even after different cutoff points are applied to define male-
dominated occupations. Consistent with the findings from previous analyses (see 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5), additional analyses here also provide evidence that supports the 
main argument that women are more likely to move out of male-dominated 
occupations because of conflict between the norm of overwork and the demands of 
caregiving responsibility.  
The interaction effects between having children and working between 50 and 
60 hours per week in Models 1 and 2 indicate that mothers who previously worked in  
                                                
17 Applying a 25 percent cutoff point gives similar results, but since only a small number of women 
remain in the sample with a 25 percent cutoff point, some of the estimates become unstable. In addition, 
applying a 30 percent or higher cutoff point has an advantage of including some professional 
occupations that are excluded otherwise.  
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Table 4.6. Random effects logistic regression coefficients for the effects of overwork 
on the log odds of moving out of male-dominated occupations, using different cutoff 
points  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 (35 percent cutoff point) (40 percent cutoff point) 
 Men Women Men Women 
Usual work hours per week (≥ 35 hours < 
50 hours is omitted):      
<35 hours (part-time)  0.32**  0.29**  0.32**  0.30** 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours -0.02 -0.17 -0.02 -0.16 
 (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.12) 
≥ 60 hours  0.11  0.03  0.07 -0.02 
 (0.09) (0.19) (0.09) (0.17) 
Have children -0.03  0.13+ -0.01  0.13+ 
 (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) 
× <35 hours   0.12 -0.07  0.12 -0.07 
 (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
× ≥ 50 < 60 hours  -0.17  0.47* -0.20+  0.42* 
 (0.11) (0.19) (0.11) (0.18) 
× ≥ 60 hours -0.04  0.29 -0.10  0.16 
 (0.13) (0.28) (0.13) (0.27) 
Other demographic and job characteristics 
variables a Included 
Log likelihood 
-19222.3 
-
8753.4 -19230.5 -9583.7 
! 
ˆ "  b  0.23 0.28  0.26  0.26 
Number of persons 159,462 36,933 167,508 41,633 
Number of observations 26,496 8,036 27,592 8,888 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.   
a The models adjust for the effects of the same set of control variables used in Model 2 (Table 4.4). Full 
results are available upon request.  
b 
! 
ˆ "  (intra-class correlation) = 
! 
ˆ " 
( ˆ " + ˆ # )
, where 
! 
ˆ "  is the estimate of the variance of the random intercept 
of persons,  
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
male-dominated occupations are more likely to leave the occupation than their 
childless counterparts when they work between 50 and 60 hours per week. However, 
the interaction effect for men does not reach the 5 percent significance level. Not 
surprisingly, the overwork effect for women decreases when higher cutoff points are 
applied, and the interaction effects of children and long work hours appear weaker. 
Also, the estimated effects do not reach the significance level for women who work 60 
hours or more per week. 
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In contrast, the results suggest that having children decreases the odds of 
men’s moving out of male-dominated occupations. Using the 40 percent cutoff point, 
the odds of men who work between 50 and 60 hours and have children are 19 percent 
smaller than those of men without children, net of all other adjusting factors (see 
Model 2 in Table 4.6). For the 35 percent cutoff point, the direction of the effect is 
also negative, although the effect does not reach conventional significance levels. This 
suggests that the American ideal of fatherhood, which mainly consists of the provider 
role (Townsend 2002), may prevent men from quitting their jobs or moving to more 
female-dominated occupations.  
Lastly, I confirm that the overwork effect found here is specific to male-
dominated occupations. I argue that the effect of overwork on the attrition of women is 
more specific to male-dominated occupations because the overwork norm is stronger 
in male-dominated occupations than in other occupations. A close examination of the 
means of average work hours in each occupation in fact suggests the prevalence of 
overwork in male-dominated occupations (not shown). About 78 percent men and 73 
percent women in male-dominated occupations work in occupations in which the 
mean of occupational work hours is above the median of all occupations. Overwork is 
more common in male-dominated occupations than in other occupations, and 
furthermore, the penalty imposed on workers when they do not meet the norm is 
greater in these occupations (Epstein et al. 1999; Roth 2006; Stone 2007). 
In Table 4.7, I evaluate whether the overwork effect is specific to male-
dominated occupations. I applied Model 2 in Table 4.4 to the sample of those who 
work other occupations (% women ≥ 30) and estimated log odds of these workers 
quitting or moving to male-dominated occupations (% women <30). As expected, the 
results do not show the significant effect of overwork on increasing the odds of 
mobility of mothers in these occupations. Specifically, Model 1 in Table 4.7 indicates  
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Table 4.7. Random effects logistic regression coefficients for the effects of overwork 
on the log odds of moving out of female-dominated occupations (% women ≥30)  
 Model 1 
 Men Women 
Usual work hours per week (≥ 35 hours < 50 hours is 
omitted):    
<35 hours (part-time)  0.23**  0.24** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours -0.02 -0.10 
 (0.08) (0.11) 
≥ 60 hours  0.02  0.16 
 (0.10) (0.15) 
Have children  0.02  0.19** 
 (0.05) (0.05) 
× <35 hours   0.13+  0.06 
 (0.08) (0.06) 
× ≥ 50 < 60 hours  -0.03  0.24 
 (0.11) (0.16) 
× ≥ 60 hours -0.03  0.13 
 (0.15) (0.23) 
Other demographic and job characteristics variables a Included 
Log likelihood -17665.4 -23768.3 
! 
ˆ "  b  0.27  0.25 
Number of persons 117,527 221,979 
Number of observations 20,776 35,145 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.   
a The models adjust for the effects of the same set of control variables used in Model 2 (Table 4.4). 
Full results are available upon request. 
  
that the interaction term between having children and having worked 60 hours or more 
is not significant for either men or women: mothers who work 60 hours or more are no 
more likely to leave these occupations than childless women. The overwork effect 
appears to be more specific to women in male-dominated occupations. 
In summary, the findings presented here suggest that long work hours 
significantly increase the odds of moving out of male-dominated occupations for 
women in male-dominated occupations, while they do not affect the occupational 
mobility of men in male-dominated occupations. The overwork effect for women is 
mostly driven by women with children, indicating that caregiving responsibility is the 
key factor differentiating the effects of overwork for men and women. The workplace 
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norm that requires constant presence at work creates conflicts with the norm that 
requires constant presence in the family and results in the departure of many women 
from male-dominated occupations.    
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CHAPTER 5 
OVERWORK AND GENDER EARNINGS INEQUALITY  
 
In this chapter, I investigate whether overwork is an important source of 
gender earnings inequality. To explore this question, I conduct two sets of analyses. 
First, I examine the earnings consequences of gender-typed occupational mobility that 
is driven by overwork. In the previous chapter, I have shown that overwork is an 
important cause of women’s mobility out of male-dominated occupations. Then, what 
is the earnings consequence of this mobility? While occupational sex segregation has 
many implications for many dimensions of gender inequality, one of the immediate 
consequences is on the gender earnings gap (e.g., Petersen and Morgan 1995). In this 
chapter, I examine whether women (also men) who leave male-dominated occupations 
because of overwork experience earnings loss after moving to more female-dominated 
occupations.  
The second analysis turns to the aggregate-level inequality structure. This 
examines whether the overwork phenomenon affects trends in the gender earnings gap 
in the past three decades. The purpose of this analysis is to show that the increased pay 
for overwork, coupled with women’s under-representation in overwork, contributes to 
slow convergence in the gender earnings gap. In so doing, I also engage the important 
puzzle of why the trend of a narrowing gender earnings gap has slowed in recent years 
(Blau and Kahn 2006). I employ wage decomposition, which allows me to 
demonstrate whether the slowdown in the pace of earnings convergence is explained 
by changes in price for overwork, the gender gap in overwork, or both.  
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OVERWORK, MOBILITY, AND EARNINGS 
Data and Variables 
For the first analysis, I use the same data as in the previous chapter, SIPP, 
IPUMS, and O*NET 3.1 database (see Chapter 4). In this analysis, the sample is 
restricted to respondents who are between 18 and 64 years old, who are employed, and 
who have earnings. Also, because the focus of this study is to see whether workers 
who experience mobility from male-dominated to female-dominated occupations 
experience earnings loss, the analyses examine those who previously worked in male-
dominated occupations. The distinction between male-dominated occupations and 
other occupations is based on the 30 percent cut-off point, as in the previous chapter. 
The final sample consists of 133,511 observations (person-month) from 25,809 men, 
and 20,223 observations from 4,994 women. The sample size for men is larger than 
that for women because of the lower representation of women in male-dominated 
occupations.  
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of monthly earnings.18 
Earnings are adjusted to 2000 dollars using the Personal Consumption Expenditures 
Deflator (Bureau of Economic Analysis 2005). The means and standard deviations of 
monthly earnings are presented in Table 5.1 by gender. Not surprisingly, men’s 
earnings are higher than women’s earnings in my sample: men’s average monthly 
earnings are $2,949, and women’s earnings are $2,486. 
The key independent variables measure whether a respondent experiences 
mobility out of male-dominated occupations in response to long work hours. I measure 
this effect with the following variables. First, I use an indicator of mobility out of 
                                                
18  I use monthly earnings, instead of hourly earnings, because monthly earnings are collected for both 
hourly and salary workers, whereas hourly earnings are asked only for hourly workers. In the models, I 
include categorical variables that measure usual weekly work hours to capture any non-linearity 
between work hours and earnings (see below).  
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Table 5.1. Means and standard deviations of individual and occupational 
characteristics 
Variable  Men  Women 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Monthly earnings (2000 $100 US) 29.49 23.39 24.86 19.54 
Monthly earnings (log) 3.14 0.77 2.93 0.88 
Exit from male-dominated occupations  0.03  0.07  
Usual work hours per week, 4 month 
lagged  (≥ 35 hours < 50 hours is omitted):      
< 35 hours (part-time) 0.18  0.27  
≥ 50 hours <60 hours 0.13  0.07  
≥ 60 hours 0.07  0.03  
Married 0.66  0.52  
Have child 0.45  0.43  
Age 38.89 11.12 38.73 10.60 
Age squared 1636.37 891.92 1612.14 846.66 
Education (“less than high school is 
omitted”):     
High school graduate 0.37  0.34  
Some college 0.32  0.31  
College graduate 0.12  0.20  
Advanced degree 0.04  0.06  
Years of job tenure 8.03 8.58 6.99 7.44 
Years of job tenure squared 138.25 255.63 104.19 201.10 
Union 0.20  0.13  
Government  0.13  0.16  
Have two or more jobs 0.08  0.09  
Usual work hours per week (≥ 35 hours < 
50 hours is omitted):      
< 35 hours (part-time) 0.18  0.27  
≥ 50 hours <60 hours 0.13  0.07  
≥ 60 hours 0.07  0.02  
Occupational skill measures     
Verbal -0.16 0.90 0.06 0.90 
Dexterity 2.25 0.67 2.06 0.59 
Nurturance -0.27 0.69 -0.08 0.74 
Strength 0.66 1.00 0.18 0.93 
Disamenities 0.47 0.68 0.03 0.62 
Math -0.12 0.90 0.06 0.90 
Analytical -0.14 0.90 -0.02 0.95 
Authority -0.14 0.87 -0.03 0.88 
Technical 0.54 0.87 0.17 0.76 
Index of occupational specific skills 2.60 1.14 2.55 1.22 
Other occupational characteristics:     
Percent of self-employed workers 3.82 2.55 3.59 2.67 
Average years of work experience 18.76 3.01 17.97 3.22 
Average years of job tenure 7.45 2.87 7.30 2.79 
Median of monthly earnings (2000 U.S. 
100 dollars) 24.78 9.17 24.99 10.33 
Percent of non-white workers 24.61 10.68 25.18 10.74 
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Table 5.1 (Continued) 
Percent of married workers 60.27 12.41 57.87 13.31 
Percent of workers with children 43.49 6.53 42.89 5.99 
Percent of workers with college degree 4.34 10.14 6.18 11.53 
Industry (“manufacturing” is omitted)     
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries 0.04  0.03  
Mining, construction 0.17  0.02  
Manufacturing 0.25  0.30  
Transportation, communication, and 
other public utilities 0.13  0.10  
Wholesale trade 0.07  0.07  
Retail trade 0.09  0.14  
Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.02  0.03  
Business and repair services 0.08  0.09  
Personal services 0.01  0.01  
Entertainment and recreation services 0.01  0.01  
Public administration 0.07  0.09  
Occupation (“professional and managerial” 
is omitted):     
Technical, sales, and administrative 
support  0.13  0.27  
Service  0.06  0.08  
Farming, forestry, and fishing  0.04  0.03  
Precision production, craft, and repair  0.33  0.13  
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 0.30  0.29  
Year (“1996” is omitted)     
1997 0.18  0.17  
1998 0.16  0.16  
1999 0.16  0.16  
2000 0.03  0.03  
2001 0.10  0.11  
2002 0.14  0.14  
2003 0.14  0.14  
Number of observations 133511  20223  
Number of persons 25809  4994  
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003) 
 
male-dominated occupations: if a respondent who previously worked in a male-
dominated occupation now works in a more female-dominated occupation, it is coded 
1; if a respondent still works in a male-dominated occupation, it is coded 0. In my 
sample, 3 percent men and 7 percent women move from male-dominated to female-
dominated occupations.  
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A second set of variables measure whether a respondent worked long hours in 
his or her previous job. As in the previous chapter, I measure this with a series of 
dummy variables indicating a respondent’s weekly hours in the main jobs are less than 
35 hours per week (“part-time”); 50 hours or more but less than 60 hours per week 
(“between 50 and 60 hours”); 60 hours or more per week (“60 hours or more”). The 
category that indicates respondents’ work hours of 35 hours or more but less than 50 
hours (“full-time”) serves as the reference category. These variables are lagged by 4 
months. The last two categories measure the overwork effect. Table 5.1 shows that 
more men than women overworked in their previous jobs: 20 percent men and 10 
percent women previously worked 50 hours or more in my sample. The primary 
interest in this analysis is in the effect of mobility driven by overwork, and this is 
estimated by the interaction effects between exit from male-dominated occupation and 
overwork. The interaction terms consist of 751 men, or 0.6 percent of the sample; 119 
women, or 0.7 percent of the sample.  
In addition to these key variables, I include other time varying covariates in the 
models which are known to affect the relationship between mobility and earnings. 
They include age, marital status, parental status, education, years of job tenure, union 
coverage, public sector, weekly work hours in the current job (measured by 
categorical variables), occupation, industry, and year. I use the same scales for these 
variables that I used in the previous chapter (see Table 5.1 for complete list and 
Chapter 4 for variable descriptions). 
 
Method 
I use fixed effects regression models to evaluate whether mobility driven by 
overwork decreases men’s and women’s earnings. Fixed effects models are commonly 
used to examine the consequence of an event on earnings. They adjust for both 
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observed and unobserved characteristics that are stable over time. The residual 
variance is attributed to longitudinal change within respondents. The general form of 
the model is written as follows: 
 yij = xijβ + αi + εit                           (1) 
where yit is the natural logarithm of monthly earnings of worker i at month j; xit is a 
vector of time varying covariates for person i at month t; β is a vector of regression 
coefficients; αi, represents unobserved stable characteristics of person i; εit, represents 
the random error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean 
and constant variance.     
 
Fixed Effects Analysis of Earnings 
The fixed effects models in Table 5.2 evaluate whether mobility driven by 
overwork from male-dominated to female-dominated occupations is associated with a 
decrease in earnings. Model 1 presents this effect with standard covariates of 
individual characteristics that are typically used for the earnings regressions. For 
Model 2, I add occupational characteristics measures as covariates. The results support 
the hypothesis that overwork-based mobility generates earnings loss for women. For 
men, by contrast, it leads to either no change or a slight increase in earnings. 
In Model 1, the interaction effect of mobility to more female-dominated 
occupations and working 60 hours or more per week in the previous jobs indicates a 
significant negative effect on earnings for women. Women who work 60 hours or 
more per week and leave male-dominated occupations tend to experience about 2.5 
percent earnings loss in their next jobs, compared to women who work similar hours 
but stay in male-dominated occupations. However, if women move to female-
dominated occupations, and the mobility is not driven by overwork (i.e., previously 
worked full-time hours), they do not experience significant earnings loss, as the main  
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Table 5.2. Fixed effects regression models estimating the log of monthly earnings, all 
workers  
 Model 1  Model 2  
 Men Women Men Women 
Usual work hours per week, 4 month 
lagged  (≥ 35 hours < 50 hours is 
omitted):      
<35 hours (part-time) -0.03** -0.08** -0.03** -0.08** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.02**  0.02  0.02**  0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
≥ 60 hours  0.02**  0.05  0.02**  0.05 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Exit from male-dominated occupations  -0.09** -0.02 -0.07**  0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
 × <35 hours (part-time)  0.10**  0.24**  0.11**  0.23** 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
× ≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.10** -0.09  0.09** -0.10 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.09) 
× ≥ 60 hours -0.03 -0.25* -0.03 -0.27* 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.04) (0.11) 
Married  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Have child  0.01 -0.02  0.01 -0.01 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Age  0.10**  0.02  0.10**  0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education (“less than high school” is 
omitted)     
High school graduate  0.12**  0.23**  0.12**  0.23** 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) 
Some college  0.13**  0.22*  0.13**  0.24* 
 (0.03) (0.10) (0.03) (0.10) 
College graduate  0.38**  0.43**  0.37**  0.44** 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) 
Advanced degree  0.39**  0.42*  0.39**  0.43* 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.17) 
Years of job tenure -0.00  0.01 -0.00  0.01 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Years of job tenure squared  0.00** -0.00  0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union  0.08**  0.01  0.08**  0.01 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Government sector -0.04* -0.27** -0.04+ -0.26** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
Two or more jobs -0.13** -0.11** -0.13** -0.11** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Usual work hours per week  (≥ 35 hours < 
50 hours is omitted):      
<35 hours (part-time) -0.12** -0.12** -0.12** -0.12** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.11**  0.11**  0.11**  0.11** 
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Table 5.2 (Continued) 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
≥ 60 hours  0.18**  0.13**  0.18**  0.13** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Industry a     
Occupations b     
Year c     
Occupational skill measures d      
Constant  0.80**  2.12**  5.19**  6.32** 
 (0.15) (0.47) (0.16) (0.49) 
Number of observations 133511 20223 133511 20220 d 
Number of persons 25809 4994 25809 4993 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.   
a b c  The coefficients of dummy variables for the industry, occupation, and year as well as the effects of 
occupational skill measures are estimated in all models but are not shown here. Full results are available 
upon request. 
d The number of observations differ for women in Model 3 due to 3 cases missing on one of the 
occupational skill measures (the average years of job experience in the occupation).   
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
effect of exiting male-dominated occupations indicates. Also, the wage penalty for 
women who previously worked 50 hours or more is not significant, as indicated by the 
interaction effect between exiting male-dominated occupations and having worked 50 
hours or more. This is consistent with the findings from the prior chapter, indicating 
that only excessive long hours generate different labor market outcomes for men and 
women. The greater earnings loss for women who worked excessively long hours may 
be associated with employer-worker match (Bartel and Borjas 1981; Jovanovic 1979). 
Women’s mobility driven by overwork is likely to occur because of having difficulty 
reconciling work and caregiving responsibilities, which may lead to poor job match, 
hence decrease workers’ subsequent earnings. The main effects of both overwork 
categories for women indicate positive coefficients, suggesting that among stayers, 
earnings of overworkers are more likely to be higher than those of non-overworkers.   
Men’s earnings do not show a similar pattern: men who leave male-dominated 
occupations in response to overwork do not experience earnings loss. On the contrary, 
the interaction effect of leaving male-dominated occupations and 50 hours or more 
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suggests that these men’s earnings increase by 2 percent. The increased earnings may 
reflect improved job match for these men. Unlike overworking women, overworking 
are under a fewer structural constraints in the mobility process. On the contrary, 
normative expectation of breadwinning prevents these men to change jobs due to 
familial reasons, and therefore, their mobility is more likely to be job-related reasons, 
improving job match. The earnings increase may also be because overworking men 
who move to female-dominated occupations are experiencing the relative advantages 
of being male in female-dominated occupations. These “glass escalator” effect 
(Williams 1989:256) is no longer significant for men who worked even more hours, 
60 hours or more per week. However, at the very least, these men do not experience 
significant earnings loss, unlike their female-counterparts.  
We have seen in the previous chapter that overwork prompts gender typed 
mobility by increasing women’s odds of exiting male-dominated occupations, but not 
men’s odds. Together with the previous findings, the findings in this chapter suggest 
that overwork increases the attrition of women from male-dominated occupations, and 
when this happens, it results in greater earnings loss for women than for men.  
Unlike quitting driven by overwork, quitting driven by non-overwork factors 
does not result in earnings increase for men; instead, these men’s earnings are lower 
by 9 percent than earnings of those who stay in male-dominated occupations, as the 
main effect of exiting male-dominated occupations indicates. This suggests that the 
glass escalator effect only exists for overworking men who quit male-dominated 
occupations, and non-overworking men experience earnings loss by moving from 
male-dominated to female-dominated occupations.19 Women who previously worked 
                                                
19 While job match theory predicts that job-related mobility should result in earnings increase because 
job mobility is a process of improving employer-worker match (e.g., Jovanovic 1979). This is not 
strictly applicable to this study because earnings gain here are compared to those who stay in male-
dominated occupations (including job switchers within male-dominated occupations), not their prior 
earnings. 
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full-time hours do not experience significant earnings loss by this mobility process. 
Note, however, that although men working full-time hours tend to experience greater 
earnings loss than their female-counterparts when they move to female-dominated 
occupations, the earnings penalty for these men is still lower (b = -.09) than that of 
women experience overwork-based mobility (b = -.25).  
Those who previously worked part-time hours reveal an interesting mobility 
effect. The main effect of working part-time hours in the prior job suggests that both 
part-time men and women experience wage penalties, even though they stay in the 
male-dominated occupations, but part-time women experience greater penalties: part-
timers’ earnings are lower by 3 percent for men and by 8 percent for women, 
compared to those of full-time workers. Interestingly, however, mobility to female-
dominated occupations increases earnings for both part-time men and women. 
Specifically, when part-time men move to more female-dominated occupations, their 
earnings increase by 10 percent, and when part-time women does, by 24 percent. The 
earnings increase for part-time workers may be due to greater earnings penalties for 
part-time work in male-dominated occupations than in other occupations (Epstein et al. 
1999; Hochschild 1997; Stone 2007). For this reason, once part-timers move out of 
male-dominated occupations, they may experience earnings gain even if they still 
work part-time hours. If part-time workers quit male-dominated occupations because 
of “underwork,” and this is resolved in the subsequent occupation, their earnings gain 
may reflect changes from part-time to full-time workers.  
While results in Model 1 confirm the hypothesis that overworkers’ exiting 
from male-dominated occupations contributes to gender earnings inequality, the 
results do not tell us why women experience greater earnings loss than men. One 
explanation may be gender differences in occupational skill requirements in the 
destination occupations (e.g., Polachek 1975; Zellner 1975). One could argue that 
 78 
although both men and women quit male-dominated occupations, women tend to 
move to occupations that require lower-level skills than men do, thereby generating 
greater earnings loss.  
I evaluate this argument in Model 2. I use additional variables that adjust for 
occupational skill requirements and other important occupational characteristics, each 
measured at the detailed (3-digit) occupation level (See Table 4.2 for a complete list).  
The results from Model 2 show that accounting for occupational skills helps to 
explain some, but not all, of the gender differences in the mobility effect. After 
adjusting for occupational characteristics, the wage penalty decreases from 9 percent 
to 7 percent, for men who previously worked full-time hours. However, more than half 
of the penalty remains. The glass escalator effect for overworking men moving to 
female-dominated occupations also reduces slightly, but remains strong and positive 
(see the interaction between mobility and 50 hours or more). 
Adjusting for detailed occupational characteristics decreases the magnitudes of 
the effects for most key mobility variables, but the earnings loss increases for women 
who worked 60 hours or more before leaving exiting male-dominated occupations 
(from 25 percent to 27 percent).  
The findings in Model 2 suggest that differences in skills in the destination 
occupations help to explain why we see earnings loss from this mobility process, but a 
substantial portion remains unexplained. Sources for this unexplained mobility penalty 
could be gender difference in worker-employer match of the subsequent job 
(Jovanovic 1979), job-level segregation (Petersen and Morgan 1995), cultural 
devaluation for women’s work (Kilbourne et al. 1994), and wage discrimination. One 
could argue that gender differences in unobserved qualifications (e.g., commitment to 
work or unobserved skills) can explain the greater earnings loss for women (e.g., 
Hakim 1991; Tam 1997). However, given that women tend to experience more 
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discrimination, lack of social support, and sexual harassment than their male 
counterparts (Jacobs 1989; Long 2001; Williams 1989), women in the observational 
data in the sample may be in fact more committed and competent than their male peers.  
Does the segregation effect, measured by women’s representation in 
destination occupations, explain the remaining penalty effect? To explore this question, 
in Table 5.3, I separate workers who move to female-dominated occupations into two 
groups: (1) workers who move to occupations in which women’s representation is 
between 30 and 70 percent of the occupation, and (2) workers who move to 
occupations in which women’s representation is 70 percent or more. For each variable, 
which is modeled separately, the reference category consists of those who stay in 
male-dominated occupations. Model 1 in Table 5.3 estimates the effect of moving 
from male-dominated occupations to occupations with percent of women between 30 
and 70; Model 2 estimates the effect of mobility from male-dominated occupations to 
occupations with 70 percent or more women. In my sample, 2.8 percent of men and 
4.5 percent of women move to the occupations with percent of women between 30 and 
70 (“less than 70”); 0.6 percent men and 3.6 percent of women moved to the 
occupations with percent of women 70 or more (“70 or more”). 
The results from Table 5.3 show that the wage penalty for mobility driven by 
overwork is greater for women as women’s representation in destination occupations 
increase. The overwork driven mobility, indicated by the interaction effect of exiting 
male-dominated occupations and 60 hours or more (in prior jobs) in Model 1 of Table 
5.3, is negative but not significant (p>.05). In Model 2, the same interaction effect is 
significant, and the magnitude of the negative effect is larger (43 percent earnings 
loss) than previously shown in Table 5.2 (25 to 27 percent). Earnings are lower in 
female-dominated occupations than in male-dominated occupations even after 
adjusting for many known factors, which may in part explain why the penalty of  
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Table 5.3. Fixed effects regression models estimating the log of monthly earnings, by 
gender type of current occupations  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Men Women Men Women 
Usual work hours per week, 4 month 
lagged  (≥ 35 hours < 50 hours is 
omitted):      
<35 hours (part-time) -0.03** -0.07** -0.03** -0.07** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.02**  0.01  0.02**  0.02 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
≥ 60 hours  0.02**  0.04  0.02**  0.06* 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Exit from male-dominated occupations 
    to occupations with  % women ≥30  
<70 -0.03**  0.00   
 (0.02) (0.04)   
 × <35 hours (part-time)  0.10**  0.23**   
 (0.02) (0.05)   
× ≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.09** -0.02   
 (0.03) (0.10)   
× ≥ 60 hours -0.03 -0.19   
 (0.04) (0.13)   
Exit from male-dominated occupations 
    to occupations with  % women ≥70   -0.13** -0.08+ 
   (0.04) (0.05) 
 × <35 hours (part-time)    0.13*  0.28** 
   (0.05) (0.07) 
× ≥ 50 hours < 60 hours    0.19* -0.23 
   (0.10) (0.15) 
× ≥ 60 hours   -0.02 -0.43* 
   (0.11) (0.21) 
Married  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Have child  0.01 -0.03  0.01 -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Age  0.10**  0.02  0.09**  0.03+ 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Age squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education (“less than high school” is 
omitted)     
High school graduate  0.11**  0.24**  0.12**  0.23** 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.09) 
Some college  0.12**  0.25*  0.12**  0.22* 
 (0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (0.10) 
College graduate  0.35**  0.48**  0.36**  0.45** 
 (0.04) (0.12) (0.04) (0.12) 
Advanced degree  0.37**  0.48**  0.31**  0.44** 
 (0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.17) 
Years of job tenure -0.00  0.01+  0.00  0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Years of job tenure squared  0.00** -0.00  0.00* -0.00 
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Table 5.3 (Continued) 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union  0.08**  0.01  0.08** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Government sector -0.03 -0.23** -0.06** -0.31** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) 
Two or more jobs -0.13** -0.12** -0.12** -0.09** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Usual work hours per week  (≥ 35 hours 
< 50 hours is omitted):      
<35 hours (part-time) -0.12** -0.11** -0.11** -0.10** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.11**  0.11**  0.11**  0.11** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
≥ 60 hours  0.18**  0.11**  0.18**  0.13** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Industry a     
Occupations b     
Year c     
Constant  0.85**  2.18**  0.92**  1.90** 
 (0.15) (0.47) (0.15) (0.46) 
     
     
Number of observations 132765 19550 129985 19396 
Number of persons 25529 4647 24818 4691 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.   
a b c  The coefficients of dummy variables for the industry, occupation, and year as well as the effects of 
occupational skill measures are estimated in all models but are not shown here. Full results are available 
upon request.  
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
mobility due to overwork is greater when women move to occupations where 
women’s representation is higher.  
Both Models 1 and 2 in Table 5.3 show the glass escalator effect for men who 
move to female-dominated occupations, but the earnings gain is greater for men who 
move to occupations in which women’s representation is the highest (Model 2). This 
means that being in more female-dominated occupations give men more earnings 
advantage. As shown in the previous models, however, this glass escalator effect only 
applies to men who previously worked long hours. Men who worked full-time hours 
lose by moving to female-dominated occupations, and the penalty is greater for men 
who move to occupations in which women’s representation is 70 percent or more, than 
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for men who move to female occupations in which women’s representation is lower 
than 70 percent (3 percent vs. 13 percent). 
Lastly, I investigate whether the wage penalty for mobility driven by overwork 
differs by workers’ parental status. In keeping with the findings from the previous 
chapter, I expect that after quitting, mothers are also more likely to face the most 
constraints in finding their next jobs, because of discrimination toward mothers and 
gendered expectations to fulfill the caregiving role (Correll et al. 2007; Gerson 1986), 
and experience greatest earnings penalties in their next jobs.  
Models 1 and 2 in Table 5.4 support this argument. I estimate the model 
separately for workers with children (Model 1) and for workers without children 
(Model 2).20 Comparison of two models indicates that the coefficient of the interaction 
effects of exiting male-dominated occupations and working 60 hours or more in the 
previous job is significantly negative only for mothers, indicating a 38 percent 
earnings decrease, but not childless women. Childless women’s earnings are not 
significantly different from similar women who stay in male-dominated occupations. 
This suggests that the greater earnings loss for women who experience mobility to 
female-dominated occupations is partly explained by the motherhood penalty effect 
(Budig and England 2001; Correll et al. 2007).  
Both fathers and childless men continue to show an earnings increase when 
they move to female-dominated occupations after overworking. An earnings increase 
is slightly larger for childless men (12 percent) than fathers (9 percent).  
In summary, the results in this chapter show that mobility due to overwork 
generates substantial earnings loss for women, but men tend to experience a relative 
                                                
20 Alternatively, the interaction effect between the variables of interest and the indicator of having 
children can be estimated in the pooled model. However, because the key variable is already an 
interaction effect between mobility and work hours in previous jobs, this will generate three-way 
interaction terms, which decrease the accuracy of the results due to the small variance in each 
subcategory (especially for women) and also complicate the interpretation.  
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Table 5.4. Fixed effects regression models estimating the log of monthly earnings, by 
parental status  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
(Workers with 
children) 
(Workers without 
children) 
 Men Women Men Women 
Usual work hours per week, 4 
month lagged  (≥ 35 hours < 50 
hours is omitted):      
<35 hours (part-time) -0.03** -0.09** -0.03** -0.06** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.01  0.02  0.02** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
≥ 60 hours  0.03**  0.02  0.01  0.06 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) 
Exit from male-dominated 
occupations -0.08**  0.04 -0.09** -0.05 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
 × <35 hours (part-time)  0.09*  0.25**  0.12**  0.23** 
 (0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06) 
× ≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.09+ -0.11  0.12** -0.07 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.04) (0.12) 
× ≥ 60 hours -0.07 -0.38* -0.00 -0.04 
 (0.06) (0.15) (0.06) (0.17) 
Married  0.01  0.01  0.00 -0.03 
 (0.02) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) 
Have child -0.03*  0.01  0.02  0.04 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.06) 
Age  0.08**  0.03  0.10**  0.02 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.03) 
Age squared -0.00** -0.00 -0.00** -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education (“less than high school” 
is omitted)     
High school graduate  0.11**  0.30*  0.16**  0.16 
 (0.03) (0.13) (0.04) (0.13) 
Some college  0.08+  0.29+  0.20**  0.13 
 (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) (0.14) 
College graduate  0.35**  0.16  0.46**  0.39* 
 (0.06) (0.20) (0.06) (0.17) 
Advanced degree  0.22*  0.21  0.49**  0.37 
 (0.09) (0.26) (0.09) (0.24) 
Years of job tenure -0.00  0.01+ -0.00  0.00 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Years of job tenure squared  0.00 -0.00  0.00* -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Union  0.06**  0.02  0.08** -0.02 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Government sector -0.03 -0.12 -0.06* -0.36** 
 (0.03) (0.09) (0.03) (0.08) 
Two or more jobs -0.13** -0.17** -0.13** -0.09** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.03) 
Usual work hours per week  (≥ 35 
hours < 50 hours is omitted):      
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<35 hours (part-time) -0.10** -0.15** -0.13** -0.07** 
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Table 5.4 (Continued) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.12**  0.15**  0.11**  0.09** 
 (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) 
≥ 60 hours  0.19**  0.13**  0.17**  0.12** 
 (0.01) (0.05) (0.01) (0.04) 
Industry a     
Occupations b     
Year c     
Constant  1.32**  1.77*  0.66**  2.36** 
 (0.24) (0.75) (0.20) (0.65) 
     
     
Number of observations 59733 8680 73778 11543 
Number of persons 11744 2285 16427 2983 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.   
a b c The coefficients of dummy variables for the industry, occupation, and year are estimated in all 
models but are not shown here. Full results are available upon request.  
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
 
advantage through this mobility process. A part of this disparity is due to segregation: 
women tend to move to occupations in which women’s representation is greater. 
Greater earnings loss for women associated with this mobility is driven by mothers: 
the same mobility generates greater penalty for mothers, but earnings loss becomes 
nonsignificant for non-mothers. As in the previous chapter, this analysis suggests that 
mothers are mostly likely to leave male-dominated occupations when they work long 
hours, and when they do, this mobility generates the largest decline in earnings.  
 
OVERWORK AND THE SLOW CONVERGENCE IN THE GENDER 
EARNINGS GAP 
In this final analysis, I turn to aggregate trends in earnings to evaluate the 
effect of overwork on the slow pace of earnings convergence between men and 
women. The pace of narrowing the gender gap in earnings slowed during the 1990s 
(Blau and Kahn 2006). Figure 5.1 confirms this pattern in a more comprehensive  
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Figure 5.1. The trend of the gender earnings ratio 
 
range of years. I include both part-time and full-time workers, unlike many prior 
studies. The upper line indicates women’s hourly weekly earnings, presented as a 
proportion of men’s, and the lower line indicates women’s mean weekly earnings, also 
presented as a proportion of men’s. Both gender earnings ratios show that the gender 
gap in earnings narrowed over the study period. However, most of the changes 
occurred during the 1980s, and we see very little change after the mid-1990s. The 
upper line shows that in mean hourly earnings, women earned 65 percent of men’s 
earnings in 1979, but the gap narrowed by 1994, in which women earned 79 percent of 
men’s earnings. The rate of this improvement did not continue afterwards: the gender 
hourly earnings ratio improved only by 2 percentage points by 2008, in which women 
earned 81 percent of men’s earnings. Weekly earnings also indicates a similar pattern, 
although the overall gender weekly earnings ratio shows more inequality than gender 
hourly earnings ratio does. Women earned 56 percent of their male counterparts in 
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1979, 67 percent in 1994, and 71 percent in 2008, which also suggests that the rate of 
narrowing the gender earnings gap has stalled since the mid 1990s. 
In the structural sense, there are two ways that overwork can affect the trend in 
the gender earnings gap. One stems from the changes in the number of men and 
women who overwork (“compositional change”). The gender earnings gap can widen 
as the gender gap in work hours increases. The other way is through the changes in 
returns to overwork (“price factor change”). Even if the gap in work hours remains 
constant, the gender gap in earnings can widen when returns to overwork increase, 
given that there are more men who overwork than women.  
In this chapter, I assess both potential sources of change and show that 
overwork contributes to increased gender earnings inequality through the second 
process, an increased compensation for overwork. I begin with examining important 
trends: the trend of the gender gap in earnings and returns to overwork. I then use 
wage decomposition to analytically separate the two ways in which overwork 
contributes to slowing the narrowing of the gender earnings gap. 
 
Data 
I use the data from Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups of the Current 
Population Survey (hereafter CPS), which are commonly used for the analysis of 
earnings. In CPS, in contrast to the SIPP, earnings data are available for a longer time 
period, and the variables are more consistently constructed throughout the survey 
years. I first use all available years’ data (from 1979 to 2008) from CPS to show the 
trend of the gender earnings gap and the returns to work hours. I then apply the 
decomposition method to data from 1979 and 2007 to investigate whether the 
increased price of overwork contributes to widening the gender earnings gap.21 Lastly, 
                                                
21  I do not use the 2008 data because it is in the middle of the late 2000s recession, which started in Dec 
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I compare the decomposition results from 1979, 1994, and 2007 to assess whether the 
overwork phenomenon can partly explain why convergence of the gender gap slowed 
in the latter period. The analytic sample is limited to workers aged 18 to 64 with 
positive earnings (N = 4,494,906 for the trend analysis; N= 440,632 for the 
decomposition analysis). I use sampling weights provided by CPS files for all analyses.  
 
Methods 
To show how the compensation of long work hours have changed over the 
years, I use ordinary least square regression analysis to estimate the returns to 
overwork (i.e., weekly hours 50 or more), net of various individual characteristics. 
Unlike in other analyses, I use only one overwork variable in the final analysis for 
simplicity. After examining how the returns to overwork have changed over time, I 
apply the decomposition method developed by Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1991) to 
analytically separate the effect of overwork into two parts: composition and price 
effects (also see Blau and Kahn 2006).  
I begin with a male wage equation, which assumes that prices for men for the 
observed characteristics would prevail without discrimination. The model takes the 
general form as follows:  
 
! 
yit = xitbt +"t#t ,     (1) 
 
where yit is the log of earnings for individual i in year t; x is a row vector of 
independent variables; b is a column vector of regression coefficients; σ is the residual 
standard deviation of male earnings for that year, which measures the male residual 
earnings inequality; θ is a standardized residual, with mean zero and variance 1 for 
                                                                                                                                       
2007. The macro economic conditions indicate overall strong economy in years used for the analysis.  
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each year. The difference in the gender earnings gap between two time points, denoted 
by 0 and 1, can be decomposed into four components (for details see Blau and Kahn 
2006; Juhn et al. 1991): 
 
 Observed x effect = (Δx1-Δx0)b1    (2) 
 Observed price effect = Δxo(b1-b0)    (3)  
  Unobserved quantity effect = (Δθ1 - Δθ0)σ1  (4)  
  Unobserved price effect = Δθ0(σ1 - σ0)   (5) 
 
In these equations, Δ denotes the average male-female difference for the 
variable it precedes. The observed x effect is the portion of the variance explained by 
changes in the gender gap in the quantity of observed qualifications (x), which include 
the decrease or increase in the gender gap in overwork between the two time points. 
The observed price effect indicates changes in the gender earnings gap due to the 
changes in the price of each qualification x in the male equation. For example, it 
estimates the changes in the returns to overwork between two time points. Even if the 
average of hours worked for men and women remains the same in two time points, if 
the labor market pays higher wage per hour for overworkers, the earnings gap can 
widen, given that more men than women work long hours. 
The unobserved quantity and price effects measure the effect of unobserved 
variables on the changes in the earnings gap. The unobserved quantity effect explains 
the composition effect, as in (2): it measures the contribution of changing gender gaps 
in the relative positions (i.e., percentile rankings) in the men’s residual wage 
distribution. The unobserved price effect explains the price factor for the 
unobservables, as in (3): it measures the changes in the gender gap in earnings due to 
the changes in men’s residual wage distribution, under the assumption that women’s 
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percentile rankings in the male residual wage distribution did not change. The primary 
interest in this chapter are in (2) and (3) for observed effects. These estimates bring 
evidence to see whether the stalling of the gender gap in earnings has been driven by 
(a) the increase in the gender gap in work hours or (b) the increase in price for 
overwork.  
To apply the variance decomposition technique, I use the standard wage 
equation that estimates the log of hourly earnings with weekly hours variables and 
covariates, which I describe below.  
 
Variables 
 The dependent variable is the log of real hourly earnings expressed in 2008 
pennies.22 I use real earnings, instead of logged earnings, for some trend analyses to 
provide more meaningful interpretations. Top-coded earnings are multiplied by 1.4, 
the most commonly accepted multiplier in labor economics (e.g., Card and DiNardo 
2002). As shown in Table 5.5, men’s hourly earnings are substantially higher than 
women’s earnings, although the gap has narrowed. In 1979, men’s average hourly 
earnings were about 22.0, dollars, and women’s earnings were 14.3 dollars, or 65 
percent of men’s earnings. In 1994, men’s hourly earnings decreased to about 20.0 
dollars, whereas women’s earnings improved substantially to 15.8 dollars, or 79 
percent of men’s earnings. Women’s earnings continue to increase, and the gap 
narrows further, but at a slower pace. In 2007, men’s and women’s hourly earnings 
were about 22.2 dollars and 18 dollars (81 percent of men’s earnings).  
 To estimate the effect of long work hours, I use a set of dummy variables 
indicating individual weekly work hours, as in previous chapters: less than 35 hours  
                                                
22 Alternative is to use weekly earnings adjusting for weekly work hours in addition to the indicators for 
overwork and part-time, but using hourly earnings gives cleaner interpretation. Hourly earnings are 
presented in pennies to carry fewer decimal points.   
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Table 5.5. Means and standard deviations of variables used for the wage 
decomposition analysis 
Variable Men Women 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Hourly earnings (2008 US Dollars in 
pennies)     
in 1979 2199.18 1263.91 1438.73 977.79 
in 1994 2004.95 1476.00 1588.17 1355.55 
in 2007 2218.04 2237.67 1803.40 1508.76 
Overwork     
in 1979 0.15  0.03  
in 1994 0.18  0.06  
in 2007 0.17  0.07  
Part-time     
in 1979 0.06  0.24  
in 1994 0.08  0.24  
in 2007 0.08  0.21  
Age 37.80 12.05 38.12 12.24 
Age squared 1573.95 959.19 1602.61 973.51 
Race:     
Black 0.10  0.13  
Hispanic 0.12  0.09  
Other race 0.04  0.04  
Education:     
Less than high school 0.34  0.35  
High school graduates 0.26  0.30  
Some college 0.17  0.18  
College graduates 0.09  0.08  
Potential experience 18.69 12.24 18.78 12.50 
Potential experience squared 499.15 534.24 509.11 536.56 
Region:     
Midwest 0.25  0.25  
South 0.35  0.35  
West 0.21  0.20  
Metropolitan residency 0.80  0.81  
Public 0.15  0.20  
N 230083  210549  
Source: Current Population Survey, 1979, 1994, 2007 
 
(part-time), 35 hours or more but less than 50 hours (full-time), and 50 hours or more 
(overwork). The full-time hour category serves as the reference category. Table 5.5 
suggests that the percentage of overworkers has increased for both men and women 
between 1979 and 2007, but men are overrepresented in the overwork category 
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throughout the years. In 1979, 15 percent of men and 3 percent of women worked 50 
hours or more per week; in 2007, 17 percent of men and 7 percent of women did. 
In the models, earnings are also predicted from individual characteristics, such 
as race, gender, age, age squared, marriage, education, potential years of work 
experience (i.e., age – years of schooling – 6), experience squared, region, 
metropolitan residency, and whether the job is in the public sector (see list in Table 
A.2 in the appendix for the variables used for the trend analysis, and Table 5.5 for 
variables used for the decomposition analysis).23 
Although marriage is an important determinant of men’s and women’s wages, 
I include it only in the regression models for the trend analysis that estimates the 
returns to overwork, but not in the wage equation for the decomposition result. The 
JMP decomposition assumes the common labor market for men and women, applying 
the price for men to both men and women. However, marital status has a drastically 
different impact on men’s and women’s earnings: it has a positive association with 
men’s earnings (Korenman and Neumark 1991) and a negative association with 
women’s earnings. Without adjusting for children variables (which are not available in 
the data), marital status may be highly correlated with parental status, which has 
shown a wage penalty effect for women (Budig and England 2001; Correll et al. 2007; 
Waldfogel 1997).24 Because of this gender difference, if I include marital status in the 
model and apply the male wage equation to women, it would assume that marriage has 
a positive effect on women’s earnings as well, and this would severely underestimate 
                                                
23  Years of work experience and years of job tenure are important determinants of earnings, but such 
information is not provided by CPS. Despite the several drawbacks of SIPP described earlier, SIPP asks 
respondents’ actual work experience once at the beginning of the panel through the “topical module.”  
Work experience variables include actual years of long-term work experience (length of employment 
more than 6 months) and an indicator whether it is mostly in part-time positions (see Table A.4 in the 
Appendix). I use data from available years in SIPP (1996 and 2004) and apply the decomposition 
technique to confirm the robustness of the results on the overwork effect using CPS, and also examine 
more accurate effects of work experience and job tenure. I discuss the results from this analysis below.    
24 CPS does not collect information on parental status before 1984 and between 1993 and 1999. 
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the price effect of marital status on the gender gap in earnings. Therefore, I omit 
marital status in the model and allow its effect, as well as parental status, to be 
captured by the unexplained terms.  
Also, while occupations and industries are known to be important factors to 
determine the gender earnings gap, I do not include them in the models because 
occupation and industry codes are not compatible across all years. Nonetheless, the 
sorting process to occupations and industries itself may in fact be influenced by 
discrimination or gender stereotyping. Occupations and industries also reflect the 
hierarchical structure of the market, which is also stratified by work hours (the 
overwork norm is stronger in higher rank better-paying jobs). Therefore, the models 
allow these factors to be endogenous. 
 
The Trend Analysis of Earnings and Overwork 
 The pace of narrowing the gender gap in earnings slowed during the 1990s as 
shown earlier in Figure 5.1. The “slow convergence” of the gender earnings gap has 
been a puzzle for many scholars, who have attempted to identify causes that drive this 
pattern (e.g., Blau and Kahn 2006). The increased norm of overwork suggests that the 
major contribution to this phenomenon may be the tendency for the labor market to 
value employees who work long hours. On the other hand, as shown in Figures 3.1 
and 3.3, the gender gap in the mean of weekly work hours has narrowed, and the 
gender gap in the proportion of overworkers also has remained relatively stable. Here, 
I explore whether changes in the price for overwork contributed to stalling the closing 
of the gender gap in earnings. I first examine changes in returns to overwork in Figure 
5.2, presented as hourly earnings of overworkers as a percent of full-time workers (see 
Table A.2 in the appendix for the list of variables included in the model). The effects 
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are all significant at the 5 percent level, except for years 1994 to 1996, where the 
effects are close to 0.  
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Source: Current Population Survey, Merged Outgoing Rotation Group, 1979-2008 
Note: The effects are adjusted by demographic and job-related factors (see Table A.2 for a complete list 
of variables) 
 
Figure 5.2. The mean of overworkers’ hourly earnings, as a percent of full-time 
workers 
 
 The result shows that returns to per hour earnings for those who worked 50 
hours or more has increased dramatically over the years. Per hour earnings for 
overworkers are lower than those for full-time workers from 1979 to 1996, but after 
1996, overworkers earned higher per hourly earnings than full-time workers, by up to 
6 percent. In 1979, overworking men earned 86 percent, and overworking women 80 
percent of their full-time worker counterparts’ earnings; in 1989 overworking men and 
women earned 94 and 93 percent of their full-time worker counterparts, respectively. 
In 1999, for example, overworking men’s and women’s per hour earnings were greater 
by 3 percent and 1 percent, compared to men and women who worked full-time hours. 
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By 2008, this premium increased further, to 6 percent and 5 percent for men and 
women, respectively. 
We see overworkers’ per hour earnings are lower than those of full-time 
workers because the model uses hourly earnings for both salary workers and hourly 
workers, and this way tends to underestimate the returns to overwork for salary 
workers, whose earnings do not increase proportion to hours they work.25 Strikingly, 
however, despite the aspect of the model that penalizes salary workers’ estimated 
hourly rates, returns to overwork continue to increase and exceed those for full-time 
workers after mid-1990s. The result suggests that the price that the labor market pays 
for overwork has increased for both men and women.  
The wage premium for overwork does not appear to significantly differ by 
gender. However, the increased wage premium may negatively affect the gender 
earnings gap because there are more men than women who overwork all throughout 
the years (Figure 3.3). To assess this conjecture on the price effect of overwork, in the 
next section, I decompose changes in the gender gap into two parts: changes due to the 
composition effect and changes due to the price effect.  
 
JMP Decomposition of the Gender Earnings Gap 
Table 5.6 shows the decomposition of changes in the gender hourly earnings 
gap between 1979 and 2007. The decomposition results are based on regression 
models, in which the log of hourly earnings is regressed on work hour variables, 
workers’ age, age squared, race, education, potential years of work experience, 
potential experience squared, region, and sector.  
                                                
25 As the overwork norm becomes stronger, one may expect that the tendency in which workers over-
report their work hours may increase. If this is true, estimated wage premium from the observation data 
understates the “true” wage premium for overwork.    
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Table 5.6. Decomposition of changes in the gender hourly earnings Gap, 1979-2007 
Decomposition Components 1979-2007 
Change in Differential -0.213 
  
Observed Prices  
All b's 0.009 
Overwork 0.020 
Part-time 0.000 
Age variables 0.006 
Race variables 0.001 
Education variables -0.012 
 Experience variables -0.003 
Region variables 0.000 
Metropolitan residency 0.000 
Public sector -0.003 
  
Observed x’s  
All x's -0.049 
Overwork 0.002 
Part-time -0.015 
Age variables -0.058 
Race variables -0.005 
Education variables -0.008 
 Experience variables 0.031 
Region variables 0.001 
Metropolitan residency 0.002 
Public sector 0.001 
  
Unexplained Differential -0.173 
Unobserved Prices 0.025 
Unobserved Quantities -0.198 
N 290067 
Source: Current Population Survey, 1979, 2007 
Notes: See Table A2 for the regression results. 
 
The results show that the gender earnings gap decreased by .213 log points, or 
about 19 percent between 1979 and 2007. The results support the argument that the 
overwork phenomenon contributes to widening the gender earnings gap between 1979 
and 2007. While both the composition and price factor of overwork contribute to 
widening the gap, the price effect contributes more than the quantity effect.  
Specifically, the increased price for overwork widens the gender earnings gap 
by .020 log points, the size of which is equivalent to 9.4 percent of the total changes in 
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the gap. The changes in the gender gap in the proportion of overworkers also increase 
the gap between 1979 and 2007, but smaller in magnitude, by .002 log points, or 0.9 
percent of the total changes.  
Other observed characteristics, both composition and price factors, contribute 
to narrowing the gender earnings gap or widening the gap, but these effects are smaller 
than the price effect for overwork. This suggests that the normative effect of work 
hours, which reflects the norm of “ideal worker,” is indeed an important 
countervailing force that hinders progress toward gender equality. 
The narrowing of the gender gap in the proportion of part-time workers 
contributes to decreasing the gender gap in earnings. The observed gap effect for part-
time indicates that it decreases the gender gap by  .015 log points, or about 7 percent 
of the changes in total differential. The part-time wage penalty has no effect on 
changes in the gender gap in earnings.     
In addition, the decomposition results suggest that most changes are due to the 
improvement in women’s unobserved labor market qualifications, as shown in the 
unobserved quantity effect, indicating a decrease of the gender gap by .198 log points, 
or about 93 percent of the total decline. Also, changes in the gender gap in observed 
characteristics, including women’s upgraded human capital, contribute to decreasing 
the gender earnings gap by .049 log points, which is 23 percent of the total changes. In 
contrast, the results suggest that changes in price contribute to widening the gender 
earnings gap. The effect of observed price increases the gender gap slightly, by .009 
log points, or 4.2 percent of the total changes in the gap.  
Next, I examine whether the increasing norm of overwork explains why the 
rate of the narrowing of the gender gap slowed after mid-1990s, compared to earlier 
years. To this end, I compare two sets of decomposition analyses for two different 
time periods, from 1979 to 1994, in which we see much improvement in closing the  
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Table 5.7. Decomposition of changes in the gender hourly earnings gap, 1979-1994 
and 1994-2007 
Decomposition Components 1979-94 1994-2007 (1994-2007)-(1979-94) 
Change in Differential -0.178 -0.035 0.143 
    
Observed Prices    
All b's 0.010 0.009 -0.001 
Overwork 0.017 0.005 -0.012 
Part-time -0.001 0.001 0.002 
Age variables -0.001 0.007 0.008 
Race variables 0.000 0.001 0.001 
Education variables -0.001 -0.005 -0.004 
 Experience variables 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
Region variables -0.001 0.001 0.002 
Metropolitan residency 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Public sector -0.004 0.002 0.006 
    
Observed x’s    
All x's -0.031 -0.029 0.002 
Overwork 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Part-time -0.008 -0.007 0.001 
Age variables -0.043 -0.016 0.027 
Race variables -0.003 -0.001 0.002 
Education variables -0.003 -0.011 -0.008 
 Experience variables 0.025 0.006 -0.019 
Region variables 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
Metropolitan residency 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
Public sector 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Unexplained Differential -0.157 -0.016 0.141 
Unobserved Prices 0.021 0.008 -0.013 
Unobserved Quantities -0.177 -0.024 0.153 
N 287106 304091 440632   
Source: Current Population Survey, 1979, 1994, 2007 
Notes: See Table A2 for the regression results. 
 
gap, and in 1994 to 2007, from which the rate of closing stalled. Table 5.7 shows the 
decompositions of the changes in these two time periods. 
The results show that the closing of the gender earnings gap has slowed over 
the two time periods. Table 5.7 shows that the gender gap in hourly earnings narrowed 
by .178 log points, or a 16 percent decrease between 1979 and 1994; the gap narrowed 
 98 
only by .035 log points, or a 3 percent decrease, between 1994 and 2007 (also see 
Figure 4.1). 
Consistent with results in Table 5.6, the price factor of overwork contributes to 
widening the gender gap in both earlier and later periods, but to a greater extent in 
earlier years than in later years. In 1979 to 1994, price for overwork serves to increase 
the gender gap in hourly earnings by .017 log points, the magnitude of which is about 
9.6 percent of the total changes. The absolute value of the price effect for overwork in 
the later period is smaller than that of the earlier period: between 1994 and 2007, the 
price for overwork contributes to increasing the gender gap in earnings by .005 log 
points. As shown in the last column in Table 5.7, the extent to which increased price 
for overwork widens the gender gap is greater by .012 log points in the earlier period 
than in the later period.  
This suggests that the price effect of overwork widens the gender gap more in 
earlier years than later years, and so the price effect of overwork does not explain why 
the pace of closing the gap is slower in later period than in earlier years. However, the 
increased price for overwork does play a crucial role in widening the gender earnings 
gap in later period as well. Note that the size of the effect relative to total changes is 
greater in later period than in earlier period (9.6 percent in earlier period, and 13.8 
percent in later period).  
Between 1979 and 1994, even though increased price for overwork affects the 
gender earnings gap unfavorably, we still see a greater improvement in closing the 
gender gap. This is because other factors, women’s improvement in other observed 
characteristics, such as work hours, education, and demographic characteristics, cancel 
out the effect of increased price for overwork.    
Changes in the gender gap in overwork rarely affect changes in the gender gap 
in earnings in both time periods, as difference in the observed x effects for overwork 
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between the two time periods indicates no change. Other observed factors also do not 
contribute much to the slower rates of closing the gap in later period. The gender gap 
in qualifications in all observed characteristics explains the slowed pace by .002 log 
points, or 1.4 percent of the total difference.  
Then, what does explain the slower rate of closing the gap after the mid-
1990s? The results indicate that what drives the pattern is the unobserved quantity 
effect. The difference in unobserved quantity effect between earlier and later years 
is .153 log points, which is more than the actual change (.143 log points). This finding 
is similar to that of Blau and Kahn (2006), who applies the JMP decomposition 
technique to two time periods, 1980s and 1990s. The possible source of the 
unobserved quantity effect may be due to the following factors (also see, Blau and 
Kahn 2006).  
First, women’s unobserved labor market characteristics may have improved at 
a faster rate in earlier than in later period. In my analysis, changes in occupational sex 
segregation are not considered in the model, but may have important influence in 
changes in the gender gap. Given that prior research suggests that the desegregation 
rates have also slowed in recent years (e.g., Charles and Grusky 2004; Weeden 2004), 
I expect that a significant portion of the variance may be explained by the segregation 
effect.  
Second, the extent to which women face labor market discrimination may have 
decreased at a faster rate in earlier than in later period. The selection into the labor 
force may also partly explain the unobserved quantity effect: women who contributed 
to increased labor force participation rates in earlier years may have had better 
qualifications than women who joined labor force in later years. Blau and Kahn (2006) 
conduct further analysis confirming that the selection partly, but not entirely, 
contributes to the unobserved quantity effect. 
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Lastly, I assess how using proxy measures for work experience and omitting 
job tenure variables affect the findings. As noted earlier, one drawback of using CPS 
is that it lacks the information of years of work experience. On the other hand, SIPP 
offers better measures for work experience and also provides a measure for years of 
job tenure, despite its limited availability (see footnote 23). Table A.5 shows the JMP 
decomposition results, using SIPP data in 1996 and 2004, which is roughly 
comparable to the decomposition results for 1994-2007 in Table 5.7.26 The results 
indicate a similar effect of overwork, but suggest that using potential work experience 
leads to biased estimates of the effect of work experience. The price effect for 
overwork contributes to widening the gender earnings gap by .005 points, 20 percent 
of the total change, while the quantity effect for overwork does not have any impact. 
Note that the price effect for overwork using CPS for 1994-2007 was .005 log points 
and 14 percent of the total change. The effects for work experience are different from 
the previous results. Unlike the results using CPS in Table 5.7, the quantity effect for 
work experience is negative, suggesting that women’s improvement in work 
experience contributed to narrowing the gender earnings gap between 1996 and 2004. 
Furthermore, the price effect for work experience is also different: the results using 
SIPP suggest that an increased wage premium for work experience in fact widens the 
gender earnings gap, unlike the results from the CPS data. Although not strictly 
comparable due to the shift of the study period in the analysis samples, this disparity 
of the work experience effects in two datasets suggests that the potential work 
experience variable of CPS does not estimate accurately either compositional and 
price effect of work experience. In addition, job tenure is an important factor in 
                                                
26 Another difference of models using SIPP, as compared to earlier ones, is that they use an indicator of 
whether employees are a member of a union, which is an important determinant of earnings. 
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narrowing the gender earnings gap substantially through both price and quantity 
effects.  
In summary, the results of the JMP decomposition suggest that the increased 
price for overwork contributes to widening the gender earnings gap throughout the 
years. This confirms that overwork is an important factor that increases gender 
inequality. However, the results do not explain why we see that the closing of the gap 
has slowed in more recent years, suggesting that the changes are mostly explained by 
the fact that women’s unobserved labor market qualifications improved at faster rate 
in earlier period. Future research should explore the sources of “slowing 
convergence.” 
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CHAPTER 6 
SPOUSAL OVERWORK AND MEN’S AND WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT  
 
 So far, I have shown that overwork affect women’s careers by affecting their 
job mobility and earnings. In this chapter, I more actively engage the role of the family 
by investigating how spousal overwork negatively affects women’s careers. 
Specifically, I show that having a husband who works long hours significantly 
increases women’s likelihood of quitting, while having a wife who works long hours 
does not appear to increase men’s odds of quitting. This way, I show that the influence 
of overwork is not limited to women who are themselves in a workplace that expects 
long work hours, but can affect women in all occupations and classes through their 
husbands’ overwork.  
I also examine whether the gendered pattern is more prominent among workers 
in professional and managerial occupations, in which the norm of overwork and the 
intensive parenting culture is the strongest. Consistent with the previous chapter, I also 
emphasize the motherhood penalty and examine whether the spousal overwork effect 
is magnified among parents. The empirical findings show men and women respond 
differently to their spouses’ overwork, and support my broader argument, overwork 
reintroduces “separate spheres,” consisting breadwinning men and homemaking 
women, to many formerly dual-earner households. 
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
Sample 
I use the 1996 panel of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), 
a longitudinal household survey dataset collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. The 
1996 panel covers the years 1995 through 2000. Overwork has recently become more 
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common, and the late-1990s’ labor market indicators show favorable economic 
conditions (Hipple 1999); using data from this period helps avoid the influence of 
external factors associated with an economic downturn. 
The 1996 panel of the SIPP interviewed individuals every four months over a 
48-month period. As discussed in Chapter 4, I use data only from the fourth month to 
avoid “seam bias” (Weinberg 2003). 
The panel structure allows me to observe changes in men’s and women’s 
employment status. In addition, although the SIPP is an individual-level dataset, it 
provides variables that identify households and relations among household members. 
Using these identifiers, I reshaped the data into a person-spouse structure, which 
allows me to include variables of spousal characteristics in the model. I restrict the 
sample to dual-earner married couples because the question of interest deals with 
employment decisions in response to spousal overwork status. I also restrict the 
sample to individuals who were in the labor force at the first time point and were in 
economically active ages (18 to 64 years). The final sample includes 150,205 
observations (person-months) from 23,593 respondents. Among them, 49,139 
observations (8,484 persons) are for professional workers; 101,066 observations 
(17,648 persons) are for nonprofessional workers.  
 
Dependent Variables 
Quitting. The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that measures 
whether an individual’s employment status changed from working to not working. To 
estimate the likelihood of quitting in response to spousal overwork, I allow a time lag 
between one’s quitting and the independent variables. I applied a four-month time lag 
because employment data are available once every four months. I exclude workers 
who quit for job displacement, illness, and disability to prevent the possibility that 
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employment decisions were driven by non-voluntary, external factors. I also exclude 
individuals who reported their reason for not working as “not interested in working” to 
ensure that the relationship is not driven by workers with low work commitment.27 All 
other voluntary quitters, including those who quit for schooling, retirement, or job-
related, personal, or familial reasons are considered quitters. I include schooling and 
retirement because more women than men may leave jobs and go to school or retire 
early in response to conflict between work and family.28   
 
Independent Variables 
Spousal overwork. The independent variable of theoretical interest is a set of 
categorical variables that measures weekly work hours of a respondent’s spouse.  The 
measures do not consider hours that spouses spend outside of their workplace. The 
model includes two dummy variables that indicate whether the work hours of a 
respondent’s spouse in their main jobs are (1) 50 hours or more but less than 60 hours 
per week (“50 hours or more”) or (2) 60 hours or more per week (“60 hours or 
more”).29 The baseline category is “spouse works less than 50 hours per week.”30 I use 
categorical variables because the effect of spousal work hours on women’s 
employment may increase in a nonlinear fashion. Although a continuous measure for 
                                                
27 Including these quitters in the baseline category does not change the findings. 
28 Supplementary analysis of a more restricted age group (25 to 49 years), which is less likely to be 
affected by schooling in early years or retirement in later years, confirms the same findings. The gender 
gap in quit rates is slightly larger among these workers than is shown in Table 6.1 (2.26 versus 2.09 
percent). 
29 Of all workers in the sample, 90 percent reported that their main job is their only job. Although SIPP 
offers the work hours variable from the second job (where relevant), I use work hours only from the 
main job because a close examination of the data suggests that respondents frequently reported the same 
values for the first and the second job. Nonetheless, considering the hours in a second job does not 
change the findings. 
30 Separating part-time hours (“less than 35 hours”) from the baseline category does not change the 
findings. Because interpretation of the effect of overwork is more straightforward in the current 
specification, I do not further disaggregate the baseline category. 
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spousal work hours could be used with its quadratic term to capture the nonlinearity, 
this would make interpreting the results less intuitive (see footnote 32). 
Using categorical variables to measure spousal overwork has advantages, but it 
may leave the possibility that the observed gendered effects are influenced by a gender 
difference in average work hours within categories. That is, although men and women 
are in the same overwork category (“50 hours or more” or “60 hours or more”), men 
may work longer hours than women in the same category. The data indicate small 
gender differences in average work hours within categories. Men’s average work 
hours are greater than those of women by .2 hours in the “50 hours or more” category 
and .4 hours in the “60 hours or more” category. Although the differences are small, 
one could argue that women are more responsive to their husbands’ overwork because 
of these differences. Employing multiple categories allows me to assess this 
possibility. For the “50 hours or more” category, the average work hours is less than 
the average work hours for the “60 hours or more” category. So, if we find the effect 
for men in the latter but not the former category, we could suspect that the effects are 
driven by gender differences of work hours within the category. The results, however, 
do not support this alternative explanation. 
Have children. I use a dummy variable that indicates whether respondents have 
children under age 18 to determine whether spousal overwork has a greater effect for 
workers who have children. This can be tested by the interaction effect between 
spousal overwork and children. I consider only respondents’ own children under age 
18 who are living with them to estimate the immediate effect of childcare 
responsibility.  
I include other variables shown to affect the relationship between spousal 
overwork and employment decisions. I include workers’ age and its squared term to 
capture the nonlinear effect of age on employment: while younger workers are more 
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likely than older workers to quit their jobs, older workers tend to quit more as they 
move closer to retirement age. I measure race by the three indicator variables that 
identify respondents’ race as Black, Hispanic, and other races; Whites are the 
reference category.  
I also include variables that measure workers’ skill accumulation because 
research shows that one is less likely to quit a job if the degree of job investment is 
high (Bielby and Bielby 1992). I use schooling and job experience to measure 
workers’ skills. Five categorical measures for educational attainment (“less than high 
school,” “high school graduate,” “some college,” “college graduate,” and “advanced 
degree”) capture its nonlinear effect. I use years of experience and its squared term to 
measure job-specific skills. I include earnings of respondents and their spouses 
because the decision on employment change may be sensitive to both husbands’ and 
wives’ earnings. I use hourly earnings with an inflation adjustment to 2000 dollars 
adjusted by the Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator (Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 2005). Because respondents’ work hours may reflect their labor market 
attachment and the time pressure they experience, I employ a series of dummy 
variables that indicate the number of hours respondents usually worked per week 
(“less than 35 hours,” “35 hours to 50 hours,” “50 hours to 60 hours,” and “60 hours 
or more”).31    
To reflect the range of flexibility in different occupations’ work arrangements, 
I use four dummy variables for occupations based on the one-digit-level 1990 census 
                                                
31 An alternative way of examining the effect of overwork might consider couples’ joint work hours. 
However, this cannot estimate the effect of spousal overwork net of one’s own work hours, nor can it 
identify gender differences in these effects. Furthermore, prior research suggests that in response to 
conflict between work and family, women often go part-time before eventually quitting, which cannot 
be captured by aggregated work hours. Alternatively, one could model the interaction effects between 
one’s own (3 categorical variables) and spousal work hours (2 categorical variables), but this generates 
too many interaction terms, which not only make the interpretation difficult but also decrease the 
accuracy of the results due to small degrees of freedom in each sub-category. 
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occupational codes (see the list in Table 6.1). The “managerial and professional 
specialty” category serves as the reference category. Similarly, because jobs in some 
industries are less stable than others (e.g., service industry jobs have more turnover 
than jobs in professional industries), I include 11 industry dummy variables based on 
the 1990 one-digit census industry codes. The “professional and related services” 
category serves as the baseline.  
In some models, I include other spousal job characteristics in addition to 
earnings, because economic theory suggests that spousal human capital variables can 
affect respondents’ employment decisions (Becker 1985). For example, respondents’ 
employment decisions may be affected when spouses’ jobs bring in more of the family 
income, or when spouses’ human capital investment in their jobs is greater than 
respondents’ investments (e.g., jobs that require more years of educations or more job-
specific skills). To adjust for these effects, some models include variables that 
measure spouses’ education, years of work experience, years of job tenure, occupation, 
and industry. I use the same coding as those used for corresponding respondents’ 
characteristics. 
 
METHOD 
I use logistic regression models to estimate the effect of spousal overwork on 
the log odds of men’s and women’s quitting work net of adjustment factors. Because 
the data include multiple records per individual as a result of the panel structure, I 
introduce a random intercept term to address the dependence among observations 
within the same individuals. The models take the following general form:  
! 
log
pij
1" pij
=  xijβ + αi + εit ,     (1) 
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where pij is the probability of quitting by the next time point (four months later), xij is 
a row vector of variables for individual i at time j, and β is a column vector of 
regression coefficients. Residuals are composed of two parts: αi represents random 
intercepts for persons, assumed to be uncorrelated with xij and normally distributed 
with a mean of zero and constant variance; εij is a random disturbance term. 
 I estimated the models presented here in STATA 10 using the xtlogit 
procedure, which employs an adaptive Gauss-Hermite quadrature to calculate the 
parameters. This procedure works particularly well for models with binary outcomes 
and small-to-moderate clusters (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles 2002). 
Estimating models using this procedure is appropriate for the data used in this study 
because the number of observations for each person is relatively small (maximum 
cluster size is 11; average cluster size is 8.6).  I estimate the effects separately by 
gender. 
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Results 
Table 6.1 shows means and standard deviations of variables used for this study 
by workers’ professional status. First, we see that more women than men quit their 
jobs. Among professional workers, 0.7 percent of men quit their jobs, compared with 
2 percent of women. Because quit rates here are based on job quitting only for selected 
reasons, the rates are lower than those for all job quitters. The percent of respondents 
who reported quitting jobs is higher among nonprofessional workers for both men and 
women (0.9 percent of men and 3 percent of women). In both samples, quit rates are 
higher for women than for men, which suggests that women’s labor force status is 
more changeable.  
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Table 6.1. Means and standard deviations for the variables used in the analysis by 
professional status and gender  
Variables Professional  Non-Professional  
 Men Women Men Women 
Quitting (%, after 4 month) 0.70  1.95  0.94  3.41 
Spouse’s usual work hours per week (%):      
< 50 hours 88.15 70.61 93.56 77.67 
≥ 50 hours <60 hours  8.53 19.04  4.77 14.63 
≥ 60 hours  3.32 10.36  1.66  7.70 
Have children  0.55  0.56  0.58  0.58 
Age 42.50 
(9.52) 
39.98 
  (9.19) 
40.88 
(10.05) 
38.92 
  (9.75) 
Race:      
White  0.88  0.86  0.77  0.76 
Black  0.05  0.06  0.10  0.08 
Hispanic  0.03  0.04  0.10  0.11 
Other race  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.05 
Education:     
Less than high school  0.01  0.01  0.12  0.11 
High school graduate  0.10  0.13  0.39  0.40 
Some college  0.22  0.26  0.35  0.37 
College graduate  0.37  0.38  0.11  0.11 
Advanced degree  0.30  0.22  0.02  0.01 
Years of work experience 22.12 
(10.06) 
17.44 
 (8.84) 
21.69 
(10.50) 
15.97 
 (9.48) 
Years of job tenure 10.12 
  (9.00) 
 8.01 
 (7.42) 
 8.81 
 (8.66) 
 6.15 
 (6.64) 
Usual work hours per week:      
 <35 hours (part-time)  0.17  0.33  0.16  0.40 
≥ 35 hours < 50 hours     
≥ 50 hours <60 hours  0.23  0.11  0.13  0.03 
≥ 60 hours  0.13  0.04  0.07  0.01 
Hourly earnings (in 2000 $U.S.) 24.18 
(22.09) 
17.55 
(13.87) 
15.20 
(14.70) 
10.86 
(10.09) 
Spousal hourly earnings (in 2000 $U.S.) 16.20 
(13.81) 
21.24 
(21.58) 
11.94 
(10.89) 
16.03 
(15.10) 
Occupation:     
Technical, sales, and administrative support     0.28  0.62 
Service     0.12  0.21 
Farming, forestry, and fishing     0.04  0.01 
Precision production, craft, and repair     0.28  0.03 
Operators, fabricators, and laborers    0.29  0.12 
Industry:      
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries  0.01 0.00  0.03  0.02 
Mining, construction  0.04 0.01  0.12  0.01 
Manufacturing  0.19 0.07  0.27  0.16 
Transportation, communication, and other 
public utilities 
 0.07 0.03  0.12  0.05 
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Table 6.1 (Continued) 
Wholesale trade  0.03  0.01  0.08  0.03 
Retail trade  0.05  0.05  0.12  0.19 
Finance, insurance, and real estate  0.06  0.07  0.04  0.09 
Business and repair services  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.04 
Personal services  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.05 
Entertainment and recreation services  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Professional and related services  0.35  0.61  0.07  0.30 
Public administration  0.11  0.07  0.08  0.05 
Spousal education:     
Less than high school  0.01  0.03  0.10  0.12 
High school graduate  0.16  0.19  0.37  0.36 
Some college  0.30  0.29  0.35  0.33 
College graduate  0.34  0.29  0.15  0.13 
Advanced degree  0.18  0.21  0.04  0.05 
Spousal years of work experience 17.27 
 (8.95) 
21.86 
(10.15) 
16.16 
 (9.42) 
21.74 
(10.48) 
Spousal years of job tenure  7.14 
 (7.01) 
 9.79 
 (8.89) 
 6.65 
 (6.97) 
 8.84 
 (8.68) 
Spousal occupation:     
Professional and managerial   0.55  0.47  0.27  0.21 
Technical, sales, and administrative support   0.34  0.20  0.42  0.19 
Service   0.07  0.06  0.16  0.09 
Farming, forestry, and fishing   0.00  0.02  0.01  0.03 
Precision production, craft, and repair   0.01  0.14  0.03  0.22 
Operators, fabricators, and laborers  0.02  0.12  0.10  0.25 
Spousal industry:      
Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries  0.01  0.02  0.01  0.03 
Mining, construction  0.01  0.08  0.01  0.11 
Manufacturing  0.08  0.21  0.15  0.26 
Transportation, communication, and other 
public utilities 
 0.04  0.09  0.04  0.11 
Wholesale trade  0.02  0.06  0.03  0.07 
Retail trade  0.10  0.08  0.16  0.11 
Finance, insurance, and real estate  0.08  0.06  0.09  0.04 
Business and repair services  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.06 
Personal services  0.02  0.01  0.04  0.02 
Entertainment and recreation services  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.01 
Professional and related services  0.52  0.23  0.37  0.10 
Public administration  0.06  0.10  0.05  0.08 
Number of observations 22,562 26,577 52,615 48,451 
Number of persons 3,946 4,538 9,015 8,633 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 (1995-2000) 
Note: Standard deviations are presented in parentheses where relevant.  
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Table 6.1 also reveals a clear gender difference in spousal overwork. Men tend 
to be represented more in the spousal overwork categories than do women. In 
particular, 12 percent of professional men’s wives work 50 hours or more per week, 
compared with 29 percent of professional women’s husbands. This suggests that 
women in professional occupations are less likely than their male counterparts to 
receive spousal support. The gender gap also exists for nonprofessional workers, 
although a smaller percentage of their spouses overwork than that of professional 
workers’ spouses. Specifically, 7 percent of wives and 23 percent of husbands of 
nonprofessional workers work 50 hours or more per week. 
 
The Effect of Spousal Overwork on Men’s and Women’s Employment for All 
Workers 
Models in Table 6.2 evaluates whether having a spouse who works long hours 
increases women’s likelihood of quitting but not men’s. Results support this 
hypothesis. First, Model 1 estimates the effect of spousal overwork on the log odds of 
quitting, net of one’s important demographic and job-related characteristics. Because 
neoclassical economic theory suggests that spousal income is an important factor in 
family-level economic decisions, I include spouse’s hourly earnings in the model. 
Results show that having a husband who works 60 hours or more per week 
significantly increases women’s odds of quitting by 42 percent (exp[.352] = 1.42). 
However, having a wife who works 60 hours or more per week does not significantly 
affect men’s log odds of quitting. This supports the argument that spousal long work 
hours contribute to the gender gap in employment status by increasing women’s, but 
not men’s odds of quitting. The effect of having a spouse who works 50 hours or more 
per week is not significant at the 5 percent level for either men or women. This 
suggests that the results support the argument developed earlier, showing the expected 
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Table 6.2. Random effects logistic regression models for the effects of spousal 
overwork on the log odds of quitting for all men and women  
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Men Women Men Women 
Spouse’s usual work hours per week 
(“less than 50 hours” is omitted):      
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.332  0.105  0.330  0.091 
 (0.172) (0.067) (0.175) (0.068) 
≥ 60 hours  0.145  0.352**  0.122  0.337** 
 (0.286) (0.080) (0.290) (0.081) 
Have children -0.076  0.540** -0.070  0.540** 
 (0.105) (0.063) (0.106) (0.063) 
Age -0.190** -0.142** -0.183** -0.129** 
 (0.046) (0.023) (0.047) (0.026) 
Age squared  0.003**  0.002**  0.003**  0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Race (“white” is omitted):      
Black  0.299  0.159  0.240  0.194 
 (0.156) (0.100) (0.157) (0.101) 
Hispanic  0.205  0.168  0.106  0.170 
 (0.165) (0.088) (0.171) (0.089) 
Other race  0.263  0.054  0.239 -0.006 
 (0.229) (0.129) (0.231) (0.129) 
Education (“less than high school” is 
omitted):     
High school graduate -0.181 -0.442** -0.115 -0.409** 
 (0.153) (0.093) (0.160) (0.097) 
Some college -0.220 -0.396** -0.122 -0.414** 
 (0.161) (0.097) (0.174) (0.103) 
College graduate -0.290 -0.500** -0.148 -0.675** 
 (0.195) (0.114) (0.214) (0.128) 
Advanced degree -0.499* -0.627** -0.452 -0.927** 
 (0.241) (0.155) (0.265) (0.169) 
Years of work experience -0.099** -0.080** -0.095** -0.077** 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) 
Years of work experience squared  0.002**  0.002**  0.002**  0.002** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Years of job tenure -0.055** -0.118** -0.058** -0.112** 
 (0.014) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
Years of job tenure squared  0.002**  0.003**  0.002**  0.003** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Usual hours worked per week (“≥35 
hours <50 hours” omitted):     
  <35 hours (Part-time)  0.515**  0.469**  0.505**  0.454** 
 (0.098) (0.052) (0.099) (0.052) 
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours -0.664** -0.126 -0.642** -0.139 
 (0.157) (0.128) (0.158) (0.128) 
≥ 60 hours -0.142  0.320 -0.132  0.316 
 (0.171) (0.172) (0.171) (0.172) 
Hourly earnings (in 2000 $U.S.)  0.000  0.002  0.001  0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Spousal hourly earnings (in 2000 
$U.S.) 
 0.003  0.004**  0.002  0.003** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) 
 113 
 Table 6.2 (Continued) 
Occupation a     
Industry a     
Other spousal job related variables b     
Constant -1.522 -0.735 -1.284 -1.002* 
 (0.801) (0.389) (0.839) (0.433) 
Log likelihood -3440.4 -9027.9 -3421.5 -8980.9 
! 
ˆ "  c 0.33 0.24 0.32 0.23 
Number of observations 75,177 75,028 75,177 75,028 
Number of persons 11,816 11,777 11,816 11,777 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 (1995-2000). 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
a   The coefficients of dummy variables for the industry and occupation are estimated in all models but 
are not shown here. Full results are available upon request. 
b The coefficients of the variables that measure spousal characteristics other than earnings are estimated 
in Model 2 but are not shown here. These characteristics include education, years of work experience, 
years of job tenure, occupations and industries. Full results are available upon request.  
c 
! 
ˆ "  (intra-class correlation) = 
! 
ˆ " 
( ˆ " + ˆ # )
, where 
! 
ˆ "  is the estimate of the variance of the random intercept 
of persons (αi), and 
! 
ˆ "  is the estimate of the variance of the random disturbance term (εij). Likelihood 
ratio tests of 
! 
ˆ " =0 for all 
! 
ˆ " s are significant at 0.001 level. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
gender difference in the spousal overwork effect when spouses work excessively long 
hours, namely, 60 hours or more. 
Next, Model 2 shows that this gendered pattern is consistently found even after 
additional adjusting factors are introduced in the model. The models adjust for 
additional spousal characteristics such as educational attainment, years of work 
experience, years of job tenure, occupation, and industry. Even after this 
comprehensive range of factors is added, spousal overwork consistently remains 
significant. More specifically, women whose husbands work more than 60 hours per 
week are 40 percent more likely to quit in the next time point than women whose 
husbands work less than 50 hours per week, holding a wide range of factors constant. 
In contrast, wives’ overwork does not influence men’s odds of quitting significantly. 
This suggests that the overwork phenomenon is by no means a gender-neutral process; 
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rather, it is a gendered process that results in women’s exclusion from the labor 
market.32  
While the results reveal the gendered aspect of spousal overwork, which 
increases women’s odds of quitting, an alternative explanation is that wives’ quitting, 
or their anticipated quitting, leads to husbands’ long hours. Although the research 
design, which gives a time lag between spousal overwork and respondents’ quitting, 
helps ensure the causal direction of the effects, one could argue that men’s overwork is 
a result of women’s intention to quit, to which their husbands respond by increasing 
their work hours. Yet, previous studies using qualitative data provide strong evidence 
that husbands’ overwork is an important factor leading many women to quit (e.g., 
Bunting 2004; Hochschild and Machung [1989] 2003; Stone 2007).  
I also address this alternative explanation by conducting two supplementary 
analyses that assess the causal direction of the spousal overwork effects (analyses not 
shown). First, I included a variable that measures change in spousal work hours over 
the four months prior to the time point at which I measure spousal overwork, which is 
eight months prior to the time a respondent’s quitting is observed. I further checked 
with an eight-month lag variable, which stretches the covered period to a year, to 
ensure the robustness of the results. If husbands overwork because their wives intend 
to quit, one would expect that the wives of husbands who recently increased their 
work hours would be more likely to quit than the wives of husbands with constant or 
declining work hours. This measure cannot capture the effect driven by longer-term 
plans (e.g., a couple decided a wife would quit work more than a year in advance, so 
                                                
32 Using the measure of continuous hours with its squared term leads to the substantively same 
conclusion. For women, the odds of quitting decrease as the husband’s work hours increase until 
husbands’ weekly work hours reach 15, and increase afterwards with an increasing rate. For men, by 
contrast, neither the wife’s work hours nor its squared term is significant (p>.05).      
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the husband works increased hours for more than a year), but the analyses should 
cover the effect from decisions made during the one-year period.  
In the second analysis, I included a proxy measure of one’s labor market 
attachment, namely the difference between potential years of work experience (age – 
schooling – 6) and actual years of work experience. I then allow this labor market 
attachment variable to interact with the spousal overwork variables. I assume that 
workers with lower labor market attachment have greater differences between 
potential and actual years of work experience. If women with lower attachment 
encouraged their husbands to increase work hours so that they could leave the labor 
force, and this reverse causal pathway drives the effects entirely, then we should see 
these interaction terms negative and no longer see the positive effects of spousal 
overwork for women once the interaction terms are taken into account.  
Neither of these analyses, however, changes the main conclusion of this 
chapter. The spousal overwork effect remains strong in the first analysis. In the second 
analysis, the added interaction terms are not significant at the 5 percent level for both 
men and women, and the main effect of “60 hours or more” for women remains 
significant (p < .01) . Although the results do not completely discount the reverse 
causal path argument, given the data unavailability for a direct measure of workers’ 
intentions, they provide more convincing evidence that husbands’ overwork results in 
wives’ increased quitting, rather than the other way around. 
 
The Effect of Spousal Overwork on Men’s and Women’s Employment for 
Professional Workers  
Having shown that the average effect of spousal overwork significantly 
increases women’s odds of quitting but not men’s, I now turn to analyses of  
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Table 6.3. Random effects logistic regression models for the effects of spousal 
overwork on the log odds of quitting for professional workers 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Men Women Men Women 
Spouse’s usual work hours per week 
(less than 50 hours is omitted):      
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours -0.182  0.134 -0.359 -0.336 
 (0.326) (0.126) (0.408) (0.233) 
≥ 60 hours -0.061  0.410** -0.012 -0.425 
 (0.473) (0.147) (0.532) (0.309) 
Have children -0.233  0.699** -0.266  0.428** 
 (0.202) (0.129) (0.209) (0.145) 
×  (≥ 50 < 60 hours)    0.548  0.704* 
   (0.668) (0.277) 
×  (≥ 60 hours)    -0.235  1.176** 
   (1.146) (0.351) 
Other variables a     
Log likelihood -841.0 -2400.2 -840.7 -2392.0 
! 
ˆ "  b 0.07 0.28 0.07 0.29 
Number of observations 22,562 26,577 22,562 26,577 
Number of persons 3,946 4,538 3,946 4,538 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 (1995-2000). 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
a Age, race, education, work experience, job tenure, work hours, earnings, and industry (equivalent to 
Model 1). Full results are available upon request. 
b 
! 
ˆ "  (intra-class correlation) = 
! 
ˆ " 
( ˆ " + ˆ # )
, where 
! 
ˆ "  is the estimate of the variance of the random intercept 
of persons (αi), and 
! 
ˆ "  is the estimate of the variance of the random disturbance term (εij). Likelihood 
ratio tests of 
! 
ˆ " =0 for all 
! 
ˆ " s are significant at 0.001 level only in models for women. The use of logistic 
regression without applying random intercept to models for men does not substantively change the 
results. 
 * p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
professional workers to investigate moderating effects of workers’ professional and 
parental status (Table 6.3).  
Model 3 in Table 6.3 shows the effect of having an overworking spouse on the 
log odds of quitting, adjusting for factors known to affect employment decisions, such 
as respondents’ human capital, demographic factors, and spousal earnings (equivalent 
to Model 1).33 Results suggest that having a spouse who works long hours 
                                                
33 I do not adjust for additional spousal characteristics here, because only a small number of 
professional men have overworking wives, and including an excess number of variables makes 
estimates for some variables unstable. Nonetheless, using additional controls does not change the results 
for professional women. 
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significantly increases also professional women’s odds of quitting, but it does not 
increase professional men’s odds. The odds of quitting increase by 51 percent by the 
next time point for professional women whose husbands work 60 hours or more per 
week. By contrast, for professional men, the effects are negative and not significant.  
Model 4 examines whether having children increases the effect of spousal 
overwork on the odds of quitting for professional men and women.34 As expected, 
results confirm that having children significantly increases professional women’s, but 
not professional men’s, odds of quitting, in response to their spousal overwork. The 
interaction effects between having children and both spousal overwork variables are 
positive and significant for professional women, whereas neither of the interaction 
terms is significant for professional men. Specifically, professional mothers’ odds of 
quitting increase by 2 times when their husbands work 50 hours or more, and 3.2 times 
when their husbands work 60 hours or more, as compared to their childless 
counterparts. With main effects and interaction terms considered together, for 
professional mothers whose husbands work 50 hours or more per week, the odds of 
quitting are greater by 44 percent (exp[–.336 + .704] = 1.44), compared with 
professional mothers whose husbands work less than 50 hours per week. This effect is 
strikingly greater for professional mothers whose husbands work 60 hours or more per 
week: their odds of quitting are 112 percent greater than those of professional mothers 
whose husbands work less than 50 hours per week.  
With the addition of the interaction variables, main effects of spousal overwork 
for women become negative and nonsignificant, suggesting that spousal overwork 
does not significantly increase the odds of quitting for childless professional women. 
This suggests that women’s caregiving responsibility is the key factor that increases 
professional women’s odds of quitting in response to their husbands’ overwork. By 
                                                
34 The child effect is consistently found for both overwork variables in analysis including all workers 
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contrast, as expected, having children does not significantly affect professional men’s 
odds of quitting.    
Figure 6.1 illustrates this relationship. The Y-axis represents the predicted 
probability (presented as a percent) of quitting of a hypothetical man and woman who 
have the average characteristics on all covariates (see Table 6.1). The far-left group 
indicates quit rates of the reference group (less than 50 hours per week), and the next 
two groups indicate quit rates of workers whose spouses work 50 hours or more, or 60 
hours or more per week, respectively. Panel A depicts the relationship for professional 
workers without children, and Panel B shows the relationship for professional workers 
with children.  
The two panels show that spousal overwork does not affect professional men’s 
quitting. Professional men’s quit rates are close to zero in both panels and do not vary 
by their wives’ overwork. Panel A also shows no systematic relationship for childless 
professional women. By contrast, Panel B reveals that professional mothers’ quit rates 
systematically increase as their husbands’ work hours increase. In particular, quit rates 
of professional mothers whose husbands work less than 50 hours per week are .65 
percent, and they increase to .94 percent when husbands work 50 hours or more. Quit 
rates further increase to 1.37 percent when husbands work 60 hours or more per week. 
This is 110 percent higher than the quit rate of professional mothers with non-
overworking husbands. The panels effectively illustrate that caregiving responsibilities 
drive the gendered effect of spousal overwork. The effects may seem small when 
presented in predicted probabilities, because quitting is a rare event. Although rare, 
quitting has a dramatic impact on one’s economic and social life (Stone 2007), and the 
findings show that spousal overwork is an important determinant of mothers’ quitting. 
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(a) Professional workers without children 
 
(b) Professional workers with children 
 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation (1995-2000). 
Note: Estimates are derived from Model 4 in Table 6.3 (N=49,139). All other variables are set 
to their mean values 
 
Figure 6.1. The predicted probability (×100) of quitting of professional workers 
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The Effect of Spousal Overwork on Men’s and Women’s Employment for Non-
Professional Workers 
Finally, I examine the effects of spousal overwork for nonprofessional workers 
(Table 6.4). Consistent with previous results, nonprofessional women’s odds of 
quitting increase when their husbands overwork. The gendered pattern is less 
prominent, however, for nonprofessional workers than for professional workers, as 
expected.  
Model 5 in Table 6.4 shows that having a husband who works 60 hours or 
more per week increases nonprofessional women’s odds of quitting by 38 percent. 
Consistent with the prediction, the corresponding coefficients indicate that 
nonprofessional women’s odds seem lower than those of professional women (see 
Table 6.3 for comparisons), but this difference is not statistically significant when 
tested using interaction effects of spousal overwork and professional status from the 
pooled model. 
Results for nonprofessional men, however, sharply contrast with those for 
professional men. Unlike professional men, having wives who work 50 hours or more 
per week significantly increases nonprofessional men’s odds of quitting by 71 percent, 
although the effect is not detected for men whose wives work 60 hours or more. A test 
of the differences between professional and nonprofessional men using the interaction 
term from the pooled model indicates marginal significance for the “50 hours or more” 
variable (p < .10). This suggests that nonprofessional men’s odds of quitting are 
greater than those of professional men, which supports the prediction that the gendered 
pattern of spousal overwork is weaker among nonprofessional workers. The difference 
between professional and nonprofessional men is consistent with prior research that 
suggests prioritizing husbands’ careers is less common when men hold 
nonprofessional occupations (Pyke 1996).  
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Table 6.4. Random effects logistic regression models for the effects of spousal 
overwork on the log odds of quitting for non-professional workers  
 Model 5 Model 6 
 Men Women Men Women 
Spouse’s usual work hours per week 
(less than 50 hours is omitted):      
≥ 50 hours < 60 hours  0.538**  0.095  0.648** -0.197 
 (0.199) (0.080) (0.248) (0.152) 
≥ 60 hours  0.211  0.324**  0.435  0.038 
 (0.351) (0.097) (0.404) (0.185) 
Have children -0.043  0.486** -0.011  0.386** 
 (0.121) (0.074) (0.125) (0.081) 
×  (≥ 50 < 60 hours)    -0.287  0.413* 
   (0.412) (0.178) 
×  (≥ 60 hours)    -0.772  0.405 
   (0.839) (0.216) 
Other variables a      
Log likelihood  -2587.5 -6612.3 -2586.8 -6608.3 
! 
ˆ "  b 0.33 0.25 0.33 0.25 
Number of observations 52,615 48,451 52,615 48,451 
Number of persons 9,015 8,633 9,015 8,633 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 (1995-2000). 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
a Age, race, education, work experience, job tenure, work hours, earnings, and industry (equivalent to 
Model 1). Full results are available upon request. 
b 
! 
ˆ "  (intra-class correlation) = 
! 
ˆ " 
( ˆ " + ˆ # )
, where 
! 
ˆ "  is the estimate of the variance of the random intercept 
of persons (αi), and 
! 
ˆ "  is the estimate of the variance of the random disturbance term (εij). Likelihood 
ratio tests of 
! 
ˆ " =0 for all 
! 
ˆ " s are significant at 0.05 level. 
* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
Further investigation reveals an important difference between nonprofessional 
men and women. Whereas mothers drive most of the spousal overwork effect for 
nonprofessional women, childless men drive the positive effect of spousal overwork 
for nonprofessional men. When the “overwork × have children” interaction terms are 
added to the model (Model 6), the main effect of having wives who work 50 hours or 
more becomes even greater, which suggests that the odds of childless nonprofessional 
men quitting increase further, by 91 percent. However, the interaction terms of the 
spousal overwork variables and having children are negative and remain 
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nonsignificant, which suggests that being a father does not affect the spousal overwork 
effect for nonprofessional men.  
By contrast, having children magnifies the spousal overwork effect for 
nonprofessional women. The odds of quitting increase significantly, by 51 percent 
(exp[.413] = 1.51) for nonprofessional mothers whose husbands work 50 hours or 
more, compared to their non-mother counterparts. With main effects and the 
interaction terms considered together, nonprofessional mothers’ odds of quitting 
increase significantly, by 24 percent (exp[-.197+.413] = 1.24), when their husbands 
work 50 hours or more per week, compared to when their husband work less than 50 
hours; childless nonprofessional women are not affected by their husbands’ overwork, 
as the nonsignificance of the main effect of “50 hours or more” suggests. Similarly, 
nonprofessional mothers’ odds of quitting increase by 56 percent when their husbands 
work 60 hours or more per week (p < .10). Their childless counterparts’ odds do not 
increase significantly.  
Although professional status does not significantly differentiate the spousal 
overwork effect among childless women, the odds of quitting are lower for 
nonprofessional mothers than for professional mothers: the interaction “60 hours or 
more” and “having children” is significantly greater for professional than for 
nonprofessional women (p < .05). This suggests that having children increases the 
odds of quitting significantly more for professional than for nonprofessional women.35  
This relationship is illustrated by the predicted probability of quitting in Figure 
6.2. Worker characteristics are all set to the average level for nonprofessional men and 
women (see Table 6.1). The calculation of the predicted probability is based on Model 
6 and presented as a percent. 
                                                
35 A formal test is conducted using the three-way interaction term (“professional × overwork × have 
children”) from the pooled dataset.  
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(a) Non-professional workers without children 
 
 
(b) Non-professional workers with children 
 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation (1995-2000). 
Note: Estimates are derived from Model 4 in Table 6.3 (N=49,139). All other variables are 
set to their mean values 
 
Figure 6.2. The predicted probability (×100) of quitting of non-professional workers 
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Nonprofessional workers have higher quit rates than do professional workers, 
but the nonprofessional workers’ gendered pattern is less prominent. Professional 
men’s quit rates are close to zero and do not show any association with their wives’ 
work hours (Figure 6.1), however, nonprofessional men’s quit rates are more 
substantial (Figure 6.2). Furthermore, quit rates are higher among nonprofessional 
men whose wives work 50 hours or more per week, compared with those whose wives 
work less than 50 hours. More specifically, quit rates are .18 percent for childless, 
nonprofessional men whose wives work less than 50 hours per week, and .35 percent 
for similar men whose wives work 50 hours or more. Panel B, however, indicates that 
this relationship is mitigated among nonprofessional men with children. 
Nonprofessional fathers’ quit rate is .18 percent when their wives work less than 50 
hours per week, and .26 percent when their wives work 50 hours or more per week. 
This suggests that fatherhood constrains the spousal overwork effect for 
nonprofessional men. Perhaps because of the strong normative pressure of 
breadwinning (Townsend 2002), nonprofessional men with children are less 
responsive to their wives’ overwork.  
This mitigating effect of fatherhood stands in contrast to nonprofessional 
women’s quit rates. While childless, nonprofessional women’s quit rates do not vary 
systematically by their husbands’ work hours (Figure 6.2A), those of nonprofessional 
mothers increase significantly in response to their husbands’ long work hours (Figure 
6.2B). Quit rates of nonprofessional mothers whose husbands work fewer than 50 
hours per week are 1.29 percent and 1.6 percent for mothers whose husbands work 50 
hours or more per week. Quit rates are even higher, 2 percent, for women whose 
husbands work 60 hours or more. This is a 55 percent higher quit rate that that of 
nonprofessional mothers with non-overworking husbands. Although substantial, the 
increase is smaller than the corresponding number for professional women (110 
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percent), which suggests that the spousal overwork effect is more dramatic for 
professional mothers than for nonprofessional mothers.  
In summary, results support the hypothesis that spousal overwork increases 
women’s likelihood of quitting but does not affect men’s employment status. As 
predicted, this gendered pattern is more prominent among professional workers. 
Professional men, in contrast to nonprofessional men, are not affected by their wives’ 
overwork. When differences in the overall effects between professional and 
nonprofessional men are tested, they are marginally significant, which suggests that 
professional status significantly lowers the odds of quitting for men. Furthermore, the 
results suggest that having children drives most of the effect of spousal overwork for 
women, but fatherhood status does not significantly affect men’s quitting. Also, 
having children significantly increases the odds of quitting to a greater extent for 
professional than for nonprofessional women when their husbands work long hours. 
Findings provide strong evidence that long work hours contribute to gender inequality, 
and caregiving responsibility is the key condition generating unequal outcomes of 
spousal overwork for men and women. 
The findings in this chapter show one important way in which overwork 
excludes women from the labor market. Although the norm of overwork may not be 
intentionally constructed to disadvantage women, the norm is built upon the 
breadwinning model and results in systematically unequal outcomes for many women 
who do not have as much spousal support as their male counterparts. This suggests 
that, because of gendered assumptions, overwork reintroduces the separate spheres 
arrangement into many formerly dual-earner households. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
Work hours have become an important topic in social science. Economists tend 
to explain work hours as a function of workers’ wages. In their approach, workers 
optimize work hours to maximize income while they maintain their maximum 
productivity (Altonji and Paxson 1986, 1988; Rebitzer and Taylor 1995). Sociologists 
tend to focus on how work hours are structurally as well as individually determined, 
emphasizing the normative aspects of work hours (Jacobs and Gerson 2004; Perlow 
2001; Schor 1993; Sharone 2004). More recently, studies of work hours have 
expanded, in particular, since the negative effects of increased work hours were first 
revealed (e.g., Schor 1993). This dissertation departs from these prior approaches by 
exploring the gendered aspects and consequences of overwork. Theoretically, this 
dissertation reveals the gendered conditions that the overwork norm is based upon and 
demonstrates the disparate impacts of the overwork norm on women’s labor market 
outcomes. Although seemingly gender-neutral, the findings of this dissertation suggest 
that overwork reproduces gender inequality.  
In Chapter 3, I show that overwork has been increasingly common among both 
men and women, especially among workers in professional and managerial 
occupations. Importantly, I found a great divide in “backstage support” (Hochschild 
and Machung 2003 [1989]) for men and women. Men are more likely to have wives 
who stay home or work part-time hours, while women rarely have stay-at-home 
husbands or husbands who work part-time hours. Instead, the husbands are more 
likely to work long hours. The gender divide of spousal support is exacerbated among 
overworkers. Overworking women show the highest rates, relative to other women, of 
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having husbands who work 50 hours or more per week, whereas overworking men 
show the highest rates of having stay-at-home wives.  
After establishing the gender difference in spousal support, in Chapters 4 to 6, 
I conduct three empirical analyses to show whether and how overwork increases 
gender inequality. Chapter 4 identifies the process through which occupational sex 
segregation is reinforced. The occupational-level analysis confirms that long work 
hours are associated with women’s lower representation in male-dominated 
occupations. Because overwork conflicts with societal expectations about childrearing, 
women, especially mothers are less likely to maintain careers in male-dominated fields 
where overwork is more strongly expected. The results first show the aggregate level 
pattern in which overwork is associated with women’s lower representation. The 
results then show the individual mobility process in which women in male-dominated 
occupations are more likely to move out of male-dominated occupations in response to 
overwork. The findings of this chapter provide strong evidence that overwork in male-
dominated occupations is an important factor that increases women’s exit rates from 
male-dominated occupations. 
In Chapter 5, I examine the earnings consequences of gender-typed 
occupational mobility driven by overwork shown in Chapter 4. The results show that 
women who left male-dominated occupations in response to long work hours 
experienced earnings loss after moving to more female-dominated occupations. In 
contrast, for men, moving to more female-dominated occupations as a result of 
overwork leads to either no change or a slight increase in earnings. This suggests that 
while overwork results in downward earnings mobility for women, men often 
experience a “glass escalator,” having relative advantages in female-dominated 
occupations, as opposed to “glass ceiling,” the term of which describes the 
disadvantages of women in male-dominated occupations (Williams 1989). In this 
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chapter, I also engage the important puzzle of why the trend of a narrowing gender 
earnings gap has slowed. I employ a wage decomposition method, which allows me to 
formally test whether the slowdown in the rate of the gender earnings gap is in part 
explained by the increased price for overwork. The results show that the increasing 
returns to overwork contributes to widening the gender gap in earnings over the years.  
In Chapter 6, I pay special attention to the role of family in showing the 
gendered effect of overwork by examining how spousal overwork affects men’s and 
women’s employment differently among dual-earner married couples. The findings 
from this chapter show that when the husband works long hours, the wife is more 
likely to quit, but wives’ long work hours do not affect men’s employment status. This 
suggests that, because of the gendered assumption of worker and workplace, the 
overwork phenomenon contributes to reintroducing the separate spheres arrangement 
to many formerly dual-earner households.  
Findings from Chapter 6 also reveal an interesting class-specific nature of this 
phenomenon. A gendered pattern of spousal overwork is more prominent among 
professional men and women: professional men do not respond to their wives’ 
overwork, but some childless non-professional men are more likely to quit when their 
wives work long hours. This suggests that the “stalled revolution” may be more 
prominent among professional couples. This differentiated effect between professional 
and non-professional workers may be attributed to a normative expectation or a 
broader cultural ideology about prioritizing professional men’s careers and a more 
intensive form of child-rearing in upper-middle class families (Lareau 2003; Pyke 
1996). Interestingly, however, the findings also suggest that the class-specific nature 
can be mitigated by a more powerful cultural ideal of “fatherhood.” Since the key 
component of American fatherhood consists of having a job (Townsend 2002), having 
 129 
children more strongly prevents both professional and non-professional men from 
quitting, even when their wives work long hours.  
The three analyses in this dissertation reveal that caregiving responsibilities are 
the primary factor that generates gendered consequences of overwork, and mothers are 
most likely to be disadvantaged under the overwork norm. Overwork increases 
mothers’ likelihood of exiting male-dominated occupations the most, and when this 
mobility occurs, mothers experience greatest earnings loss. Furthermore, husbands’ 
long work hours also increase mothers’ likelihood of quitting, but not men’s or 
childless women’s. Considering that 71 percent of women who have children under 
age 18 work in the labor market, making up 31 percent of the female labor force 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006), this striking gendered effect for mothers has 
important implications for gender inequality.  
Three analyses in this dissertation make an important contribution to the 
literature of gendered organizations, a concept theorized by Acker (1992) and widely 
utilized to explain women’s structural disadvantages in the labor market (e.g., Britton 
1997; Pierce 1995; Williams 1989). Drawing on this theoretical perspective, this study 
develops the argument that overwork is a workplace norm that is built upon gendered 
assumptions about worker and workplace. Because the norm assumes “ideal workers,” 
rather than real workers, it results in disproportionately disadvantageous career 
outcomes for women, who are less likely to fit into this notion of workers. This 
dissertation provides empirical evidence for this theoretical argument by showing that 
the overwork norm contributes to high attrition rates of women from male-dominated 
occupations, where long work hours are common; widens gender earnings inequality; 
and increases women’s quitting rates when their husbands work long hours.  
This dissertation also helps us to understand why women’s representation is 
especially lowest among most prestigious jobs. Although increasing numbers of 
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women are entering male-dominated occupations, such as science, technology, 
engineering, and math, the attrition rates of these women remain high (Committee on 
Maximizing the Potential of Women in Academic Science and Engineering 2006). 
The “leaking pipeline” of women in these fields may be due to a number of structural 
factors that hinder the career progress of women in these fields, such as workplace 
discrimination, lack of social support, and family obligations (Committee on 
Maximizing the Potential of Women in Academic Science and Engineering 2006; 
Long 2001; Xie and Shauman 2003). In keeping with this prior research, this study 
provides evidence of one mechanism through which the attrition occurs. The long 
work hours demanded by many of these occupations increase women’s attrition, and 
only a small proportion of women make it to the higher rank positions.  
While occupational sex segregation is viewed as a source of gender inequality, 
Reskin (1988) argue that the real cause of gender inequality is that men establish rules 
to preserve their advantage. In this sense, promoting occupational integration by 
individual women increasing their work hours, or creating an environment that 
facilitates women’s long hours of work would not be an ultimate solution to gender 
inequality. If overwork is a rule created in order to bar women from the top of the 
organizational hierarchy, once women work hours similar to men, men may create 
another rule that makes it difficult for women to reach the top positions. Similarly, as 
long as workplace and family remain gendered, different forms of workplace norms of 
practices continue to emerge and hinder women’s progress. Therefore, more 
fundamental solutions would be degendering the institutions and, further, eradicating 
gender hierarchy and gender beliefs that devalue women and their work.      
Importantly, overwork not only disadvantages women who work in the 
occupations that demand for long work hours, but also women whose husbands 
overwork. By highlighting the importance of spousal overwork, this study empirically 
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demonstrates how the overwork phenomenon contributes to the “stalled revolution” 
(Hochschild and Machung 2003 [1989]), in which progress toward a gender 
egalitarian society is hindered by men’s limited contributions to household work and 
childcare. 
This dissertation also has an important implication for work-family conflict at 
the policy-level. While work-family conflict is in fact a structural problem, resulting 
from the institutional and organizational arrangements built upon the separate spheres 
assumption, the workplace has not reorganized to better accommodate the 
contemporary workforce and families, and instead, work-family conflict is mostly 
expected to be resolved at the individual level (Moen and Yu 2000; Stone 2007; 
Williams 2000). However, when individuals are held accountable for finding the 
solution to work-family conflict, solutions are likely to be impacted by existing gender 
beliefs. Given that the family is gendered as well as the workplace, the decisions tend 
to be made in ways in which women’s career outcomes are negatively affected. The 
ultimate solution would be the degendering of the society, eliminating the deeply 
rooted gender beliefs embedded in social institutions in various forms. However, as 
short-term solutions, policies at the national level, such as flexible work policies, on-
cite childcare, extending leave policies, could help to change the labor market 
assumptions more realistically so that it accurately reflects conditions in which the 
contemporary workforce is situated. In addition, given the inertia of workplace that is 
resistant to changes, additional institutional pressures through employment 
discrimination lawsuits and/or activists’ movement should help to better implement 
these policies. 
While the results support the hypotheses and offer important implications, this 
dissertation has several limitations. First, while I have argued that the gendered 
assumption of the workplace, which applies the male-breadwinning model to all 
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workers, and a normative conception of gender prevailing in the family are the two 
key factors that drive the gendered outcomes of overwork, these two underlying 
mechanisms were not directly tested in this study. In this sense, one may argue that the 
high attrition rates of women in male-dominated occupations, or higher quitting rates 
of women in response to their husbands’ long work hours, is due to unadjusted 
unobserved characteristics such as work commitment. However, if women experience 
cognitive bias, discrimination, lack of social support, and sexual harassment more than 
their male counterparts (Jacobs 1989; Long 2001; Roth 2003; Williams 1989), those 
who are selected into male-dominated occupations, and thus are observed in my data, 
may in fact be more committed and competent than their male peers. This selection 
process implies that the models here may underestimate the overwork effect on gender 
inequality. 
One may still argue that the findings may be explained by women’s “choice.” 
For example, a recent popular discussion suggests that women may “opt-out” of the 
labor market in favor of their caregiving roles over their professional careers (e.g., 
Belkin 2003). Because the data do not provide direct measures of workers’ values, I 
cannot completely discount this alternative explanation. However, a large body of 
qualitative studies suggests that women’s choices are largely made under structural 
constraints. While women who hold traditional values do exist, prior studies suggests 
that a larger proportion of women leave the labor force because of the normative 
expectation surrounding caregiving responsibilities and their husbands’ limited 
contributions to childcare and housework (e.g., Bunting 2004, Crittenden 2002, 
Gerson 1986, Hochschild 1997, Hochschild & Machung 2003, Roth 2006, Stone 
2007). Given the findings from previous studies, I do not believe that the overwork 
effects found in this study are driven by women who support traditional values. 
Instead, the gendered effects of overwork observed in this study should be understood 
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as a consequence of gendered structures and practices of the workplace and the gender 
norm that constrains women’s career choice, rather than women’s own preferences 
resulting from their traditional values or lower work commitment. 
Similarly, while the cultural and normative expectations in the workplace and 
family consists of a key mechanism through which overwork leads to gendered 
outcomes shown in this dissertation, testing the effect of “culture” or “norms” is 
beyond the scope of this study. Future studies employing a cross-national or 
comparative framework could address this by investigating how the spousal effect 
differs in countries that have a different norm of “appropriate work hours,” or that 
show different levels of gender egalitarianism at the national level. Different 
institutional environments may mediate the overwork effect as well. The national level 
policy that regulates the legal work hours or the degree to which work-family policies 
are implemented may influence the extent to which overwork affects women’s careers.  
Finally, the findings are based upon workers’ main jobs, which may not 
accurately reflect the work life of workers who hold more than one job. Also, the 
findings in Chapter 6 are based on dual-earner married couples, may not capture the 
reality of unmarried couples or single parent families. Both characteristics are more 
common among lower-wage workers and racial minorities. Workers from these 
families are more likely to hold multiple jobs, have lower control over their work 
schedules, and have less access to work-family policies (England and Edin 2007; 
Presser 2005). This suggests that work-family conflict may be more intense for these 
families. How these structural constraints may impact the effects found in this study 
should be explored by future research.  
Over the past decade, we have seen signs of slowing progress toward gender 
equality: slow convergence in the gender wage gap, the leveling off of women’s labor 
market participation rates, and a slowdown in the rate of occupational desegregation 
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(Blau and Kahn 2006; Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006b; Catalyst 2006; Charles and 
Grusky 2004). The causes of this slowed progress can perhaps be found in new forms 
and new sources of gender inequality reestablished in contemporary institutions and 
organizations (Ridgeway 1997). This dissertation identifies a gendered process in 
which various forms of gender inequalities are reproduced in today’s labor market. 
Linking one important element of organizations, overwork, and gender inequality, this 
dissertation enhances our understanding of the social processes through which gender 
inequality is reproduced by the interactions between work and family. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Table A.1. Regression coefficients for the effect of average work hours on log odds 
of women’s occupational representation 
Variables Model A1 
Average hours worked   0.34* 
 (0.16) 
Average hours worked squared -0.01** 
 (0.00) 
Verbal  1.06* 
 (0.41) 
Finger dexterity  0.27 
 (0.20) 
Nurturance  0.10 
 (0.33) 
Strength  0.19 
 (0.24) 
Disamenities -2.61** 
 (0.31) 
Math -0.52 
 (0.29) 
Analytical  0.40 
 (0.34) 
Authority -0.24 
 (0.25) 
Technical -0.15 
 (0.22) 
Index of occupational specific skills -0.43* 
 (0.18) 
Percent of unionized workers -0.01 
 (0.01) 
Percent of government-sector workers  -0.00 
 (0.01) 
Percent of self-employed workers  -0.01 
 (0.02) 
Average years of work experience  -0.09** 
 (0.03) 
Average years of job tenure   0.07 
 (0.04) 
Median monthly earnings (2000 100 U.S. dollars) -0.05* 
 (0.02) 
Percent of non-whites  0.00 
 (0.01) 
Percent of married workers  0.01 
 (0.01) 
Percent of workers with children under 18  0.01 
 (0.01) 
Percent of college graduates  -0.01 
 (0.01) 
Percent of service industry jobs -0.01 
 (0.00) 
Constant -1.48** 
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Table A.1 (Continued) 
 (0.11) 
Number of observations 496 
R-squared  0.56 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation 1996 and 2001 (1995-2003); Integrated Public 
Use Microdata Series 1990; and O*NET 3.1. 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
+ p<.1 * p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
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Table A.2. Means and standard deviations for variables used for the estimation of 
returns to overwork 
Variable Men Women 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Hourly earnings (2008 US Dollars in pennies) 2115.68 1568.67 1605.83 1181.44 
Overwork 0.17  0.06  
Part-time 0.08  0.23  
Age 37.56 11.86 37.77 11.97 
Age squared 1551.17 941.57 1570.27 948.39 
Married 0.73  0.74  
Race:     
Black 0.10  0.13  
Hispanic 0.11  0.09  
Other race 0.04  0.04  
Education:     
Less than high school 0.34  0.35  
High school graduates 0.26  0.30  
Some college 0.17  0.18  
College graduates 0.09  0.08  
Potential experience 18.42 12.02 18.46 12.25 
Potential experience squared 483.69 522.56 490.59 522.68 
Region:     
Midwest 0.25  0.25  
South 0.34  0.35  
West 0.21  0.20  
Metropolitan residency 0.81  0.81  
Public 0.15  0.20  
N 2325190  2169770  
Source: Current Population Survey, 1979-2008
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Table A.3. Regression Analysis of Hourly Earnings  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 1979 1994 2007 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Overwork -0.148** -0.218** -0.002 -0.048**  0.046**  0.041** 
 (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010) 
Part-time -0.333** -0.218** -0.330** -0.219** -0.337** -0.212** 
 (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010) (0.006) 
Age  0.070**  0.059**  0.076** 0.108**  0.053**  0.085** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age2 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.001** -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Black -0.164** -0.048** -0.171** -0.085** -0.197** -0.078** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) 
Hispanic -0.149** -0.061** -0.150** -0.078** -0.145** -0.089** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
Other race -0.170** -0.062** -0.122** -0.046** -0.064** -0.054** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Less than high school  0.047**  0.049**  0.082**  0.051**  0.100**  0.062** 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) 
High school 
graduates 
 0.064**  0.102**  0.139**  0.130**  0.182**  0.151** 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.013) (0.015) 
Some college  0.163**  0.198**  0.324**  0.269**  0.442**  0.362** 
 (0.013) (0.015) (0.019) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) 
College graduates  0.168**  0.301**  0.404**  0.354**  0.554**  0.444** 
 (0.016) (0.020) (0.025) (0.032) (0.025) (0.029) 
Experience -0.016** -0.027** -0.019** -0.052** -0.008** -0.040** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Experience2 -0.000** -0.000** -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Midwest  0.056**  0.003 -0.045** -0.090** -0.034** -0.048** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
South  -0.026** -0.063** -0.085** -0.126** -0.043** -0.069** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
West  0.086**  0.052** -0.001 -0.004  0.043**  0.046** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Metropolitan  0.114**  0.119**  0.122**  0.148**  0.119**  0.132** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Public -0.058**  0.068**  0.023**  0.084** -0.003  0.029** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) 
Constant  5.872**  5.878**  5.470**  4.853**  5.891**  5.232** 
 (0.045) (0.053) (0.065) (0.085) (0.061) (0.072) 
R-squared  0.34  0.26  0.38  0.34  0.34  0.31 
Observations 76319 60222 76326 74239 77438 76088 
Source: Current Population Survey, 1979, 1994, 2007 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
* p<.05, ** p<.01 (two-tailed). 
 
 
 139 
Table A.4. Means and standard deviations for variables used for the decomposition 
analysis, Survey of Income and Program Participation 
Variable Men Women 
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Hourly earnings (2008 US Dollars), all 
years     
in 1996 2038.87 2043.19 1557.72 1734.65 
in 2004 2302.08 2498.00 1806.10 1843.96 
Overwork     
in 1996 0.24  0.10  
in 2004 0.22  0.10  
Part-time     
in 1996 0.11  0.27  
in 2004 0.10  0.24  
Age 39.14 12.27 39.52 12.41 
Black 0.10  0.13  
Hispanic 0.12  0.09  
Other race 0.05  0.05  
Less than high school 0.29  0.27  
High school graduates 0.33  0.37  
Some college 0.17  0.18  
College graduates 0.09  0.09  
Experience 20.91 12.38 18.63 11.42 
Experience mostly part-time 0.14  0.24  
Job tenure 7.83 8.57 6.89 7.59 
Public 0.15  0.20  
Union 0.18  0.15  
Midwest 0.25  0.25  
South 0.35  0.35  
West 0.22  0.20  
Metropolitan residency 0.78  0.77  
Missing on metropolitan residency  0.02  0.02  
N 40214  39679  
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996, 2004 
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Table A.5. Decomposition of changes in the gender hourly earnings gap, 1996-2004, 
survey of income and program participation 
Decomposition Components 1996-2004 
Change in Differential -0.025 
  
Observed Prices  
All b’s 0.019 
Overwork 0.005 
Part-time 0.006 
Age variables 0.003 
Race variables 0.000 
Education variables -0.001 
 Experience variables 0.008 
 Job tenure variables -0.001 
Region variables 0.000 
Metropolitan residency 0.000 
Public sector 0.000 
Union  0.000 
  
Observed x’s  
All x’s -0.032 
Overwork 0.000 
Part-time -0.003 
Age variables -0.001 
Race variables -0.002 
Education variables -0.011 
 Experience variables -0.006 
 Job tenure variables -0.007 
Region variables -0.002 
Metropolitan residency 0.000 
Public sector 0.001 
Union -0.003 
  
Unexplained Differential -0.012 
Unobserved Prices -0.002 
Unobserved Quantities -0.010 
N 79893 
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1996, 2004 
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